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Abstract 
Since the United States’ (US) invasion of Iraq in 2003 there has been an 
intensification of the battle between the rival ethnonationalisms for the control 
of Kirkuk. Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen are all trying to manoeuvre their ethnic 
group into positions of power in Kirkuk and as a result the governance has 
suffered. There has been little in the way of negotiations in order to reach a 
settlement on the issues that create conflict in Kirkuk. This thesis examines all 
the issues of conflict and proposes a resolution that deals with them all. The 
original contribution to the knowledge is the depth of the analysis, which has 
resulted in a thorough framework that includes all the details necessary to 
implement it and proposes methods that have not been put forward for Kirkuk 
before, such as: an international committee, the available cross border 
institutions, a multi-capital city, the creation of a new province, and making 
decisions in the council based on a weighted majority of 60% with 40% of two 
of the main three ethnic groups being in favour. Prior to this thesis, analyses 
on Kirkuk have been brief, have not addressed all the issues of conflict, and 
have only given general ideas without following through on them. Additionally 
this thesis has developed liberal consociational theory with regards to trans-
regional self-determination disputes. Therefore, the concepts of cross border 
institutions, demilitarisation, multi-capital city, special status, international 
committee and regional power sharing are analysed within this context, thus 
furthering the consociational theory. 
 This thesis includes an analysis of the relevant theories on power 
sharing in order to place Kirkuk within these. It is through this analysis that 
this thesis proposes a liberal consociational settlement for Kirkuk that 
addresses all the issues of dispute. In this thesis conflicts are viewed as not 
existing within a static status quo, but rather as being ever-changing. In 
acknowledging the ever-changing nature of conflicts, the thesis makes 
forecasts of socioeconomic changes, as these too impact upon the dynamics 
and what is effectively possible in any resolution.   
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Definitions 	  
al-­‐Ta’mim	  –	  The name given to the province of Kirkuk as part of the Arabisation process. It 
is still the legal name for Kirkuk province to this day.  
 
Anfal	   –	  The Anfal Campaign was created by Saddam Hussein and consisted of a series of 
attacks against the ethnic minorities in northern Iraq, particularly the Kurds, between 1986-89. 
It resulted in the deaths of thousands and the destruction of many villages and also included 
the use of chemical weapons. 
 
Article	   140	  –	  Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for the implementation of Article 58 
of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) by the 31st December 2007. Article 58 calls for 
the normalisation of the disputed territories of Iraq, followed by a census and then a 
referendum on the future constitutional status (in Kirkuk’s case whether it would join the KRG 
or not). 
 
Article	  23 – Article 23 allowed for a temporary power sharing arrangement in Kirkuk until 
local elections could be held under a newly formed election law, created specifically for 
Kirkuk. As part of this article the Article 23 Committee was formed to examine power sharing 
for Kirkuk, the distribution of power, and the demographic issues that exist in Kirkuk. 
 
Asayesh	   –	   Kurdish secret police of which both the KDP and the PUK have their own 
branches. 
 
Centripetalism	   –	   A	   form	  of	   power	   sharing	   that	   creates	   institutional designs that promote 
and encourage interaction between the cleavages of the society. The aim is to moderate 
politics through creating multiethnic parties, thus leading to accommodation between the 
segments of the society. 
 
Consociation	  –	  A form of power sharing that guarantees segments representation – if they 
so wish – and places different parties together in a coalition government. It uses the very 
divides present within the society in the management of the conflict through elite cooperation 
at the centre. The four principles of consociation are: executive power sharing, mutual veto, 
proportionality and segmental autonomy and they can be implemented to varying levels. 
 
Dijla	  Operations	  –	  The Dijla (Arabic name for the Tigris river) Operations were created by 
Nouri al-Maliki to command the security operations in the provinces of Diyala, Salahaddin 
and Kirkuk. It links the Iraqi army's fourth, fifth and 12th divisions and the Kurds and Sunnis 
contest its existence. 
 
Disputed	   Territories	   –	   The disputed territories of Iraq are those areas that had their 
borders changed by the previous regime and now involve disputes over the borders. They 
involve Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninawa, Salahaddin and the KRG. 
 
Peshmerga	  –	  Kurdish army controlled and paid by the KRG. 
 
Sahwa	  –	  Also known as the Awakening Council or Sons of Iraq, is a Sunni Muslim force set 
up by the US to give disenfranchised Sunnis an option other than the anti-US groups and is 
used to maintain security in Sunni-majority areas. 
 
Transitional	   Administrative	   Law	   (TAL) – The TAL was an Interim constitution for 
Iraq, which was put in place before the creation of a permanent constitution in 2005. 
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Abbreviations 	  
ANC   African National Congress  
AV   Alternative Vote 
BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation 
BIC   British-Irish Council 
BiH   Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BLRC   Brčko Law Revision Commission 
BP   British Petroleum 
CLMC   Combined Loyalist Military Command 
DUP   Democratic Unionist Party 
EU   European Union  
FARC   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  
FBiH   Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
FNF   Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty 
GFA   Good Friday Agreement 
GOI   Government of Iraq 
IAF   Iraqi Accord Front 
ICG   International Crisis Group 
INA   Iraqi National Accord 
INDF   Iraqi National Dialogue Front 
INL   Iraqi National List 
INOC   Iraqi Northern Oil Company  
IQD   Iraqi Dinars 
IRA   Irish Republican Army  
ITF   Iraqi Turkmen Front 
KA   Kurdistan Alliance 
KBC   Kurdistan Bloc Coalition  
KDP   Kurdistan Democratic Party 
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SIPA   School of International & Public Affairs 
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TAL   Transitional Administrative Law  
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UK   United Kingdom 
	  	   9	  
UKUP   United Kingdom Unionist Party  
UN   United Nations 
UNAMI  United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq 
US   United States 
UUP   Ulster Unionist Party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   10	  
Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 	  
Since the United States (US) led invasion of Iraq in 2003 there has been an 
intensification of the battle between the rival ethnonationalisms for the control 
of Kirkuk. Due to this fact, many commentators claim that Kirkuk is a 
‘tinderbox’ waiting to explode and that situation is a ticking time bomb.1 In 
Kirkuk Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen are all trying to manoeuvre their ethnic 
group into positions of power, whilst Assyrians are trying to prevent 
themselves from getting further politically marginalised. Both Turkmen and 
Assyrians see Kirkuk as a symbol of their position as a relevant ethnicity in 
Iraq. Whereas Kurds see Kirkuk as their ‘Jerusalem’ and many would like for 
it to be the capital of the Kurdish region.2 Whilst the control of Kirkuk by 
Baghdad symbolises Iraqi unity for the Arab population. This demonstrates 
the large stake that all the factions in Kirkuk have in gaining as much control 
as possible, and for this reason conflict has emerged over the political control 
of Kirkuk.  
Due to competition between the rival ethnonationalisms in Kirkuk the 
governance of Kirkuk is suffering as currently all parties within the council are 
acting independently and spend a significant amount of their time and energy 
blocking the other parties/ethnic groups. Although power sharing is supposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See: Singh, Gajendra. ‘The Kirkuk Tinderbox.’ Asia Times [Online] Available from 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GA22Ak01.html [Accessed 20/09/2013]; Collier, 
Robert. ‘Ethnically Diverse Oil Zone a Tinderbox.’ SFGate [Online] Available from 2 The most high profile case being when the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader and 
President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, made this claim at a PUK rally in Slemani in 2011. See: 
Aswat al-Iraq. ‘MPs Collecting Signatures to Question Talabani.’ Aswat al-Iraq [Online] 
Available from: 
http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(lh2vcw3rhk5cym55wj22qpaw))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page
&id=141424 [Accessed 11/10/2012]. Additionally, many of the Kurdish politicians and political 
analysts interviewed for this thesis made this analogy.  
	  	   11	  
to be implemented in Kirkuk, it has not happened. The issue of the 
governance of Kirkuk is further aggravated through the interference of both 
the central government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Both of 
these larger entities bring their personal conflict to the realm of Kirkuk and 
overstep their authority by entering their battle into what should be classified 
as local governance. The ethnic competition over Kirkuk has prevented the 
effective governance of the province and the people of Kirkuk have suffered 
as a result. Thus, despite Kirkuk being one of the richest provinces in Iraq 
with regards to hydrocarbons it is one of the poorest with regards to services 
and development. Furthermore, the Kurdish desire for Kirkuk to join the 
Kurdish region has caused conflict as the majority of Arabs and Turkmen are 
against it, as in their opinion this would result in complete Kurdish control of 
Kirkuk.3  The fear of Kurdish control is intensified by the large oil and gas 
reserves in Kirkuk, as despite the fact that these are controlled by Baghdad, 
anxiety persists from the other ethnicities and neighbouring countries due to 
the fact that they believe the Kurds will use these resources to secede from 
Iraq.4 The history of Arabisation and the lack of a valid census have made the 
issue of resolving the political situation in Kirkuk a difficult one, as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See: Agence France-Presse. ‘Turkmen join Arabs to stop Referendum in Kirkuk.’ Hurriyet 
[Online] Available from 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkmen-join-arabs-to-stop-
referendum-in-kirkuk-2009-08-17 [Accessed 23/04/2010]; Kurdish Globe. ‘Kirkuk Provincial 
Council votes to join Kurdistan Region.’ Kurdish Globe [Online] Available from 
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/7A07DA05F18BE29F0B67DC9707616660/Kirkuk-
provincial-council-votes-to-join-Kurdistan-Region.html [Accessed 23/04/2010]; Anderson, 
Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, p. 200. 
4 See: Su’edi, Abduljabar. ‘Kirkuk, a Conflict Point between Baghdad and Erbil.’ Kirkuk Now 
[Online] Available from http://kirkuknow.com/english/index.php/2012/05/kirkuk-a-conflict-
point-between-baghdad-and-erbil/ [Accessed 08/11/2013]; Hiltermann, Joost. ‘Kirkuk and the 
Kurds: A Difficult Choice Ahead.’ International Crisis Group [Online] Available From 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/kirkuk-and-
the-kurds-a-difficult-choice-ahead.aspx [Accessed 08/11/2013]; Anderson, Liam & Gareth 
Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 234-236. 
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presence that each ethnicity claims in Kirkuk can easily be contested. In the 
RAND Corporations analysis of Kirkuk they claim that:  
Tensions among Arabs, Kurds and Turkomen in northern Iraq have the potential 
to escalate into intercommunal violence that draws Iraq back into civil war, leads 
the Kurdistan region to secede, and topples Iraq’s nascent political structures.5  
Furthermore, they highlight that the most temperamental of these issues is 
the legal status of Kirkuk. Therefore in order to manage the conflict in Kirkuk, 
not only does successful power sharing have to be implemented, but the 
issues of territorial ownership, ethnic security, and hydrocarbon ownership 
also have to be addressed. Furthermore an agreement on Kirkuk has to be 
reached between the KRG and the central government.   
According to Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff ethnic conflict is: 
one of the prevailing challenges to international security in our time. Left 
unchecked, or managed poorly, it threatens the very fabric of the societies in 
which it occurs, endangers the territorial integrity of existing states, wreaks 
havoc on their economic development, destabilises entire regions as conflict 
spills over from one country to another, creates the conditions in which 
transnational organised crime can flourish, and offers safe havens to terrorist 
organisations with an agenda far beyond, and often unconnected, to the conflict 
in question.6  
 
This is a worst-case scenario, however, variations of these consequences 
can be found in all unmanaged ethnic conflicts. For this reason it is imperative 
to find a solution for the conflict in Kirkuk, because failure to do so will lead to 
Kirkuk becoming this worst-case scenario and will justify commentators 
claims that Kirkuk is a tinderbox. Due to the ethnic make-up of Kirkuk, being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hanauer, Larry & Laural E. Miller. Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons Learned from Settlements of 
Earlier Ethno-Territorial Conflicts. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2012, p. 1. 
6 Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff. ‘The Study of Ethnic Conflict: an Introduction’ in Karl Cordell & 
Stefan Wolff (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 1. 
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seen as a ‘mini Iraq’7, if conflict reached this level it is likely that it would spill 
over to the rest of Iraq, destabilising the country and possibly the region. Due 
to the symbolism that Kirkuk holds to the various factions, the lack of a 
resolution has already begun to affect the governance of Iraq. Kirkuk has 
become a political issue used as a manifesto for the political campaigns of 
many parties and has transferred to an issue in the negotiations for the 
creation of a power sharing government at central level. Through Wikileaks it 
has emerged that many in the US Army believed that all-out conflict was only 
being avoided by their presence in Kirkuk and that they feared for its future 
following their withdrawal.8 For this reason the resolution of the conflict in 
Kirkuk is an issue of paramount importance for Iraq, the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG), and the US. It is also of relevance to the Middle East as 
a whole and to any entity with interests in the region. Both Article 140 of the 
Iraqi Constitution and Article 239 of the Provincial Elections Law10, which were 
created through Iraqi law to deal with the issues in Kirkuk, have so far failed 
to make any in-roads on the situation in Kirkuk. Thus, leaving Kirkuk in limbo 
with regards to the resolution of the conflict. Therefore it is the aim of this 
thesis to develop an alternative to the current situation by putting forward a 
possible settlement for Kirkuk. In order to reach an agreement that has the 
highest possibility of all the parties accepting it, it is important that each 
faction makes compromises, yet still comes out feeling as if they have gained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See: Abdullah, Muhammed. ‘Kirkuk Slides towards the Brink.’ Niqash [Online] Available 
from http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2270 [Accessed 11/10/2012]; Kane, Sean. ‘Finding 
Common Ground: Kirkuk as a Special Governorate.’ United States Institute of Peace, Peace 
Brief, 31, 2010.   
8 Gordon, Michael & Andrew Lehren. ‘Tensions High Along Kurdish-Arab Line.’ New York 
Times [Online] Available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/middleeast/24kurds.html?_r=0 [Accessed 
10/11/2013] 
9 For more details on Article 140 see Chapter 1.4. and for Article 23 see Chapter 1.5.. 
10 Elections Law of the Provincial, Districts, and Sub-Districts Councils (Law 36/2008).  
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something.11 Hence, if this thesis is to fulfil its aims, any settlement developed 
must include compromises for all the factions, whilst also maintaining that 
they make gains on issues of importance to them. Evidently any proposal for 
resolution in Kirkuk is just that, a proposal and an actual agreement involves 
negotiations, compromises and concessions from all the parties involved. 
However, through an academic scrutiny of the possibilities available for 
resolution and an analysis of the details involved therein, a neutral option that 
has the potential to gain cross-community support can be brought into the 
debate.   
 In a deeply divided society democracy is needed in order to ensure the 
security of all ethnicities.12 This is not to say that ethnic conflict cannot be 
managed successfully by authoritarian regimes, but rather that this is very 
rare indeed. For the most part the segments of society that are not in power 
bare witness to one or more of the following actions: subjugation, forced 
assimilation, displacement, and even genocide. Kirkuk has already witnessed 
subjugation and displacement under Saddam Hussein and the wider area has 
witnessed what some have called genocide in the Anfal campaigns.13 Another 
option is the dissolution into smaller, ethnically homogeneous, states. 14 
However, as Brendan O’Leary has examined, partitions are seldom just in the 
split; they do damage to the resulting states (O’Leary compares them to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This was made evident through interviews conducted by the author in 2010 with Gerry 
Adams, Martin McGuinness, William Hay and Lord Alderdice; who were all successfully 
involved in negotiations in the Northern Ireland conflict. 
12 Sisk, Timothy. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1996. 
13 For information on those who claim these actions equate to genocide see: Black, George. 
Genocide in Iraq. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. See also, Kelly, Michael. Ghosts of 
Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide. Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2008. These are just a couple of the sources that list Saddam’s actions as 
genocide. 
14 Sisk, Timothy. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1996, pp. 27-34. 
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separation of Siamese twins, where at least one is badly lamed), and they 
lead to violence, both before and after the partition. Apart from these 
consequences, partition is not an option in Kirkuk due to its size and the 
concentration of ethnicities overlapping (within the city) making it 
geographically impossible, as well as the fact that the factions are not looking 
to separate from Iraq, but are rather concerned with which region they are 
governed by.15 Therefore, the most viable option for securing a long-term 
settlement in Kirkuk is that of democratic governance. However, the 
traditional majoritarian democracy raises some problems in a deeply divided 
society. If simple majority rule were to be introduced in Kirkuk, then the Kurds 
as the majority could sideline the other ethnicities and govern for their own 
gains, i.e. annexe Kirkuk to the KRG. This would cause conflict, as it would go 
against the desires of large factions within the other ethnicities. Likewise, if 
the Turkmen and Arabs were to form an alliance, like they did in the 2010 
national election, then they too could possibly edge out the Kurdish list in 
numbers (depending on Gorran splitting the Kurdish vote) and govern Kirkuk 
to their own advantage, thus causing conflict with the Kurds.16 Majority rule in 
a deeply divided society generally creates minorities who are excluded from 
the political process and have no hope of changing this. This results in 
conflict; either through the minority groups seeking power, or the majority 
suppressing them.17 This is not to say that democratic majoritarian rule is 
impossible, India is an example of it in practise in a divided society, however 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 O’Leary, Brendan. ‘Debating Partition: Evaluating the Standard Justification’ in Karl Cordell 
& Stefan Wolff (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 
140-157. 
16 Gorran is a Kurdish political party that split from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (largest 
Kurdish party in Kirkuk). Due to them splitting the Kurdish vote the Kurds were not the 
winners in the 2010 national elections in Kirkuk. 
17 Lijphart, Arend. ‘Majority rule versus democracy in deeply divided societies.’ Politikon: 
South African Journal Of Political Studies 4, no. 2. December 1, 1977: 113-126. 
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even in India, the most successful example, conflict between the various 
factions is always at the surface. This leaves the only other democratic option 
of power sharing. Through power sharing each ethnicity is given the 
opportunity to be represented within the governance, therefore allowing 
ethnicities to negotiate on factors they differentiate on, thus avoiding conflict. 
Power sharing is the most viable form of governance in areas involving ethnic 
conflict; therefore it will be at the core of the settlement developed in this 
thesis.18 In their analysis of the situation in Kirkuk the Rand Corporation stated 
that in order to settle disputes in ethnically mixed territories there must be 
negotiations that establish new structures for governance, ones that either 
promote assimilation or guarantee communal autonomy. As already stated, 
this thesis does not recommend the promotion of assimilation, where a 
dominant ethnic group forces others to forgo their identity for that of the 
dominant one – Kirkuk has witnessed enough of this already. The alternative 
is communal autonomy, which will be assessed in this thesis through 
consociational theory.19 
 There is a major debate as to whether centripetalist or consociational 
power sharing is better for regulating ethnic conflict in a deeply divided 
society.20 Although this thesis is in the consociational camp, it also uses 
elements of complex power sharing, which allows for the amalgamation of 
different aspects of the respective power sharing theories. The leading 
hypothesis developed in this thesis is that the conflict in Kirkuk can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Sisk, Timothy. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1996, pp. 27-34. 
19 Hanauer, Larry & Laural E. Miller. Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons Learned from Settlements of 
Earlier Ethno-Territorial Conflicts. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2012, p. 2. 
20 For arguments in favor of consociation see the works of McGarry, O’Leary and Lijphart. For 
arguments in favor of centripetalism see the works of Horowitz and O’Reilly. Also see 
Chapters 3.2. (consociation) & 3.3. (centripetalism) of this thesis.  
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regulated through having liberal consociation at the core of the settlement 
without being constrained within the confines of this theory. In order to prove 
that liberal consociation should be at the foundation of any settlement, it firstly 
needs to be demonstrated that the other forms of power sharing are not 
feasible for this and that rather elements of these theories should be 
introduced to this liberal consociational foundation. Secondly, the key issues 
of conflict need to be identified and a thorough understanding of why they 
have caused conflict needs to be gathered. Finally, a detailed method of the 
liberal consociational institutional mechanisms that can regulate the major 
issues of conflict needs to be outlined. Through these three elements it can 
then be proved that not only can the issues of conflict in Kirkuk be 
successfully regulated through liberal consociation, but also that this is the 
most viable method for the resolution of the core issues. The second 
hypothesis put forward is that the agreement needs to go beyond mere 
consociational theory to resolve all the issues of conflict. That is, that the 
agreement should include other options that address the areas of conflict and 
are not necessarily confined to consociational institutions. This ensures that 
issues that go beyond the political institutions do not reoccur to reinvigorate 
the conflict at a later stage. Liberal consociation is flexible with regards to 
introducing other elements, as long as consociation remains at the centre. In 
order to defend this hypothesis this thesis will demonstrate areas in the 
agreement that resolve conflict and go beyond consociational institutions, yet 
still allows for consociation to remain at the core. It will be proven that these 
elements are imperative to ensure the longevity and success of the 
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agreement, thus emphasising that the agreement needs to go beyond 
consociation.  
Significance of the Study 	  
As already stated, the settlement of the conflict in Kirkuk is of great 
importance to peace in the region. Furthermore, it has a considerable role to 
play in the economic capabilities of Iraq, as – despite the damage caused to 
the Kirkuk oil fields by over-production towards the end of Saddam’s reign 
and its decreased oil production following the war – Kirkuk still has a large 
proportion of Iraq’s proven oil reserves.21 It is also a key source of Iraqi 
natural gas production, making it an extremely crucial mineral-rich area that 
has the potential to generate a large income for Iraq. This income could help 
with the reconstruction and development that is necessary following the years 
of turmoil.22 Yet, despite all this, there is still a lack of literature relating to the 
Kirkuk conflict. This is partly because, although this is an old conflict, it has 
intensified and come to the fore since 2003. Furthermore, the dynamics have 
changed as a result of the ending of the Ba’ath regime. This said, it has 
reached the stage where there should be more literature pertaining to the 
Kirkuki conflict. The only academic book concentrating solely on an analysis 
of the conflict in Kirkuk is Crisis in Kirkuk by Liam Anderson and Gareth 
Stansfield.23 When this is compared to the hundreds of books written for 
example in relation to the Northern Irish conflict, it becomes evident just how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Iraq. U.S. Energy Administration [Online] Available from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iraq/Oil.html [Accessed 21/10/09] 
22 Daly, John Analysis: Kirkuk Elections and Iraqi Oil. United Press International [Online] 
Available from http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2009/06/02/Analysis-
Kirkuk-elections-and-Iraqi-oil/UPI-31501243950233/ [Accessed 07/11/09] 
23 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 
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far behind Kirkuk is in the conflict analysis and resolution field. This is an 
important area of study as it helps advance the understanding of the conflict 
as well as developing the path towards resolution. As Crisis in Kirkuk is 
the only academic book on Kirkuk, it is important that this thesis adds to, 
rather than repeats, the advancements that it has made towards 
understanding the conflict. Crisis in Kirkuk analyses the situation and creates 
a greater understanding of the conflict in Kirkuk and the positions of the 
relevant actors. Whereas, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
possible future of Kirkuk by developing a settlement that manages these 
issues of conflict – it could be said that it is a follow on to Anderson and 
Stansfield’s book.  
There are other analyses on the possible future for Kirkuk by both 
academics and policy makers alike (see Chapter 4), but the issue with these 
is that they are short in both content and detail. Therefore, although they 
contribute ideas to the literature on the Kirkuki conflict, they do little to actually 
develop the knowledge needed to make these relevant when it comes to the 
practicalities of developing a settlement. This is where this thesis is different, 
as its aim is to not only develop methods that regulate the issues of conflict, 
but also to analyse the institutional designs necessary to implement them. 
Therefore, this thesis will be the first to layout a complete package for Kirkuk 
were all the elements are linked together. Another core difference that also 
allows this thesis to link all the elements of the proposed resolution together is 
the view that conflicts are ever-changing.  Thus, this thesis has made 
socioeconomic predictions on elements that correlate to a proposed 
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resolution and has taken into account that once an aim is achieved or a 
compromise is reached the dynamics of the remaining issues at stake change. 
The rest of the literature involving Kirkuk is mainly taken up by those 
who have a stake in the conflict and concentrates on the ethnic ownership of 
Kirkuk rather than placing Kirkuk within the context of conflict resolution, and 
thus do little to advance the conflict analysis and resolution field of study 
relating to Kirkuk.24 Therefore the literature on power sharing takes more 
prominence in this thesis, as it gives a more thorough analysis on the options 
of governance available for Kirkuk, and is thus examined in Chapter 3.  
 This thesis is a practical one; rather than focusing on developing power 
sharing theory, its aim is to propose a settlement that is feasible for Kirkuk 
and therefore contributing to the literature on the Kirkuki conflict. However, 
through this process power sharing theory is developed as many aspects 
proposed are transferable and as Kirkuk is a conflict involving a trans-region 
self-determination disputes it develops and extends consociational theory into 
this sphere. Furthermore, by default this thesis makes a contribution to the 
centripetalism/consociational debate by favouring one over the other. The 
overall aim of developing a settlement is to bring forward the academic 
debate on the future of Kirkuk and to demonstrate methods of resolving 
issues of conflict that can then be used and further developed by the leading 
actors in the conflict. The numerous academic works on the conflict in 
Northern Ireland helped advance the conflict towards a settlement, with the 
works of John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary making a significant 
contribution towards consociational theory for conflicts involving self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Evidence of this is seen in the ‘Who owns Kirkuk’ series in the Middle East Quarterly 
(Winter 2007). 
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determination disputes. Therefore, it is the aim of this thesis to create a 
greater understanding of an option that is available to Kirkuk that creates 
debate and contains facets that at least some of the protagonists agree with 
and would like to develop themselves. Thus, helping Kirkuk move towards the 
arena where a wealth of knowledge pertaining to the conflict is developed.  
 
Methodological Approach 	  
In designing an alternative for Kirkuk, this thesis works from the premise that 
conflicts exist due to the main political actors having incompatible aims and 
goals. Consequently, strategies must be analysed and developed in order to 
overcome these incompatibilities and prevent them from leading to violence. 
In this thesis conflicts are viewed as not existing within a static status quo, but 
rather as being ever-changing. In acknowledging the ever-changing nature of 
conflicts, the thesis makes forecasts of socioeconomic changes, as these too 
impact upon the dynamics and what is effectively possible in any resolution. 
Furthermore, the notion of an ever-changing context impacts on the 
development of a resolution, in that each side has aims and once an aim is 
achieved or a compromise is reached the dynamics of the remaining issues at 
stake evolve accordingly. Therefore, when working towards a resolution all 
the strategies are linked together, as the previous steps taken open up new 
possibilities, whilst halting others. The thesis includes an examination of all 
the relevant issues of conflict that exist in Kirkuk – from security to 
governance – and also addresses the role that socioeconomic factors play in 
the conflict as well as their potential role in opening up new possibilities for 
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debate. In order to highlight the issues of conflict I conducted a context 
analysis of all the media and political parties’ output, interviewed political 
actors and politicians in Iraq, and spent one year (09/12-09/13) living in the 
region in order to gain a thorough understanding of the minute issues of 
conflict at a local level. This is the main difference between this thesis and the 
proposals that preceded it; in that it is a proposal for a complete agreement 
that covers minor and major issues with each aspect linked in order to make 
more options possible and in order to propose a resolution that won’t falter at 
the first obstacle. 
The methodological angle used for this thesis is a three tier approach, 
which begins by examining relevant local issues on the ground, then moves 
to examining the applicability of the relevant theoretical literature, before 
finally deconstructing and exposing weaknesses in previous proposals put 
forward for Kirkuk. This information is then used in developing a complete 
proposal where the conflict is viewed as ever-changing and all the aspects of 
the proposed resolution are linked. 
 Therefore, a complete resolution with power sharing at its core that 
solves the major issues revolving around power sharing, as well as other 
smaller local issues is proposed. Through living in the region and engaging 
with the political actors and the populace on a day-to-day basis for one year 
an idea of the local issues that need to be included in a proposal was formed. 
Although one of the main issues was ethnic competition between the rival 
ethnonationalism, which was mainly caused by the lack of power sharing, 
there were also many smaller issues that stemmed from this, such as: 
security, employment, education, returnees, Kirkuk’s constitutional status and 
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the proportionality of each ethnic groups share of Kirkuk and its bodies. Thus, 
in the process of the fieldwork conducted for this project it became clear that 
any agreement needs to go beyond mere power sharing and must include 
these local facets. 
As already highlighted (and discussed in detail in Chapter 3) liberal 
consociation is a method of power sharing that will allow for all of these 
issues to be addressed in one package, which is important in order to ensure 
that conflict does not escalate in Kirkuk. The analysis that liberal consociation 
is the most suitable theory for the governance of Kirkuk also opens up the 
developments made in this theory to the prospective proposal for Kirkuk and 
these developments can thus be worked to fit within the dynamics of the 
region. Therefore, the proposal must follow the principles of traditional 
consociation in that there must be executive power sharing, some form of a 
minority veto, cultural autonomy and proportionality.25 Furthermore, it should 
include the developments to consociational theory made by O’Leary and 
McGarry, as they were formed with ethnic conflict in mind. These include: the 
introduction of exogenous pressure; the addressing of self-determination 
disputes through bodies such as cross border institutions; addressing the 
local issues on the ground such as police, return of exiles, educational reform, 
etc.; finding the correct election system to fit within the dynamics of the 
conflict; and finally, allocating ministerial portfolios through sequential 
proportionality rules.26 Additionally the formation of liberal consociation by 
O’Leary should be utilised; this allows any political identity that wins enough 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 25-52.	  26	  McGarry, John & Brendan O’Leary. ‘Power Shared after the Deaths of Thousands’ in 
Rupert Taylor (ed.) Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland 
Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 15-84	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votes in the election to choose to join the power sharing coalition and has no 
ascriptive criteria where group identities are fixed. As a result, the power 
sharing government can develop with the dynamics of the society.27 
 Although there have been other examinations of the conflict in Kirkuk 
(as highlighted in detail in Chapter 4) the main problem is that they do not 
address all the issues of conflict and the issues that they do address are not 
examined in enough detail. Not creating a package that covers all the issues 
and offers a proposed solution that links these issues in one complete 
agreement, makes it is impossible to end conflict in Kirkuk. As through linking 
all the facets of the proposal new possibilities become feasible and thus a 
complete package that can prevent further conflict can be developed. This is 
the main difference between the proposal put forward in this thesis and those 
that preceded it and one that is highlighted throughout this thesis. However, 
the existing proposals do introduce some promising elements that can be 
used and further developed in order to successfully address the issues of 
conflict in Kirkuk.  
For example, [1] the creation of a special status for Kirkuk is put 
forward by Anderson & Stansfield, UNAMI, and Wolff.28 However, of particular 
interest for this thesis is the proposal for a special status for the city alone, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 O’Leary, Brendan. ‘Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory 
Arguments’ in S. Noel (ed.) From Powersharing to Democracy. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005, pp. 15-16. 
28 See: Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 185-203; Wolff, 
Stefan. ‘Governing (in) Kirkuk: resolving the status of a disputed territory in post-American 
Iraq.’ International Affairs 86, no. 6, November 2010, pp. 1361-1379; UNAMI. ‘Possible 
Options for the Future Administrative Status of Kirkuk Within the Iraqi Federation’ in UNAMI 
Disputed Internal Boundaries, Volume Two, 2009 [Not published] 
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which is put forward separately by O’Leary and Romano.29 [2] Allowing non-
Kurdish majority areas the option not to join the KRG.30 [3] Creating cross-
border institutions/links between Kirkuk, the KRG and Baghdad.31 [4] And 
finally, the introduction of liberal consociational power sharing.32  Through 
examining the weaknesses in these areas that are deemed as feasible for 
Kirkuk they can be developed further to fit the dynamics of the conflict and the 
overall proposal. 
However, it is not just the feasible aspects put forward by these 
analysts that are important, the unfeasible facets also add value as they allow 
for them to be discounted and through the analysis of their unfeasibility other 
aspects are developed. The key proposal that is put forward by the majority of 
the analysts that is emphasized throughout this thesis as being unfeasible is 
the prospect of power sharing based on the divisor of 32/32/32/4, which gives 
Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens all 32% of the positions in the council, whilst the 
Christians are awarded 4%. By analysing this as unfeasible other options that 
have a reasonable chance of success can be developed. 
Although the analysis of the relevant theoretical literature and previous 
proposals put forward was relatively straightforward, the understanding of the 
issues of conflict, the areas of importance to each ethnicity, as well as the 
possible compromises that each ethnic group was willing to make, involved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See: Romano, David 'The Future of Kirkuk', Ethnopolitics Volume 6, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 265 
– 283; O’Leary, Brendan. How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 141-160.	  30	  See: Romano, David 'The Future of Kirkuk', Ethnopolitics Volume 6, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 265 
– 283; O’Leary, Brendan. How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 141-160.	  31	  See:	  UNAMI. ‘Possible Options for the Future Administrative Status of Kirkuk Within the 
Iraqi Federation’ in UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries, Volume Two, 2009 [Not published]; 
SIPA. Kirkuk: Reaching a Comprehensive Settlement for a Disputed Province. New York: 
Columbia University, 2011. 32	  See:	  O’Leary, Brendan. How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 141-160.	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various methods of approach. This was initially done through discourse 
analysis; through an examination of speeches, interviews and party policies 
an understanding of these three areas was developed. In order to make the 
best use of the time available for fieldwork, the majority of this discourse 
analysis was done prior to conducting the fieldwork. This was done by 
compiling a database relating to the development of conflict in Kirkuk. This 
database was used in the background section and in analysing the issues of 
conflict, which was then used to create an outline for an agreement. Although 
this database includes major events following the 2003 invasion, its primary 
focus is on the period during which this thesis was written (2010-2013). This 
not only helps in the logistics of compiling it, but also allows one to 
concentrate on the current issues involved. The compiling of the database 
largely consisted of an analysis of the media output relating to the issues of 
conflict and the politicians’ stance on them. Apart from analysing interviews 
and statements from the Iraqi political elites, this also included monitoring the 
political party-linked media channels’ outputs. The analysis also extended to 
the documents and statements released by the political parties themselves. 
Once the data was compiled it was then analysed in order to establish the key 
areas of conflict, the compromises that each political party may be willing to 
make, and the areas that must be fulfilled in order for each specific political 
party to sign any agreement. The difficulty behind using media and published 
political discourse is that politicians often have an underlying strategy behind 
their discourse. A careful examination of this discourse allowed for a better 
understanding of the undisclosed motives. Inevitably this initial discourse 
analysis did not uncover all the aims and objectives of the protagonists, 
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however it was used to create an initial outline for an agreement that could 
then be further tested during fieldwork. The whole idea behind this thesis is to 
propose a viable agreement that takes into consideration the local 
circumstances and the often-conflicting interests of all the ethnic groups 
involved. Therefore, despite the possible inaccuracies from the initial 
discourse analysis on the true stance of the political actors, due to the nature 
of politics, the analysis does play a very important role as it allows for the 
creation of an outline that can then be developed further after closer 
interaction with the protagonists. The methodology used is based on that of 
process tracing, where the process is traced through the compiling of a 
database, which is then used in order to create hypotheses. In this study the 
compiling of a database of the events is analysed in order to create the 
outline of a potential agreement. In process tracing, elite interviews are used 
to seek out inaccuracies and further test the hypothesis and in this study 
interviews are used to test inaccuracies in what is believed to be relevant to 
the issues of conflict, check the feasibility of possible compromises and to test 
the hypothesis of the individual details of the agreement. Thus allowing for 
these to be adjusted in order to create a plan for a final agreement.33 
 This closer interaction with the protagonists involved dividing each 
ethnicity into two groups – politicians/elites and grassroots/wider populace. 
This was done in order to create an understanding of the politicians’ aims and 
their acceptance of the various possibilities for an agreement, as well as 
creating an understanding of their support and whether their support base 
shares the same aims. In order to gain an understanding of the aims of each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Tansey, Oisín. ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability 
Sampling.’ Political Science and Politics Vol. 40, no. 4, 2007, pp. 765-772. 
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ethnic group a representative sample of the leading political parties within 
these groups was created. This then helped to create an understanding of the 
goals and likely compromises of the factions within each ethnicity, which was 
then analysed for the purposes of creating an agreement that is the most 
likely to be accepted. Open-ended interviews were chosen for the elites as 
they allow one ‘to get at the contextual nuance of response and to probe 
beneath the surface of a response to the reasoning and premises that 
underlie it.’34 This allowed for the interviews to be used to gauge the actors’ 
perception of the various options available, which in turn was used to adjust 
the agreement outline towards a proposed settlement. Due to the security 
situation in Kirkuk it was not possible to gain access to as many of the 
protagonists as was desirable. Therefore, interviews conducted by large 
groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and UNAMI, who have 
the resources security to administer interviews on a much wider scale, were 
also used. However, interviews were still carried out with many political actors 
and these were still important as they related directly to the proposed 
settlement. Therefore, despite the fragile security situation, it was still very 
important to undertake interviews in Kirkuk. 
 At the time of the fieldwork for this thesis the tensions over the Dijla 
Operations were at the highest levels.35 This drastically affected the research 
as many politicians did not want the responsibility of security for meetings and 
as politicians were continuously being targeted, this was a realistic danger. 
Therefore, it was an uphill battle to persuade politicians to conduct meetings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Aberbach, Joel & Bert A. Rockman. ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews.’ Political 
Science and Politics Vol. 35, No. 4, 2002, pp. 673-676.  
35 See Chapter 1.7. for a detailed account of the Dijla Operations.  
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and particularly facilitate meetings with the populace, which thus had an affect 
on the scale of the research. The author initially planned to conduct a small 
survey with the elites in order to highlight the areas of importance, the issues 
associated with conflict and the possible compromises, and furthermore, 
where the ethnic groups converge on these factors. This, unfortunately, had 
to be abandoned due to the security situation, as it was not possible to gain 
access to a broad enough sample of interviewees to make this survey 
accurate.36 Furthermore, in order to understand the support that the populace 
has for the ideologies of their political parties, as well as determining what 
aspects are important to the people, it was initially planned to use both 
quantitative and qualitative methods with regards to the grassroots. On the 
quantitative side of the research a survey was to be conducted in order to 
understand the political support each ethnic group has for their 
representatives. This survey would have been largely based on the work of 
John Fraser in measuring political legitimacy, but was abandoned due to the 
lack of access to the populace in Kirkuk.37  Even if these surveys were 
possible, they would have played a secondary role to interviews, as the 
problem with conducting surveys is that you cannot push the boundaries of 
people’s perceptions and thus create an understanding of their overall opinion 
on the various options available for Kirkuk. Unfortunately these interviews 
were limited to elites, as it was not feasible to interact with the populace in 
Kirkuk and therefore the qualitative research with the grassroots in Kirkuk 
also had to be abandoned, although interviews were conducted with people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The survey created for this purpose borrowed from the work of Colin Irwin. See Appendix I.  
37 See Appendix II. 
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from Kirkuk who were living in the KRG.38  
 As already mentioned the security situation in Kirkuk limits the research 
options available. This needs to be taken into consideration when compiling, 
as well as analysing, the data – as the security situation has a direct affect on 
the information available. The fact that the KRG was used as a base, rather 
than Kirkuk, means that any subjects for interviews, political or otherwise, 
were effectively controlled by the KRG, thus altering the information available. 
Furthermore, one can be seen as biased in favour of the KRG, due to the fact 
that KRG officials will inevitably play a large role in facilitating the research. In 
order to counteract this fact, research on the background information of 
prospective interviewees was conducted in order to understand their 
relationship with the KRG and their own ethnic group. This helped to create 
an understanding of their answers and to prevent misunderstandings, i.e. 
gathering pro KRG information from all ethnicities only to find that these 
specific political parties receive funding from the KRG. Another method used 
to avoid bias in favour of the KRG was to contact and create dialogue with as 
many organisations as possible prior to beginning fieldwork. This enabled the 
creation of relationships and an understanding of the project before any 
meetings were conducted. Despite all this, the fact that the KRG was used as 
a base made it very difficult to interact with non-Kurdish political parties – 
particularly Arab parties, as they have no representation in the KRG – again, 
due to the security situation, it was not possible to meet them without a prior 
arranged meeting which would have to be facilitated through someone within 
the KRG. This was counteracted to some extent by interacting and forming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For an example of how the interviews would be conducted see Appendix II.  
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links with their communities within the KRG, however it did not prevent the 
absence of direct interaction with Arab politicians and therefore this lack had 
to always be kept in mind when analysing the data.  
 It has been outlined here how an understanding of the core issues of 
conflict was formed and how this was used alongside the relevant theories of 
power sharing and the previous proposals for Kirkuk by other analysts in 
order to develop a proposed resolution that covers all the relevant areas 
necessary in order to ease conflict. These three elements used together form 
the three-tiered methodological approach that was utilised in this thesis. 
Structure of the Thesis 	  
This section has been used to contextualise the issue and form hypotheses 
that will be proved through the remaining chapters.   
 Chapter 1 gives a historical background of Kirkuk and examines the 
development of the contemporary conflict and highlights the current political 
situation in Kirkuk. 
 This thus allows for Chapter 2 to analyse the issues of conflict, and 
their relevance to each ethnic group, that need resolving in Kirkuk. 
Chapter 3 examines the theories that exist within the wider theory of power 
sharing in order to gain a theoretical understanding of the methods available 
for Kirkuk, to discover which theory is the most suitable, and to examine how 
this theory can be developed within the dynamics of Kirkuk. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 gives the theoretical background necessary to understand the 
faults with the proposals analysed in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 examines the various proposals put forward for Kirkuk by 
other analysts in order to highlight what proposals exist within the literature for 
Kirkuk and what aspects within these are feasible or are rejected outright.  
 Chapter 5 employs all the information gathered in the previous 
chapters in order to develop a settlement for Kirkuk. Whereas Chapter 6 
examines the laws neccesary to implement this and form an actual power 
sharing structure for the governance of Kirkuk. 
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Chapter 1: Contextualising Kirkuk within Iraq 
 
1.1. Introduction 
It is important to examine the history of Kirkuk, from its ancient past to the 
contemporary situation, in order to create an understanding of the causes of 
the conflict. Examining Kirkuk’s history helps to create an awareness of the 
symbolical value that Kirkuk has for the various ethnicities. Whereas, 
analysing the emergence of conflict between the ethnicities allows for a 
comprehension of the reasons for animosity between the factions of Kirkuk. 
However, the most important undertaking is to investigate how these issues 
have manifested themselves in the contemporary political situation in Kirkuk, 
thus creating an understanding of the current areas of conflict. Through 
establishing a background of Kirkuk that focuses on tensions between the 
ethnicities, it is possible to highlight the main areas of conflict. The purpose of 
creating an understanding of the core areas of conflict in this chapter is so 
that they can be analysed in Chapter 2 in order to underline the relevant 
issues that need to be addressed in a settlement.  
 
1.2. Historical Background  
Kirkuk is home to four main ethnicities – Assyrians, Kurds, Turkmen and 
Arabs – who all lay claim to its ownership. The Assyrians claim that they are 
descendants of the people who founded the ancient city of Arrapha, thus 
making them the founders of the city currently known as Kirkuk.39 Although, 
the Kurds also claim to be descendants of the founders of the city. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Kramers, J.H. ‘Kirkūk.’ In P. Bearman, T. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. 
Heinrichs (eds.) Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill [Online] Available from http://0-
www.brillonline.nl.lib.exeter.ac.uk/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-4390 [Accessed 
30/06/2010] 
	  	   34	  
the Kurds also claim the Medes as their ancestors and they only gained 
control of Kirkuk from the Assyrians in 615 B.C.40 The Arab control of the area 
came later with the spread of Islam when the Abbasid empire took control of 
the region.41  The Arab presence in Kirkuk increased in the 1600’s when the 
Ottoman Sultan, Murad IV, gave the Tikriti tribe (from Syria) villages and land, 
in the southwest of Kirkuk, as a reward for the help they had given him. More 
Arabs came to the region in the 1800’s, when the Hadidi tribe settled in Kirkuk 
city.42 Whereas a strong Turkmen presence began with the invasion of the 
Seljuk Empire in 1055 and the Turkmen became military and governing 
instruments for the proceeding empires. The Turkmen presence was 
strengthened when Kirkuk came under the control of the Ottoman Empire in 
1535, although it is important to note that a very strong ‘Kurdish’ presence 
remained.43  
At the time of World War I (1914-1918), Kirkuk was a multiethnic 
community with Assyrians, Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen all able to claim control 
of the city over some time in its history (in that historical order). Following the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I the British took control of 
the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, changing their agreement with 
France over French control of Mosul in order to gain control of the regions oil. 
With the creation of Iraq, which eventually included these three provinces, the 
Arabs could once again lay claim to Kirkuk – although there was only a minor 
Arab tribal community in the area. Nevertheless, through installing the loyal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Abdulla, Mufid. An Interview with Kamal Mudhir Ahmed. Dr. Kamal Mudhir Ahmed [Online] 
Available from http://drkamal.com/articles/mufid_interview.htm [Accessed 01/07/2010] 
41 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 14-17. 
42 UNAMI. ‘Kirkuk Markaz’ in UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries, Volume Two, 2009 [Not 
published] 
43 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 14-17. 
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Hashemite monarchy to rule over Iraq the British were able to assert the 
control they desired over the regions oil. It was during this period that 
Arabisation of Kirkuk first begun. The Hashemites gave nomadic Arab tribes 
grants as well as land to farm surrounding the newly created Haweeja 
irrigation project. At the same time Arabs, Assyrians and Armenians were 
brought to Kirkuk in order to work in the oil industry.44 This Arabisation 
process escalated with the formation of the Republic of Iraq, when Kurds 
were excluded entirely from the oil industry and there was a wholesale shift of 
the population, with Kurds being expelled from the region and Arabs being 
enticed with special privileges and bonuses. The policy of Arabisation in 
Kirkuk changed the demographics of the society, installing an Iraqi-loyal 
population and thus allowing the Iraqi government to control the mineral 
exploitation of Kirkuk. The effect this Arabisation had on the society, was to 
cause issues of conflict that still exist in Kirkuk today.45 Another issue that has 
transferred into the contemporary conflict from this time period is the 
animosity between the Kurds and Turkmen that was created by the events of 
the 14th of July 1959 – during the celebrations for the anniversary of the coup 
that overthrew the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, Turkmen officials marched 
through Kirkuk and were attacked leading to 25 fatalities and 140 injured 
victims, these attacks were blamed on the Kurds.46  
 During his rule Saddam Hussein strengthened the control of Kirkuk by 
changing the borders – he replaced Kurdish-majority rural areas with Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Iraq: The Past Present and Future. London: Pluto Press, 2007, 
pp. 205-206. 
45 O’Leary, Brendan. ‘Power sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy.’, in O’Leary, 
Brendan, John McGarry & Khaled Salih (ed.). The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, pp. 85-86. 
46 Al-Hirmizi, Arshad. The Turkmen Reality in Iraq. Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfi, 2005, pp. 109-118. 
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ones, in a new governorate called al-Tamim (nationalisation). Further damage 
to the non-Arab demographics was done by the Anfal campaign – where Ali 
Hassan al-Majid, who came to be known as Chemical Ali, deployed chemical 
weapons against the Kurds – which claimed the lives of thousands of Kurds 
from the Kirkuk region.47 Following Operation Dessert Storm in 1991, in which 
the US led coalition forces expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the Kurds took 
advantage of the chaos and seized Kirkuk, this was however short lived and 
the Iraqi forces soon regrouped and recaptured Kirkuk. Despite losing Kirkuk, 
the Kurds did manage to effectively create an autonomous Kurdish region, in 
the Kurdish provinces of northern Iraq, due to the creation of a no-fly zone 
north of the thirty-sixth parallel, which was created by the US and UK forces. 
With the threat this newly created Kurdish region posed on the oil wealth of 
Kirkuk, Saddam strengthened the process of Arabisation in order to maintain 
his hold over Kirkuk and as a consequence large numbers of Kurds were 
expelled.48 As a result of this long process of Arabisation, the numbers of 
Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk drastically decreased, whilst at the same time 
the number of Arabs increased. This has transferred into the conflict today, as 
Turkmen see themselves as having held the majority in the city, whereas 
Kurds claim they had the majority in the province and Arabs claim that it is an 
Iraqi city first and foremost. The result of these competing claims of 
ownership is that each of the three ethnicities claims that they should control 
Kirkuk, which effectively causes conflict. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Talabany, Nouri. Ethnic Cleansing by the Iraqi regime in the Kirkuk Region. [Online] 
Available from http://www.9neesan.com/docs/doc72.htm [Accessed 23/11/09] 
48 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 41-45. 
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The following maps demonstrate the gerrymandering of Kirkuk as part 
of the Arabisation process.49 In order to analyse these one must understand 
the geographic structure of Iraq. Iraq is divided into 18 governorates or 
provinces, with the three governorates of Slemani, Duhok and Erbil forming 
the current day Kurdish region. Map 150 demonstrates the governorates of 
Iraq. 
Map 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Original maps taken from report Atlas of Kirkuk by the KRG’s High Committee for Kurdistan 
de-Arabization report. These maps have been edited to fit into the framework of this thesis. 
See: H. Haddad, S. Abdul-Rahman & A. Kirkuky (Eds.) Atlas of Kirkuk. High Committee for 
Kurdistan de-Arabization. Erbil, 2006.  
50 Adapted from: Iraq Pictures. Map of Iraq. [Online] Available from 
http://iraqpictures.org/map-of-iraq/ [Accessed 01/09/2013] 
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Map 2 shows Kirkuk as it stood in 1957 before any major changes had been 
made to external or internal borders. 
 
 
 
Map 2 
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Map 3 shows Kirkuk as it stood in 1965, and displays the first changes to the 
internal borders. A new district, Al-Hawija, has been created taking territory 
from the central Kirkuk district and thus creating an Arab dominated district. 
Another smaller change that was made was that the Daquq sub-district was 
removed from Tuz Khormato and attached to the central Kirkuk district. 
Through these changes Kirkuk gained another district moving from four to five 
districts. 
 
 
Map 3 
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Map 4 shows Kirkuk as it stood in 1976, as is evident drastic changes have 
been made to the external borders. This was the largest geographic change 
that occurred as part of the Arabisation of Kirkuk where large districts with 
Kurdish or Turkmen majorities were removed from the Kirkuk Governorate 
and attached to others. The Chamchamal District and part of the Kalar District 
were removed from the Kirkuk Governorate and attached to the Slemani 
Governorate. The Tuz Khormato District was also removed from the Kirkuk 
Governorate and attached to the Salahaddin Governorate. Finally, the 
remaining part of the Kalar District and the Kifri District were attached to the 
Diyala Governorate. Furthermore, in addition to the changing of the external 
borders, the internal borders were changed too with the creation of a new 
district called Dubz, taking away territory from the central Kirkuk District. 
Kirkuk Governorate went from having five districts to just having three and 
lost over 10,000 sq. km in the process. 
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Map 5 shows Kirkuk as it stood in 1977 and once again the external borders 
have been changed. As is evident by the map the district of Dubz has 
increased in size and the border is no longer created by the Small Zab, but 
instead extends beyond the river; thus removing Sargaran from the Erbil 
Governorate and attaching it to the Kirkuk Governorate. 
 
 
 
Map 5 
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Map 6 shows Kirkuk as it stood in 1987 and illustrates how further Arabisation 
has taken place through increasing the territory of the Arab dominated district 
of Al-Hawija by detaching the Al-Zab sub-district from the Mosul Governorate 
and attaching it to the Kirkuk Governorate. 
 
Map 6 
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Map 7 is of Kirkuk in 1997. This map illustrates how Sargaram has been 
detached from Dubz and has been reattached to the Erbil Governorate. 
Furthermore, Dubz has lost its district status and has been reattached to the 
central Kirkuk District as a sub-district. Internally, the Daquq sub-district and a 
large part of the Taza sub-district, both previously part of the central Kirkuk 
District, have been joined together to form the new Daquq District. 
 
 
 
Map 7 
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Map 8 demonstrates the loss of territory and administration units to Kirkuk, 
from 1957-1997, as part of the gerrymandering process. 
 
 
 
Map 8 
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1.3. Creation of New Iraqi Government 
On 20 March 2003 the US and allied forces launched an attack on Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. On 1 May 2003 the US declared an end to the war, 
thus ending Saddam’s reign and beginning the US led process of installing a 
new regime in Iraq.51 This included the appointment of Paul Bremer as Iraq's 
civil administrator, charged with supervising the transition to democracy.52 On 
13 July 2003 the Iraqi Governing Council was created, which consisted of 25 
members chosen by the US. An agreement was signed between Coalition 
Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council, on 15 November 2003, 
for a timetable and programme for the drafting of a new constitution followed 
by elections. The Iraqi Governing Council signed an interim constitution, 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004. Following the 
timetable set out, on 28 June 2004 the Iraqi Governing Council was dissolved 
and the US handed power over to a newly created Iraqi government with Iyad 
Allawi as prime minister.53 On 18 August 2004 the Iraqi National Conference 
selected a one hundred seat national assembly to oversee Iyad Allawi’s 
government until general elections could be held.  Elections were held in Iraq 
on 30 January 2005 and by 7 April Jalal Talabani was elected – to the largely 
ceremonial position of – president of Iraq. On 15 October 2005 Iraq voted on 
a referendum for a new constitution and on 15 December 2005 elections were 
held for a full term government. On 21 January 2006 the Shiite-led United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 ‘Iraq War’. Encyclopædia Britannica [Online] Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/870845/Iraq-War/231539/Occupation-and-
continued-warfare [Accessed 15/05/2013] 
52 Siddique, Haroon & Mark Tran. ‘Timeline: Iraq 2003-2010’ Guardian [Online] Available from 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jul/30/iraq-timeline-2003-2009 [Accessed 
15/05/2013] 
53 ‘Iraqi Governing Council.’ Global Security [Online] Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/igc.htm [Accessed 25/06/2013] 
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Iraqi Alliance were announced as winners of the election, but without an 
absolute majority. On 22 April 2006 the Shiite politician Nouri al-Maliki was 
appointed as prime minister of Iraq.54 
 
1.4. Political Wrangling over Kirkuk 
Following Turkey’s refusal to allow the coalition forces to use its airspace 
during the 2nd Gulf War, the Kurds of Iraq were able to become a key ally to 
the US due to their strategic location. As a result of this, as well as of the 
stability of the Kurdish region in comparison to the rest of Iraq, the Kurds were 
able to take advantage of the war and gain a council (established by the US) 
in Kirkuk more favourable to the Kurds – thus exerting an early influence on 
the governance of Kirkuk.55  Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Kurds 
were able to begin returning to Kirkuk – some of the realistic estimations 
suggest that as many as a quarter of a million Kurds have ‘returned’56 since 
the outbreak of the war.57 Thus the Kurds have managed to reverse the trend 
of Arabisation and gain a numerical and political advantage in Kirkuk province. 
This has become an issue of conflict as the Turkmen and Arabs believe that 
far more Kurds have returned than were ever expelled, thus leading to 
accusations that Kurdification is now taking place in Kirkuk. The numerical 
advantage that the Kurds managed to gain, paired with the stability of the 
Kurdish region meant the Kurds found themselves in a strong position. 
Furthermore, the Kurds made gains in the Transitional Administrative Law 	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(TAL); Article 58 of the TAL sanctioned a process of normalisation, followed 
by a census and then a referendum on the status of the disputed territories. 
This largely favoured the Kurds in Kirkuk, as it was deemed that Article 58 
would lead to them gaining control of Kirkuk. Another factor in the Kurds’ 
ascendance was the fact that according to the TAL two-thirds of three or more 
governorates were able to reject proposals, thus giving the Kurds a large 
bargaining tool by effectively giving them a veto right in the creation of the 
permanent constitution.58  Although positive for the Kurds this went against 
the other ethnicities in Kirkuk who wanted an immediate census in Kirkuk 
(prior to normalisation), before the Kurds could alter the numbers.  
 By the time of the January 2005 election the Kurds had not managed 
to implement Article 58 of the TAL, but had managed to gain the right to vote 
in Kirkuk for the ‘returnee’ Kurds. The Kirkuk Brotherhood List, which 
consisted mainly of the Kurdish parties, succeeded in gaining just under 60% 
of the votes in the January election – thus giving them a majority of the seats 
on the council of Kirkuk. The Front of Iraqi Turkmens and the Iraqi Republican 
Assembly only secured eight and five seats respectively, in comparison to the 
twenty-six of the Kurdish dominated list. At a national level the Kurds also 
found themselves in a good position, with their list winning seventy-five seats 
– over a quarter of the total number of seats in the Iraqi parliament, and the 
Kurds managed to gain majority control in five of the eighteen governorates. 
As a result they managed to get Jalal Talabani elected as president of Iraq. 
The position the Kurds found themselves in nationally gave them significant 
power to influence the creation of the permanent constitution, which in turn 
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gave them power to deal with the Kirkuk issue. This allowed the Kurds to 
introduce the idea of federalism into the constitution, giving them a Kurdish 
region, and to introduce Article 140, which gave a deadline for the 
implementation of Article 58 of the TAL of the 31st December 2007. Following 
the elections in January 2005 no agreement was reached between the 
ethnicities of Kirkuk for a power sharing arrangement and the Kurds went 
ahead in forming a government by themselves, however, many of the 
governing decisions were still coming from Baghdad and cooperation 
between the ethnicities in the Kirkuk council was virtually non existent. In the 
national election in December 2005 the Kurds’ percentage of the Kirkuki votes 
decreased to just over 53%, due largely to the participation of the Sunni 
Arabs who had boycotted the previous election. On a national level Talabani 
remained as president and the Kurds’ support for Nuri al-Maliki as prime 
minister gained them a written guarantee for the implementation of Article 140 
and resulted in the creation of the Article 140 Committee. The duty of this 
committee was to fulfil the article by its deadline, but progress was slow and 
by November 2007 only 1000 of the 36000 normalisation claims for 
compensation had been processed – leaving them failing at the first step of 
normalisation with the deadline drawing near. As a result of this the deadline 
was extended at the proposal of United Nations (UN) special envoy to Iraq, 
Stefan De Mistura, and was approved by the federal supreme court, rather 
than voted for by parliamentary vote, where it would have clearly failed due to 
the lack of support from non-Kurds – thus putting into question the continued 
legitimacy of Article 140.59 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 113-163. 
	  	   50	  
 
1.5. Leading up to the 2010 Elections 
With Article 140 seemingly dead in the water, the problem over the future 
status of Kirkuk and its governance still persisted and there was no plan, 
agreed upon by all the factions, to deal with the issue. In Kirkuk itself, the 
various ethnonationalisms occupied themselves with the task of proving the 
legitimacy of their ownership of Kirkuk and manoeuvring their ethnicity into a 
better position, rather than establishing a government and governing the 
region for the best of the population. For example, both Arabs and Turkmen 
avoided council meetings refusing to participate in what they saw as a 
Kurdish dominated council.60 The political process was continually slowed 
down and undermined by these actions. Kirkuk did not participate in the 
January 2009 provincial elections due to the political situation there. Article 23, 
part of the Provincial Elections Law relating directly to Kirkuk, had been set up 
to deal with this issue. The purpose of this article was to allow for a temporary 
power sharing arrangement in Kirkuk until local elections could be held under 
a newly formed election law, created specifically for Kirkuk. As part of this 
article the Article 23 Committee was formed, which consisted of two Kurds, 
two Arabs, two Turkmen and one Assyrian. The duties of the committee 
included examining power sharing for Kirkuk, the distribution of power, and 
the demographic issues that exist in Kirkuk. It was their duty to report back on 
these issues to the Iraqi parliament so that they could then create a new 
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election law for Kirkuk.61 UNAMI became heavily involved with the Article 23 
Committee and as part of this organised a trip to Northern Ireland for the 
members of the committee in order to learn about the Northern Irish 
successes on some of these very issues.62  Deadlines for the Article 23 
Committee’s report on Kirkuk came and went and the committee began to be 
viewed as a charade, rather then a research group that could provide any 
resolutions to the issues in Kirkuk63. Evidently the Article 23 Committee faded 
into the distance and none of their recommendations were used for the 
creation of a new electoral law for Kirkuk.64 Thus, with no agreement reached 
on a new electoral law the Turkmen threatened to boycott the census that 
would determine a list of eligible voters for a referendum on Kirkuk’s future 
until the question of the influx of Kurds was addressed.65 When it came to 
forming the electoral law needed for the 2010 election, Kurdish lawmakers 
threatened to abstain from a vote to decide the voter-registration to use for a 
Kirkuk election,66 attempting to negotiate instead.67 When an agreement was 
reached it was not desirable to all parties and was not a permanent deal – 
although the new electoral rolls were to be used, they were subject to 	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investigation and the results could be modified.68 A new electoral law was 
finally agreed with national elections planned for March 2010, but this did not 
settle the issue of Kirkuk, which was still placed under a year-long review.69 
The 2010 National elections saw a large proportion of the Arab and Turkmen 
political parties align themselves together against the Kurds (and their desire 
to annexe Kirkuk to the KRG), in the Iraqiya list.70 This detracted from the 
Kurds’ political dominance in Kirkuk, with the Kurdish Alliance and Iraqiya 
each winning six seats in the national elections.71 Although the Arabs and 
Turkmen formed an alliance, this is not to say that conflict between the two 
does not exist, as the purpose of this alliance was solely to prevent Kirkuk 
joining the KRG. There still remain issues of conflict between Arabs and 
Turkmen relating to political power in Kirkuk and the reversal of Arabisation, 
which was responsible for the decline of the Turkmen population in Kirkuk. 
This was seen in February 2011 when clashes erupted between these two 
factions due to problems over land tenure in the Bashir village of southern 
Kirkuk. In these clashes three members of the Awakening Council72 were 
killed while three other Arabs and four Turkmen were wounded.73 The 2010 
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election results led to the battle over the future of Kirkuk becoming embroiled 
in the task of forming a government in Iraq, with the Kurds seeking 
guarantees over the future before joining any alliance and other parties in 
Kirkuk threatening to withdraw if a government was formed as a result of a 
deal made on Kirkuk.  
The long awaited national census was planned for October 24, 2010. 
This caused problems, as despite the fact that elections had been held in 
March a government had still not been formed by the time the census was 
supposed to take place. The instability created due to the lack of a 
government, paired with the threat of the census led to an increase in ethnic 
tensions in Kirkuk. These ethnic tensions were highly evident in the political 
arena, with numerous accusations being directed at opposing ethnicities. One 
such accusation came from the speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament, Kamal 
Kirkuki, who claimed that 8520 new Arab families had settled in Kirkuk since 
the 2003-US-led invasion of Iraq, thus in his opinion continuing the 
Arabisation of Kirkuk.  This charge was carried forth by the Kurdish 
newspaper Rudaw, who claimed that by October 2010, 14000 Arab families 
had been compensated to move back to their original area, yet had remained 
in Kirkuk. Kirkuk’s Kurdish Governor at the time, Abdurrahman Mustafa, 
received criticism from other Kurdish officials for not evicting these Arab 
families, however Mustafa claimed that it was not within his power to do so 
and should instead be implemented by Kirkuk’s Governorate Council and the 
Immigration Office. These accusations created tension between the Kurds 
and the Arabs, as well as amongst the various Kurdish officials themselves.74  	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 Tensions were further increased when Kurdish security forces in Kirkuk 
claimed that large numbers of the incoming Arab settlers had links to 
terrorists. Brig. Gen. Sarhad Qadir, a high-ranking police official in Kirkuk, 
went further saying that the insurgents had connections with the officials 
inside the city. He claimed that he had to send his forces to a jewellery 
robbery, despite it happening 100m from a police station. He also questioned 
how the three cars of heavily armed men involved in this robbery made it 
through the checkpoints and into the city.75 As result of these increasing 
tensions between the factions during this period of uncertainty, Kirkuk saw an 
increase in violence; including many kidnappings, assassinations and 
bombings.76 Although there has steadily been a yearly decrease in violence 
over the entire of Iraq, and 2010 was no different, beginning in March there 
was a drastic increase in violence that continued until the census was 
postponed and a government was formed. During this time period Kirkuk was 
Iraq’s fifth deadliest province. The unrest was clearly demonstrated through 
the direction of the violence, with security and political entities increasingly 
becoming targets. Therefore, although violence had continued to decrease in 
Kirkuk as a whole, the period from March to October, 2010 saw an increase in 
violence in comparison to rest of the year.77 This increase in violence created 
a fear that tensions could increase and reach the stage of all-out ethnic 
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conflict, especially with the impending withdrawal of US troops.78 Thus this 
period of uncertainty, and more importantly the issues that created this 
uncertainty has demonstrated the precarious nature of the political situation in 
Kirkuk and by extension the importance of resolving these issues before 
another period such as this emerges and possibly passes the threshold this 
time into all-out ethnic conflict. 
Although, as part of Article 140, a census for Kirkuk was supposed to 
be carried out by the end of 2007, continual delays and two postponements 
led to an eventual date being set for the census of October 24, 2010. Due to 
a fear that this census would lead to Kurdish control of Kirkuk, Turkmen and 
Arabs threatened to boycott it, whereas the Kurds insisted that it must go 
ahead. The Iraqi Turkmen Front79 stated that the census should not go ahead 
until the formation of a new government and the application of Article 23, 
relating to the distribution of administration positions, were completed.80 On 4 
October, the census was postponed until December 5, 2010. This was just 
another deferral to a census that was originally planned for 2007. According 
to the Deputy Planning Minister of Iraq, Mehdi al-Alak, the census was 
postponed in order to conclude some unresolved negotiations – mainly the 
control of land around the provinces of Kirkuk and Nineveh.81 As part of the 
discussions about the census, Ali Baban, Baghdad’s Planning Minister, 
suggested the possibility of removing the question of ethnicity from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Gordan, Michael and Andrew Lehran. ‘Tensions High Along Kurdish-Arab Line’ New York 
Times [Online] Available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/middleeast/24kurds.html?_r=1&ref=michael_r_gor
don [Accessed 25/10/2010] 
79 Coalition of the majority of Turkmen parties in Iraq. 
80 Taha, Yaseen. ‘Incensed over the Census.’ Niqash [Online] Available from 
http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2752&lang=0 [Accessed 
18/10/2010] 
81 AFP. ‘Iraq Postpones Nationwide Census Again.’ Kurd Net [Online] Available from 
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2010/10/kirkuk629.htm [Accessed 18/10/2010] 
	  	   56	  
census. In response to this, Osman al-Senaidi, Planning Minister for the KRG, 
said that if the question of ethnicity were removed from the census the KRG 
would not participate.82 However, the ethnicity question aside, the Federal 
Supreme Court ruled that the national census has no relationship to Article 
140 and that Article 140 called for a separate census for the disputed 
territories, whereas this is a census for the whole of Iraq.83  In late November, 
just a couple of weeks prior to when the census was supposed to take place, 
a committee was formed, which consisted of representatives from the 
disputed territories, to discuss the issues. This placed doubts as to whether 
the census would actually take place on December 5.84 As was expected, the 
Council of Ministers postponed the General Census and stated that a new 
date would be decided in the future.85 As the Federal Supreme Court had 
ruled that this census was not part of Article 140, it begs the question as to 
why the census was postponed due to issues with the disputed territories. 
Following the postponement, it was said that the census would go ahead on 
20 December 2010, however this date was not released officially. Inevitably, 
with such a tight time frame, this date was not upheld and a new date for the 
census was not released.86 This delay was partly caused by al-Iraqiya not 
attending the meetings of the Special Actions Committee, whose objective it 
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was to examine the issues relating to the census in the disputed territories.87 
As demonstrated, the threat of an impending census contributed to the 
creation of a period of uncertainty, which helped increase ethnic tensions in 
Kirkuk. However, the census itself also created ethnic tensions as the Arabs 
and Turkmen were against it, for fears that it would lead to the eventual 
annexation of Kirkuk to the KRG, whilst the Kurds continually demanded its 
implementation as part of Article 140. 
 
1.6. Formation of Government following 2010 elections 
The March 2010 national elections saw al-Iraqiya winning just two more seats 
than the coalition led by Maliki, State of Law, which put the Kurds in a strong 
position as these two parties were aiming to win power in a coalition 
government. For this reason the Kurds released a document containing 
nineteen conditions that would need to be agreed to in order for them to join 
any coalition. These conditions included the implementation of Article 140.88 
As a result of this, Arab and Turkmen parties (Arab Political Council and 
Turkmen blocs) in Kirkuk threatened to cease their support for the al-Iraqiya 
coalition unless it made its stance on the Kurdish demands clear. They also 
stated that they would not support any government that was made over a 
deal regarding Kirkuk.89 After weeks of intensive negotiations by all parties 
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under the Barzani Initiative90, and several months after the election in March, 
an agreement was reached on a new joint power sharing government on 11 
November 2010. This deal saw Maliki remain as prime minister, Talabani 
remain as president, Osama al-Nujaifi (al-Iraqiya) elected as speaker of the 
parliament and also included the creation of a new strategic council to act as 
a check on the prime minister’s power, which would be chaired by Allawi.91 
The Kirkuk question played a central role in the formation of this new 
government and as part of this deal the KBC and the National coalition signed 
an agreement stating that Maliki would implement Article 140 in a two-year 
time period. The Kurds insisted that this be installed as a condition for them 
joining the coalition, however Maliki had previously signed an agreement with 
the Kurds to implement Article 140, which was never upheld.92  
 The new Article 140 Committee instantaneously ran into problems as 
Narmin Othman, the Deputy Head of the committee, claimed that they had 
requested 700 billion Iraqi Dinars (IQD) to be allocated for reimbursing the 
displaced people to move back to their area of origin, but was only allocated 
two billion IQD for this purpose. She stated that this was a deliberate ploy to 
postpone the implementation of Article 140 and that she did not expect the 
article to be fulfilled in the two years that forecasted.93 Therefore, although the 
Kurds were in a strong position leading up to the formation of the government, 
it seems that they have found themselves in the same place as before, where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 This was a series of meetings, organised by the KRG President, for all the parties to 
negotiate towards the creation of a new coalition government. 
91 ‘Power sharing deal reached in Iraq.’ Al Jazeera [Online] Available from 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/11/201011119329394717.html [Accessed 
11/11/2010] 
92 Ali, Saman. ‘Maliki signed to implement article 140 in two years.’ AK News [Online] 
Available from http://aknews.com/en/aknews/4/204359/ [Accessed 21/12/2010] 
93 Ahmed, Hevidar. ‘Neighbors’ interference greatest impediment for enforcing article 140, 
says official.’ AKnews [Online] Available from http://aknews.com/en/aknews/4/214014/ 
[Accessed 28/01/2011] 
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the completion of Article 140 is promised, but unlikely to happen. This is even 
more unlikely due to the strength that al-Iraqiya, who oppose Article 140, has 
in Kirkuk and Baghdad. This reiterates the problem Article 140 posses to 
Kirkuk; rather than being a solution to ethnic tension, it creates more of an 
ethnic struggle. 
1.7. Tigris Tensions and the Repercussions for Iraqi Politics 
 
In May 2012 Maliki ordered the dissolving of the Diyala Operations 
Command94 and for the creation of the Dijla Operations Command (Tigris 
Operation), which links the Iraqi army's fourth, fifth and 12th divisions. He 
claimed it was created to secure the provinces of Diyala, Salahaddin and 
Kirkuk. Maliki – without the agreement of parliament – appointed a senior 
member of his own party, Abdul Amir al-Zaidi, as commander of this force, 
which only further intensified the Kurds and Sunni’s fear that he was trying to 
increase his power over Iraq and form a dictatorship. Abdul Amir al-Zaidi, is 
seen as very hostile to the implementation of Article 140; has a history of 
antagonism with the peshmerga95 and security forces of Kirkuk; and was a 
high-ranking Shiite member of the military under the Ba’ath regime. 96 
Furthermore, the Kurds claim that he played a role in the Anfal campaign 
against them in the late 1980s.97  Salah Dalo, Head of KDP Kirkuk and 
Garmiyan Leadership Council states: ‘The commander was involved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 The military command in charge of security of Diyala province. 
95 KRG’s official army. 
96 ‘Paper Views Kurdish ‘Fears’ Over Operations Command in Eastern Iraq.’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring [Online] Available from http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-
298383721/paper-views-kurdish-fears.html [Accessed 17/01/2013] 
97 This was voiced to the author in an interview conducted with Fatih Muhammed Ameen, 
Member of KDP's Kirkuk-Garmiyan leadership Council, Kirkuk – 06/06/13 and in: ‘Iraq: Kurds, 
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Warily-Around-Kirkuk--Oil-and-All-- [Accessed 16/01/2013] 
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Anfal campaigns against the Kurds’, which strengthens their belief that Maliki 
is getting ready to take not only Kirkuk, but also Iraq, by force.98 In September 
the Kurdish parties agreed to object to the creation of the Dijla Operation, 
stating that it was unconstitutional as the constitution stipulates that the 
security of the disputed territories should be jointly managed by the KRG and 
Baghdad until Article 140 is implemented. Kirkuk’s provincial council also 
reached an agreement to oppose the Dijla Operation on the same grounds.99 
The President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani claimed that Maliki had no right to form 
this operation as ‘the emergency is imposed with the approval of the 
President and the Premier’ and he, as president, did not approve it. 100 
Whereas Baghdad claimed that it was necessary in order to combat terrorism 
and thus placed the Dijla Command as overseers of the police and security 
forces, which are dominated by the Kurds.101 Consequently, the Kurds believe 
that Maliki is using the army to strengthen his hold over Iraq. Salah Dalo, 
illustrates this by stating that: 
The Iraqi army must be for everyone not just for Maliki – Iraq is returning to a 
dictatorship. Kirkuk security system belongs to Maliki, not like in other cities 
where all the agencies belong to the governor and are under his control. 
Kirkuk cannot be different from the other cities. In Kirkuk, before this, all 
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Leadership Council, Kirkuk KDP Head Office, 17/04/2013 
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nations ran security, even the Christians, but the Arabs want to go back to the 
time of Saddam where they controlled everything.102 
As a direct result of the creation of the Dijla Operation and the increase in 
Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, the KRG leadership created a joint command for the 
Kurdish peshmerga, security and police forces in Kirkuk.103 Following this, in 
November 2012 both Kurdish and Iraqi forces amassed in and around Kirkuk, 
with just 15km separating the two armies. In Kirkuk city, the governor acted to 
maintain control of the city by setting up checkpoints to prevent the army from 
entering the city and by ordering the directors of the police not to obey orders 
from Baghdad. ‘We ensured the police did not obey the order that everything 
would come under military control. The Iraqi army knew if they entered there 
would be a confrontation.’ 104  The military flexing between the two 
governments has had a direct result on the people of Kirkuk, as with fear of 
an outbreak of civil war in Kirkuk many foreign businesses suspended their 
operations in Kirkuk. As seen before, with regards to negotiations on Kirkuk, 
the actions of the KRG and Baghdad, although taken without consultation 
with the people of Kirkuk, have greatly affected the Kirkuki population and 
once again fears of open military confrontation were heightened.105  
 
With the amassing of both Kurdish and Maliki-controlled troops in Kirkuk, 
tensions were high and finally erupted in November 2012 when a gun battle 
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wells  [Accessed 09/04/2013] 
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ensued between the Kurdish peshmerga and the police.  According to the 
commander of the Dijla Operations, Lt. Gen. al-Zaidi, the police were chasing 
a smuggler who took refuge in a PUK office and when the police tried to 
break in those guarding the office fired upon them and as a result one person 
was killed and several were injured. 106  Following this incident the KRG 
President, Massoud Barzani, issued a statement ordering peshmerga forces 
‘to exercise restraint in the face of provocations, but also to be in the highest 
state of readiness to face any aggressive acts.’ As a result Baghdad moved 
more troops into the area and Maliki warned the peshmerga not to change 
positions or to approach the federal forces.107 The animosity between the 
KRG and Baghdad continued with numerous negative statements from both 
sides about the other. In one such statement Qubad Talabani, the KRG 
Washington representative at the time and son of Jalal Talabani, said: 'Why 
be part of a country that a) cuts your budget, b) constantly undermines the 
constitution and c) then attacks you'.108 Whilst Baghdad highlighted that if 
Exxon, which had received oil rights from the KRG, drilled for oil in the 
disputed areas it would be seen as a declaration of war.109 Additionally, in an 
interview about the creation of the Dijla operations, Massoud Barzani had the 
following to say:  
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The escalation to begin with started by the Federal Government and from the 
prime minister's office and actually neither the cabinet or House of 
Representatives know. Essentially, the formation of the operations commands 
should be carried out with the approval of the parliament. The whole thing is 
essentially unconstitutional. Building the army in this way is unconstitutional 
because now it is not Iraq's army but the army of one person.110  
Many of the political actors on the ground in Kirkuk called for the return of US 
troops in order to ease and monitor the situation. However, when US Vice-
President, Joe Biden offered to send troops, Maliki rejected the offer 
outright.111 The situation between the KRG and Baghdad also raised concerns 
from its neighbours, with Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogon, 
stating that ‘We always had concerns that, God forbid, this [conflict] might turn 
into a sectarian clash. Now our fears are slowly becoming real’. 112  The 
relationship between the KRG and Turkey has strengthened, whilst the 
relationship between Turkey and Baghdad has soured; Maliki sees Turkey as 
pursuing hostile policies in the region and interfering with Iraqi affairs. A major 
cause of Maliki’s discontent was the unauthorised visit to Kirkuk by Turkish 
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu in August 2012, which was facilitated by 
the KRG.113 Baghdad also expelled Turkey’s state owned oil company from 
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Iraq and denied landing permission, in Erbil, for Turkey’s Energy Minister.114 
Still tensions remained high between the KRG and Baghdad and this was 
exacerbated by Barzani’s visit to Kirkuk were he stated  that: ‘[Kurds] are 
against the war and we do not like war, but if things come to war, then all 
Kurdish people are ready to fight in order to preserve the Kurdish identity of 
Kirkuk.’115  
The situation in Kirkuk seemed to be improving by December 2012 
when Baghdad and the KRG reached a preliminary agreement to let the 
inhabitants of the disputed areas oversee their own security and thus replace 
Kurdish and Iraqi forces. The implementation of this is another matter as it 
would take a great deal of time to realise and would be an extremely difficult 
task with no actual agreement on the future of the disputed territories in 
place.116 However, despite this agreement, which was brokered by Talabani 
and involved the committee created to try and solve the issue, Kurdish forces 
shot at an Iraqi military helicopter on 12 December 2012, which they claimed 
was taking pictures of the position of their forces.117 Fears of conflict further 
increased when Talabani suffered a stroke later in December, as he is seen 
as the calming force and mediator between Barzani and Maliki. 118  With 	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Talabani in hospital negotiations stopped, however in late December 
ministers from both sides did attend the meetings of the committee 
responsible for ending the issue of security in the disputed territories.119 In 
January the ethnic violence in Kirkuk had increased with a number of attacks 
on Kurds and Turkmen. A suicide bomber blew himself up outside the offices 
of Kurdistan Democratic Party in Kirkuk, whilst a car bomb exploded close by 
killing two people. In Tuz Khurmatu, another car bomb went off at the local 
headquarters of the Kurdish security forces, killing five people. 120  Many 
blamed the increase in violence in Kirkuk on the Dijla Operations, including 
the Spokesperson for the KDP Asayesh121, Lieutenant Colonel Azad:  
in Kirkuk, after the creation of the Dijla Command Operations all the terrorist 
activities inside Kirkuk city, bombs, roadside bombs, car bombs, suicide attacks, 
etc., increased. Not just in Kirkuk, also in Diyala and Tikrit, which also belong to 
the Dijla Operation Command.122  
The sectarian violence in the disputed territories escalated even further when 
a suicide bomber blew up a tent of Turkmen mourners in Tuz Khurmatu, 
which was previously part of Kirkuk province, leaving 35 people dead and 117 
injured. As the deceased was a civil servant many Turkmen politicians were 
present at his funeral. Following the incident, Faid Alla, a tribal leader, 
demanded that there be international forces to secure the Turkmen and their 
areas.123 In another incident suicide bombers killed at least 16 people, in the 
beginning of February 2013, outside the police headquarters in Kirkuk when a 	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vehicle made to resemble a police car exploded outside the entrance whilst 
two gunmen dressed as police and wearing suicide vests tried to shoot their 
way into the building, but were killed before they had the chance. Amongst 
the many injured was Kirkuk police chief, Sarhan Qader.124  
Moreover, it is not just the Kurds who are unhappy with Maliki, with the 
creation of the Dijla operations being part of the wider discontent over Maliki’s 
governance and the lack of power sharing. This discontent led to widespread 
protests from Sunnis across Iraq, particularly in Anbar, Salahaddin, Nineveh, 
Diyala and Kirkuk.125 Both Kurdish and Sunni politicians boycotted cabinet 
meetings to show support for the protestors.126 Protests continued throughout 
Iraq with the Sadr movement127, the Kurdish parties and Iraqiya making 
statements against Maliki and what they see as his authoritarian government. 
Part of this issue is related to the arrest of nine guards, under alleged 
terrorism charges, belonging to the finance minister, Rafa al-Essawi, who is a 
leading member of the Iraqiya bloc.128 As a result of the ongoing sectarian 
tensions and the continued protests against the government the Iraqiya bloc 
persisted with its boycott of cabinet meetings.129 At the same time, Kurdistan 
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Alliance (KA) MP, Mahmoud Othman, claimed that the boycott by Iraqiya MPs 
resulted in a negative affect on the council and made it unable to resolve the 
current issues. He thus opined that the UN should act as mediator to the 
current crisis as Iraq is still under Chapter VII130 and under the domination of 
the Security Council and the United Nations.131 As the protests against the 
government continued throughout Iraq in January 2013, many of Kirkuk’s 
Arab MPs put their resignation in the hands of the leaders of Iraqiya calling for 
the government to meet the demands of the protestors.132 The mounting 
tensions within Iraq in the beginning of 2013 led to sectarian violence 
between Sunni and Shiites across the country and a very real threat of civil 
war. Ethnic tensions in Iraq were further exacerbated on 25 January 2013 
when Iraqi troops opened fire on Sunni protesters in Falluja killing at least 
seven civilians and injuring many more. Later the following day two soldiers 
were killed and one was injured at a checkpoint in an act of retaliation. 
Following the death of the protestors Jaber al-Jaberi, a member of the Iraqiya 
bloc, stated that Iraqiya had ‘decided to stop all negotiations with the Maliki 
government’ and that they wanted the Shiite bloc to present a new candidate 
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for prime minister. 133 In light of the escalation of ethnic tension and violence 
both politically and on the ground, the UN Special Envoy to Iraq, Martin 
Kobler, called for the Iraqi leadership ‘to take all necessary steps that are 
required to deal with this alarming situation, particularly in Kirkuk, the symbol 
of peaceful coexistence in Iraq.’ 134  The Iraqiya Minister for Agriculture, 
Izzedine al-Dawla, resigned from the government following the death of a 
protestor in Mosul after the security forces yet again opened fire on 
protestors. 135  Whilst the Kurds were also making threats against the 
government with KA member, Adel Berwari, claiming that they could withdraw 
Kurdish ministers from the government and declare the independence of 
Kurdistan economically if the federal government continued to refuse to pay 
the dues of the oil companies operating in the KRG.136 This followed the 
ratifying of the 2013 budget on 7 March 2013, which was done in the absence 
of those parties that were boycotting the parliament, including the Kurds. As a 
result of this the Kurdish parties continued to boycott the parliament and as 
voiced by Berwari, threatened to withdraw completely. Although this would 
not necessary lead to the toppling of Maliki’s government as members of the 
Sadrist Movement replaced those Iraqiya politicians who resigned.137 In what 
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seemed to be a response to the government’s handling of the protests Shiites 
were increasingly targeted by terrorist attacks, with Friday prayers in 
particular being targeted. On Friday 29 March car bombs hit several Shiite 
mosques in Baghdad and Kirkuk, with 23 people being killed and dozens 
being injured.138 All the sectarian violence led to March 2013 being a bloody 
month – even by Iraqi standards – with the violence leading to the death of 
229 civilians, whilst 853 were injured.139  
The sectarian violence only increased prior to the elections and on 
April 15 there was a coordinated bombing campaign throughout Iraq, with 
only the far south and the KRG being spared. These attacks resulted in the 
death of at least 75 and a further 356 were injured. In Kirkuk all 
neighbourhoods were targeted and 9 people died, whilst 79 were injured.140 A 
protestor was killed and several were injured when the army, under the Dijla 
Command, opened fire on the Sunni protest against Maliki in the Hawija 
district of Kirkuk.141 On 23 April the army, under the Dijla Command, raided 
the Hawija protest claiming that they were looking for wanted suspects and 
clashes between the protestors and the army ensued. In the resulting 
violence at least 28 people were killed and more than 70 were injured. This 
act of violence was largely condemned by the Sunni bloc, as well as by the 
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Sadrists and the Kurds.142 With tensions between Sunnis and Shiites already 
at a high level, the strain created by another incident where protestors were 
killed left the whole country fearing that Iraq was on the brink of civil war.  
This fear only intensified with the events following the incident; where 13 
gunmen were killed whilst trying to take over government posts, protestors in 
Fallujah took to the streets shouting for war and later clashed with the security 
forces. As well as these Sunni retaliations, there seemed to be Shiite reaction 
too, with many Sunni mosques targeted by snipers and bombs leading to the 
death of tens of Sunni worshipers.143 The handling of the protests in Hawija 
led to a fresh round of criticisms of Maliki’s government by Sunni’s, Sadrists 
and the Kurds.144 It also resulted in the resignation of three Sunni ministers – 
with the Minister of Industry and Minerals, Ahmed al-Karbuly; the Minister of 
Education, Mohammed Tamim; and the Minister of Science, Abdul Karim al-
Sumarai, all resigning.145 This makes the total of five Sunni ministers quitting 
the government with the Agriculture Minister, Ezzedine al-Dawleh, and the 
Finance Minister, Rafa al-Essawi, having already quit.146 After two days of 
violence relating to the attack of the Hawija protest, 128 people had died and 
269 were injured. Part of this surge in violence saw gunmen take complete 
control of the town of Sulaiman Bek (which is administratively linked to Tuz 	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Khurmatu) in Salahaddin Province.147 After days of controlling the town the 
gunmen left after mediation with tribal leaders and the governor of 
Salahaddin.148 At this point even Maliki seemed willing to admit that Iraq was 
on the brink of civil war in his address to the nation: ‘If (sectarian) conflict 
erupts, there will be no winner or loser. All will lose, whether in southern or 
northern or western or eastern Iraq.’149 However, the unrest did not abate and 
continued for the third day following the protests. Gunmen seized parts of 
Mosul on 24 April 2013 and in the resulting battle at least 15 police and 31 
militants were killed.150 In the wake of the troubles the resigning Minister of 
Science, al-Sumarai, called for the resignation of Maliki: ‘One of the solutions 
is the resignation of the prime minister and for him to leave the government to 
another who can run it temporarily. Otherwise, the options for Iraq are only 
dangerous ones.’ 151 As the violence entered its fourth day, more than 200 
people had been killed and it was not helped by clerics such as Sheikh 
Hamed al-Kubaisi urging each Sunni tribe to give 100 men for the creation of 
a Sunni army.152 If one is to believe that Iraq has entered a civil war, the 	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storming of the Hawija protest camp on 23 April 2013 can be seen as the 
starting point. 
With the increase in violence the peshmerga moved into positions 
abandoned by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk with permission of the governor.153 
Jabbar Yawar, secretary general of the KRG’s peshmerga Ministry, claimed 
that this was to fill a vacuum in security around the city. Whilst, Staff General 
Ali Ghaidan Majeed, the commander of Iraqi ground forces, claimed this was 
a move to reach the oilfields.154 The continued violence following the deaths of 
the Hawija protestors led to April being the deadliest month in Iraq since June 
2008, with 712 people being killed and 1633 injured.155 Iraqiya – who won the 
most votes in Kirkuk during the 2011 national elections – list member, Hamid 
al-Mutlaq, criticised the army’s actions in the protests and called for them to 
withdraw from the cities and to return to the borders where they belong.156 
The Turkmen have called for both the army and the peshmerga to withdraw 
from Kirkuk, with the Turkmenli representative, Salar Erbil, calling for the 
creation of a unit that ‘should specialise in terrorism and not be an army’ and 
that should be made up of ‘32% of each ethnic group, Arabs, Kurds and 
Turkmen and 4% for the Christians.’157 In contrast, the Arab Political Council 
in Kirkuk called for the 12th Division of the Iraqi Army to be involved in the 
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security of the Kirkuk governorate, as they claim that the recent bombings in 
Kirkuk were a result of incompetence from the security forces and thus they 
should rely on professional officers to manage the security in Kirkuk.158 This 
idea is contested by the Governor of Kirkuk, Kirkuk’s Police Chief, the 
Asayesh spokesperson and the Commander of the Kurdish forces in Kirkuk. 
Sherko Fateeh Shwani, the Commander of the peshmerga around Kirkuk said 
that he had ceased to coordinate and share intelligence with the Iraqi army, 
and that this was probably the reason for increase of terrorism in Kirkuk.159 
The Police Chief, Sarhad Kadir, stated that they ‘cooperated with the army's 
intelligence service in the past. We [the police] exchanged information, and 
there were joint operations. That's over now.’160 The Kirkuk Governor stated 
that they ‘ordered all the directors of police not to obey the commands that 
are issued from Baghdad. So all the cooperation that used to exist when we 
had combined operations... between the police and the army has stopped 
completely.’ 161  The troubles for the army got worse when the Kurdish 
members of the 16th division refused to follow orders with regards to 
defending the town of Sulaiman Bek as they did not want to have a negative 
affect on already strained Kurdish/Arab relations in the disputed territories. As 
a result of this the Kurdish forces asked to come under the umbrella of the 
peshmerga and although they remained in the disputed area, they ceased to 
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take orders from the army and began receiving rations from the Peshmerga 
Ministry.162  When the Kurdish forces were asked to leave the province to be 
replaced by Shiite forces they refused and instead they occupied land in Tuz 
Khurmatu, which is important to the Kurds as it was previously part of Kirkuk 
(see Chapter 1.2.).163 As a result of the peshmerga’s movements the Kurdish 
security forces witnessed several attacks aimed at them in Kirkuk. On May 7 
suicide bombs hit several peshmerga-operated checkpoints, as well as the 
PUK head office. These attacks resulted in the five deaths, whilst 61 people 
were injured, the majority of whom were peshmerga.164 Whilst on May 15 the 
Kirkuk police chief’s convoy was targeted by a roadside bomb, which was 
followed by a car bomb and although he escaped two of his guards were 
killed and nine were injured.165  
As the violence continued in Iraq the attacks became more sectarian in 
nature with both Sunni and Shiite mosques being increasingly targeted.166 In 
Kirkuk a suicide bomber targeted a Shiite mosque that was hosting a funeral 
from the previous day’s violence, although he was prevented from entering, 
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four people were killed and 42 were injured.167 May 17 saw a wave of attacks 
targeting Sunnis that killed at least 76 people, thus making it the deadliest 
day for more than eight months. The deadliest attack came as worshipers 
were leaving the main Sunni mosque in Baqouba were the initial explosion 
was followed by a second, thus killing the onlookers, causing the death of 41 
people and injuring a further 56. Increasingly the situation in Iraq began to 
resemble a full-blown civil war and Jawad al-Hasnaw, a lawmaker from the 
Sadrist bloc, claimed that deadlier and darker days were to come. 168  In 
addition to the rise in attacks on mosques, the assaults also began to 
increasingly target the security forces. In one attack gunmen broke into the 
house of an anti-terrorism police captain, Adnan Ibrahim, and killed him and 
his family in their sleep. Whilst in Anbar, gunmen kidnapped eight policemen 
who were guarding the main highway linking Iraq to Jordan and Syria.169 The 
following day these policemen were found dead on a highway in Anbar.170 On 
20 May the attacks escalated with at least 77 people (and as many as 100) 
being killed and a further 248 injured. Again, the majority of these attacks 
were concentrated in and around Baghdad.171 With the violence continuing 
many more people began voicing their fears that perhaps Iraq had entered a 
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civil war.172 These fears increased as the violence became tit for tat in nature, 
alternating between attacks on Shiites and attacks on Sunnis, and continued 
targeting the police and army. On 21 May a suicide bomber attacked an army 
checkpoint and the blast was followed by gunmen opening fire on the troops 
– three soldiers were killed and nine were injured in this incident.173 On the 
same day at least 60 people were killed and 132 were injured across Iraq.174 
This comes after 24 police were killed in Anbar and six Sahwa were killed and 
many more injured north of the capital. 175 Antiwar.com, a website which lists 
the deaths in Iraq, has recorded an increasing trend of gunmen attacking 
police, particularly in Anbar.176 On 27 May a further 81 people were killed, 
whilst 246 were injured in violence that targeted mainly Shiites.177 
In response to the increase in terrorist attacks the Governor of Kirkuk 
implemented a programme to build trenches around the city in order to only 
allow people to enter through the checkpoints. He also stated that ‘People 
who are not from Kirkuk or do not have a residence permit will not be allowed 
to enter the city.’178 The Arab Political Council in Kirkuk strongly objected to 
this as they claim the trench is in order to create a defence line for the 	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peshmerga against the south. They also object to the fact that it prevents 
Arabs from entering the city and see it as a form of ethnic cleansing.179 In 
Baghdad’s response to the increase in violence the Iraqi cabinet met in late 
May to discuss ways to curb the unrest for fear that an all-out sectarian 
conflict could be developing. However, these meetings concentrated on 
security methods, rather than the issues with the power sharing system, 
which caused the unrest in the first place. Despite the high numbers of deaths 
and their sectarian nature of the targets, members of the central government 
still denied that Iraq was entering a civil war.180 Although, following another 
month of violence in May the former Iraqi National Security Adviser, Mowaffak 
al-Rubaie, did admit that he feared Iraq was heading towards a civil war and a 
bloody partition. Nevertheless, members of Maliki’s government, the US and 
the UK were still rejecting the fact that Iraq had indeed entered a civil war.181 
With the figures of those killed and injured through sectarian violence 
continuously rising it becomes ever the more difficult to deny that Iraq has 
entered a state of civil war; as despite April being the deadliest month 
recorded since June 2008, there were even more deaths in May. According to 
the UN figures 1045 people were killed in May, whilst 2397 were injured.182  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 ‘Arab Political Council Accuses the Government of Kirkuk of Ethnic Cleansing Against the 
Arab Component.’ National Iraqi News Agency [Online] Available from 
http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=GIEFEJ [Accessed 
20/06/2013] 
180 Dunlop, W.G. ‘Violence kills 27 as Iraq cabinet talks security.’ Agence France Presse 
[Online] Available from 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iqFGspUFgtBRA7tvRTXUOYx7bNSg
?docId=CNG.4fd7225a1fea039d4d9f6435239389ed.561 [Accessed 20/06/2013] 
181 Cockburn, Patrick. ‘Banned in Baghdad: The Cars that are Insurgents' Weapon of Choice.’ 
Independent [Online] Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/banned-in-baghdad-the-cars-that-are-insurgents-weapon-of-choice-8640169.html  
[Accessed 20/06/2013] 
182 ‘1045 killed, 2397 wounded in May in Iraq, UN.’ Aswat al-Iraq [Online] Available from 
http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(aqnmy155udjyfhq3il4u1k55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&
id=153479 [Accessed 20/06/2013] 
	  	   78	  
Maliki visited the capital of the KRG, Erbil, in June to try to ease the 
situation, but despite this, the following day, the violence continued as normal 
with at least 94 people being killed and 289 injured with the majority of the 
attacks happening in Mosul.183 The violence continued with at least 27 people 
killed on 16 June184 and a further 43 on 18 June in attacks mainly focused on 
Shiites.185 On 20 June the provincial elections went ahead in the two Sunni-
majority provinces where they were delayed due to security concerns and 
although they ended relatively peacefully, there was one incident where a 
suicide bomber blew himself up in a ballet-counting centre killing four 
people.186 On the 23 June 43 people were killed in Iraq,187 including four 
people in Kirkuk where three car bombs went off.188 The ethnic and sectarian 
nature of the violence was particularly present on 25 June, when a suicide 
bomber blew himself up in a tent of Shiite Turkmen protestors killing at least 
11 and injuring a further 42 - a number of Turkmen leaders were amongst the 
dead.189 Whilst, in another attack five Shiite pilgrims were killed on their way 
to the holy city of Karbala for the annual festival of Shabaniyah.190 Although 	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the number of deaths in Iraq did decrease in June, with 761 people being 
killed the death toll was still higher than in April and has done nothing to 
alleviate the fears that Iraq has entered a civil war.191 There was no sign of the 
violence ending in July either, with 42 people being killed192 on the 1st and 47 
on the 2nd.193 
Concurrently, many question the legitimacy of Maliki’s claims that the 
Dijla Operations was created for security and believe rather that it is part of a 
political game being played over the disputes between the KRG and 
Baghdad.194 This belief is highlighted by Fatih Muhammed Ameen, KDP's 
Kirkuk-Garmiyan leadership Council:  
Dijla was set up to break all the political relations between the parties, especially 
the Kurds. From the first day the Kurds rejected the Dijla force. When the central 
government insisted on having this force we were forced to react to this so that 
there would be no massacre. That is why we were forced to bring the 
peshmerga force in to protect the area.195  
 
1.8. Hydrocarbon Laws 
One of the main disagreements between Baghdad and the KRG is the 
dispute over hydrocarbon legislation. The central government is not pleased 
with the KRG signing oil contracts with international companies, such as 
Exxon Mobil and Chevron, and exporting oil to Turkey independently of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press [Online] Available from http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-bombs-kill-23-including-minority-
protesters-174517077.html [Accessed 03/07/2013] 
191 ‘June's casualties over 1,500 in Iraq.’ Anadolu Agency [Online] Available from 
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/199415--junes-casualties-over-1-500-in-iraq [Accessed 
03/07/2013] 
192 ‘Roundup: 42 Killed, 48 Wounded in Separate Attacks in Iraq.’ Xinhua General News 
Service [Online] Available from http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2013-
07/02/content_29289050.htm [Accessed 03/07/2013] 
193 ‘Iraq attacks Against Shiites Kill 47." Agence France Presse [Online] Available from 
http://www.haveeru.com.mv/world/49860 [Accessed 03/07/2013] 
194 This was voiced by all the Turkmen and Kurds who were interviewed by the author when 
questioned on the Dijla operations. 
195 Interview, conducted by the author, Fatih Muhammed Ameen, Member of KDP's Kirkuk-
Garmiyan leadership Council and former member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kirkuk, 06/06/13 
	  	   80	  
central government. Whilst the KRG sees the central government negotiating 
to sign a deal with British Petroleum (BP) to exploit fields in Kirkuk as 
unconstitutional, as this is part of the disputed territories and needs 
agreement from all parties. Furthermore, the KRG claim they are owed 
money to pay the oil companies who were supplying oil to the centrally 
controlled Ceyhan pipeline. These oil disputes have been ongoing for several 
years and with the constitution not clear on the matter and neither party 
willing to concede, the end does not seem near.196 These oil-related tensions 
were further agitated in November 2012 when the KRG began sending half 
the amount of oil they are required to export via the Baghdad-controlled 
pipeline to Turkey, this was due to the previously mentioned owing of funds 
(Baghdad announced it would not be issuing a second payment of $300 
million to cover the costs of the oil companies) and also due to the fact that 
the KRG is displeased with the funds they were to receive in the 2013 budget 
– where they are expected to import even more oil.197 By December 2012 the 
KRG halted their exports to the Ceyhan pipeline altogether198  and in an 
attempt to bypass the centrally controlled pipeline Genel Energy, a Turkish-
British joint venture, began trucking 20,000 barrels of oil a day to Turkey in 
January 2013.199 The lack of a consensus on a new hydrocarbon law has 
created several issues between the central government and the KRG. The 
Iraqi Oil Minister, Abdul Kareem Luaibi, stated that the central government 	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would sue those companies involved in ‘trafficking’ oil out of the KRG and he 
also announced that the central government was considering cutting the 
KRG’s 17% share of the budget.200 Whilst the Deputy Prime Minister for 
Energy Affairs, Hussein al-Shahristani, accused the KRG and oil companies 
of smuggling oil out of the country. 201  The KRG was angered by these 
comments and countered with their objection to the central government 
negotiating oil contracts with BP in Kirkuk without their involvement. The KRG 
claim they are exporting oil because they are not receiving their 17% share of 
the budget, nor are they receiving oil for power generation and export 
payments for the oil exported through the Ceyhan pipeline, as per the 
constitution. When questioned on Baghdad’s claim that the KRG is smuggling 
oil, the KRG Foreign Relations Minister, Falah Mustafa, had the following to 
say:  
We will not accept somebody like Shahristani to sit in Baghdad, to impose his 
will or to determine what we will do. The binding document, the only document 
that binds us with Iraq, is the constitution; if it’s not respected then it does not 
have any value for us. So therefore Baghdad has to be careful about that, we 
are committed to Iraq as much as they are committed to the constitution, if they 
respect the constitution and honour the agreements and the constitution, they 
are welcome, if not, we have nothing to commit ourselves to.  
The issue with the production of oil in the KRG is the lack of export 
opportunities with the KRG currently not having access to the centrally 
controlled Ceyhan pipeline. By March 2013 Genel was exporting only 20,000 
barrels of crude oil a day and 10,000-15,000 barrels of gas condensate, whilst 
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the KRG’s oil minister, Ashti Hawrami, claims that almost 400,000 barrels of 
crude oil are produced in the KRG daily.202 He also claims that the KRG has 
almost completed negotiations with other major oil companies to open up new 
exploration contracts and that the KRG is ready to export 250,000 barrels of 
oil a day. Thus making it highly important that the KRG either reaches a deal 
with the central government in order to allow them the use of the Ceyhan 
pipeline, or that Turkey goes ahead with its plan to link the KRG directly to the 
Ceyhan pipeline.203 Genel Energy announced that the first phase of the KRG’s 
oil export pipeline would begin construction following the negative outcome of 
the 27 February meeting between Iraqi oil minister, Abdulkarim al-Luaibi, and 
KRG Natural Resources Minister, Ashti Hawrami, which ended in 
stalemate.204  
At the end of March 2013, the Turkish Prime Minister announced that 
Turkey was discussing terms with the KRG for an energy agreement that 
would involve linking the KRG directly to the Ceyhan pipeline.205 In early April 
around 30,000 tons of Kurdish oil was sold on the international market, 
marking the first sale of oil trucked from the KRG to Turkey and further 
incensing the central government who believe that according to the 
constitution this oil is smuggled. Furthermore, it was also reported that Genel 
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had increased the amount of oil trucked to Turkey to 25,000 barrels a day.206 
The Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, made it clear in the Turkish 
parliament that energy deals with the KRG would go ahead – even in the light 
of threats from Baghdad. He went on to highlight that Turkey dealt with all 
corners of Iraq, including the KRG. 207  In an apparent effort to calm the strain 
on relations with Baghdad, Yildiz announced that Turkey would be happy to 
resolve the financial issues between Baghdad and the KRG and that they 
would be willing to give 17% of the money from oil to the KRG and 83% to the 
central government.208 Meanwhile, there were strong rumours circling that 
Genel was planning to convert the current gas pipeline to Dohuk for the use 
of oil and to extend it by 50km, thus linking it to Turkey where it could either 
join the Ceyhan pipeline or be trucked to the Mediterranean for further 
export. 209  Additionally, the Kar group agreed with the Nineveh provincial 
council to supply oil products from its Erbil refinery, with Nineveh paying a 
processing fee. This move is also disputed by the central government who 
claim that the provincial government does not have the authority to make 
such a deal. Nineveh is a Sunni-majority province and is governed by Atheel 
al-Nujaifi, brother of parliamentary speaker Usama al-Nujaifi, who is a fierce 
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opponent of Maliki.210 The KRG also passed a new oil bill, which would allow 
them to import oil independently of Baghdad if the money owed to them by 
the central government is not paid. It would seem that the KRG has 
established this law in order to take advantage of their preparations for a new 
pipeline linking them with Turkey.211  On 14 May Turkey’s Prime Minister 
announced that the Turkish state-owned oil company, Turkish Petroleum 
International Company, signed a deal with Exxon to develop hydrocarbons in 
the KRG. Not only does this have the potential to further sour relations 
between Baghdad and Ankara, but it also cements Turkey’s cooperation in a 
direct oil pipeline linking the KRG to Turkey.212 As a result of the turmoil in Iraq 
and the disagreement with the Kurds over a new hydrocarbon law, Iraq was 
forced to reduce it future oil production targets significantly.213 Meanwhile, 
despite the threats by Baghdad the oil being trucked to Turkey increased to 
as much as 70,000 barrels a day.214 Whilst in June it was reported that the 
KRG was just weeks away from their oil pipeline (this is an extension to the 
gas pipeline to Duhok) reaching the border town of Fishkhabour from where it 
could enter Turkey.215 Following these reports the KRG energy minister, Ashti 
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Hawrami, announced that the oil pipeline to Turkey would be completed by 
the end of September and would initially have the capacity to export 300,000 
barrels per day.216 Thus, firmly announcing to Baghdad that the KRG are 
willing to export oil without them and the onus is with Maliki to negotiate. The 
issue remains, when the pipeline reaches the border, whether it will connect 
to the Baghdad controlled metering station into Turkey or whether it will 
connect to Turkey on a different path controlled by the Kurds. It seems that 
this is going to be a last minute decision that will involve lots of negotiating 
and manoeuvring between Baghdad, the KRG and to some extent, Turkey. 
The result of this could determine the future of the region, as if the pipeline 
enters Turkey without Baghdad’s approval secession and, or, civil war may 
follow. This could have been the reason for Maliki’s visit to the KRG in June 
2013 and his meetings with Barzani, as he still needs the Kurds; the Sunni 
protests against the government do not seem to be slowing down and during 
the provincial elections there was a decrease in votes for both his party and 
that of the moderate Sunnis. Thus, the Kurds still maintain their role of 
kingmaker in next year’s national elections. Therefore, if the Kurds manage to 
connect their pipeline to Turkey without Baghdad having a role in this they will 
no longer have to rely on Baghdad for their 17% of the budget and will be free 
to manoeuvre as they please, thus leading to Maliki no longer being able to 
exert what little pressure he currently is able to.217 As Falah Mustafa, KRG 
Foreign Relations Minister, highlights, the Kurds are tired of waiting for 
Baghdad: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Reuters. ‘Iraqi Kurds Say New Oil Pipeline to Turkey to Start Soon.’ Today's Zaman 
[Online] Available from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-318694-iraqi-kurds-say-new-oil-
pipeline-to-turkey-to-start-soon.html [Accessed 03/07/2013] 
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we cannot beg from Baghdad for a budget that everyday they threaten us for 
this and that thing… So therefore, for us we have to be very open and honest 
with each other and we will continue talking to Baghdad to say that this does not 
work we have to find a proper way of solving these issues, whether we will be 
satisfied with federalism and implement it or whether we go to another stage – 
we have to make up our mind.218  
The hydrocarbon related issues are key in the disputes between the KRG and 
Maliki, but this is also part of the wider problem of Maliki’s grab for power and 
the lack of power sharing which has led to the Sunni’s discontent. 
1.9 Political Situation in Iraq 
The sectarian violence and thus the sectarian split of Iraq is being caused by 
the Sunni and Kurds’ fear that Maliki is attempting a grab for power and to 
break up the other parties in order to return Iraq to a dictatorship, as 
highlighted by KDP Kirkuk-Garmiyan leadership Council member, Fatih 
Muhammed Ameen: 
this plan for breaking up all the parties and the community came from the central 
government of Iraq this was pre-planned… this Shiite military is for Maliki. It is 
not an actual Iraqi military; this military has been used for purposes other than 
for the Iraqi people.219 
This began with the trial of (Sunni) Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi, 
who fled first to the KRG and then to Turkey and who was sentenced to death 
in his absence.220 The Sunnis were further incensed by the arrest of the 
bodyguards of Sunni Finance Minister, Rafie al-Issawi, also on terrorism 
charges. This resulted in protests by Sunnis who saw this as Maliki trying to 
take charge of the government and become another dictator. Whilst the Kurds 	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219 Interview, conducted by the author, Fatih Muhammed Ameen, Member of KDP's Kirkuk-
Garmiyan leadership Council and former member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kirkuk, 06/06/13 
220 Tariq al-Hashimi was charged with orchestrating terror attacks on officials and security 
forces and running ‘death squads’. See: ‘Iraq VP Tariq al-Hashemi rejects guilty verdict.’ BBC 
[Online] Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19540960 [Accessed 
22/07/2013] 
	  	   87	  
were angered when Maliki sent his troops to Kirkuk, as very few believe that 
the purpose of these troops are to fight terrorism and rather believe that Maliki 
is preparing to take control of Iraq by force. Salah Dalo, Head of KDP Kirkuk 
and Garmiyan leadership council, questions the legitimacy of Maliki’s 
statement that the Dijla operation is to fight terrorism in Kirkuk.  
It [the Dijla Command] involves three divisions; the 4th from Tikrit and 
Salahaddin, the 5th from Diyala and the 12th from Kirkuk. Tikrit and Diyala have 
more terrorist activities than Kirkuk, so why bring command to Kirkuk city? Is it 
because of the issues between the KRG and Baghdad? All the security belongs 
to the governor and should be under his command and we think there can only 
be one meaning for taking away control and this is so that Kirkuk will belong to a 
military authority.221 
Thus demonstrating that both the Kurds and Sunnis fear that Maliki is 
gathering power and getting ready to take Iraq by force. The KRG Foreign 
Relations Minister has also questioned Maliki’s actions:  
the Iraqi army today is not in a very good shape, but the logic of the use of 
military to sort out political difference internally this is unconstitutional and this is 
not allowed and we will not accept it. If this becomes the pattern what is the 
difference between this and the former regime.222  
However, despite these objections, a vote of no confidence in Maliki cannot 
be called as this needs presidential approval and Talabani is in hospital 
following a stroke, the Sunni Vice President, Tariq al-Hashimi, is in exile and 
the remaining Vice President is a Shiite aligned to Maliki. Meanwhile, despite 
the formation of a coalition government containing all the ethnicities and sects, 
Maliki has formed a Shiite grand alliance and the Sunnis have formed their 
own coalition and the Kurds have their own parliament in the KRG, thus 	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splitting Iraq along ethnic/sectarian divides. Furthermore, as well as being 
Prime Minister, Maliki is also simultaneously Minister of Defence and Minister 
of Interior.223  The issues in governance are caused by the Iraqi consociational 
power sharing model, as forming alliances after elections and breaking 
alliances during parliament, without facing consequences, should not be 
possible. The use of corporate consociational methods in Iraq have put and 
kept Maliki in power and have prevented the political process from operating. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2.2., the issues in governance can be rectified 
by adjusting the consociational system to a more liberal method that will 
ensure cooperation and will not halt the political process. Furthermore, this 
would prevent the situation of having a president who is incapable of 
conducting his duties, as under liberal consociation if he was not replaced by 
his own party the party next on the list would replace him.  
As a result of the sectarian divide in Iraq, which has been caused by 
the failure of the political system, Al-Qaeda is once again becoming a 
presence in Iraq and there has also been an increase in Shiite militias.224 
Many Sunnis and Kurds believe that Maliki is forcing those who oppose him 
out of office with terrorism and corruption charges as he did with the chairman 
of the election commission, the head of the central bank, the Vice President 
and the Finance Minister, through his guards. Whereas, those who support 
Maliki, like the former trade minister, who is thought to have embezzled 
millions, come through trials unscathed – the outcome of the trial was that the 
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investigating judge was dismissed from his position.225 Furthermore, Maliki 
postponed the Provincial elections on 20 April in the majority-Sunni western 
provinces of Anbar and Nineveh, when they were supposed to be held 
throughout Iraq except for the KRG and Kirkuk. This is despite the protests of 
Sunni politicians and the Sadrists. This is seen as a further move for power by 
Maliki; as his party is unlikely to win many seats there, it gives him time to 
further split the Sunni vote, it is a popular move amongst Shiites, and he can 
also use this as a tact to point at the Sunni regions as troublesome.226 Further 
evidence that the election was postponed for these reasons is provided by 
the fact that the Independent High Electoral Commission had stated that all 
provinces, excluding the three Kurdish provinces and Kirkuk, were ready for 
the April 20 elections.227  
Maliki has returned Iraq to sectarianism and very few Kurds, Sunni’s or 
Turkmen have faith in him as prime minister; they fear Iraq is returning 
towards a dictatorship and that since the US forces have left he has been 
amalgamating power. As Salah Dalo puts it: ‘We voted for Maliki, but he lied 
we think he is going to be a dictator again, like Saddam.’228 The fears that 
Maliki is trying to return Iraq to a dictatorship are heightened by his calls for 
early national elections and his statement that a majority government should 
be formed. Many believe – such as, Iraq's Sunni speaker of parliament 
Osama Al-Nujaifi – that the power he wields in state organisations could be 	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used to ensure victory and thus break the power sharing government, leaving 
the other sects and ethnic groups without a say.229 However, at the beginning 
of May 2013 Kurdish politicians did return to the Iraqi parliament ending their 
boycott. This follows meetings between Nechirvan Barzani and Maliki in 
which it was agreed to form a committee to resolve the outstanding issues - 
including changing the 2013 budget - and that another committee would be 
created to write a new oil and gas law.230 This meeting demonstrates a 
change in tactics by Maliki, as he now needs allies against the Sunni threat. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that despite the call from the Interior Ministry 
for the peshmerga forces to withdraw from the disputed territories, he 
remained relatively quiet and thus theories of a deal with the KRG began to 
emerge. This would make sense on Maliki’s part as he is overstretched trying 
to deal with the Sunni insurgency and could do without the worry of what my 
happen with the security in Kirkuk. Although with the Kurdish ambitions for the 
areas, he is playing a risky game. One MP that believes a deal may have 
been reached between Maliki and the Kurds is Yassin al-Obeidi from Iraqiya 
who has publicly voiced this along with his concern over the silence of the 
federal government about the peshmerga’s movements.231 Maliki needs allies, 
and possibly military assistance, at the moment, as he faces a Sunni threat 
and it would not be the first time he has got the Kurds to back him and then 
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reneged on his promises.232 Therefore, only time will tell whether these issues 
will be resolved, or once again the Kurds will find that Maliki has used them in 
order to make gains. However, with the Iraqiya boycott of the parliament, 
Maliki is unchallenged and regardless of his promises, the Kurds are better off 
fighting the issues in parliament. Along with the Sunni threat, another reason 
Maliki may have reached out to the Kurds was the April provincial election 
results.233 Although Maliki’s State of Law coalition did win the most seats, they 
failed to win an outright majority in any province; Maliki’s own party, Dawa, 
saw a vote decrease; and finally State of Law only won the most seats in 
seven of the 12 provinces participating, with them expected to win almost no 
votes in the remaining six provinces. Thus, Maliki is not in the position he 
thought he was in with regards to creating a majority government in the next 
national election in 2014, which therefore means he needs allies for a 
coalition.234  
The political process in Iraq is falling apart and yet there is still no 
president. Talabani had been in hospital in Germany for several months, but 
the PUK seem reluctant to nominate a new president. The Public Prosecution 
Office released a statement demanding the speaker of the Council of 
Representatives take legal measures to fill the presidency through 
implementing Article 72 of the Iraqi constitution, which has a cap on the time 
for the vacancy of the post. However, the head of the Legal Committee at the 
Iraqi Council of Representatives, Khalid Shwani (who is also a high level PUK 	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official), claimed that the Public Prosecution did not have the authority to 
make this demand. Thus, further demonstrating the PUK’s reluctance to 
replace Talabani.235 With rumours going around the KRG that Talabani is 
dead, but the PUK are covering it up because they are in disarray, the 
reasons for him not being replaced begin to be questioned.236 A lot of this is to 
do with a power struggle within the party with separate factions forming. 
Furthermore, both Hero Talabani237 and Barham Salih238 have visited Iran to 
have meetings with the Iranian leadership and it has been reported that this is 
to get Iranian backing for the replacement for Talabani. This is further 
complicated by the fact that the current power sharing deal stipulates that the 
president should be a Kurd and the PUK and KDP also have a deal in place 
that the President of Iraq will be from the PUK and the President of the KRG 
from the KDP.239 The fact that is left up to the PUK to select a new president 
was emphasised by Fatah Mustapha when asked about replacing Talabani: 
‘unless his family comes forward, or his party comes forward, as far as the 
people of Kurdistan we respect the will of his family and his party.’240 This 
highlights yet another failure in having a system that allows deals and 
coalition to be formed after the elections.  
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With the increase in the sectarian violence and the discontent from the 
Sunni’s to Maliki’s government, many Sunnis – the majority of the protestors 
included – have begun to call for a Sunni region similar to the KRG, this is 
possible within the constitution, but would separate Iraq along 
sectarian/ethnic lines and could lead to the eventual breakup of Iraq.241 
Indeed many of the Kurdish politicians and academics favour such a position 
as it could pave the way for future Kurdish independence. 242  With Iraq 
seemingly on the brink of a civil war Maliki blamed senior security staff and on 
21 May announced a change in the security personal, with some senior 
members losing their job. This comes despite the fact that Maliki is Minister 
for Defence, thus in reality is in charge of the army. So instead of replacing 
himself and actually having a specific Minister of Defence, Maliki has laid the 
blame upon others.243 Following the continued violence Maliki made a rare 
visit to the KRG in early June for further discussions with the Kurds over the 
ongoing issues. He also held a cabinet meeting in Erbil. Despite this, no 
agreement was reached with the Kurds over the disputed territories, budget 
or the hydrocarbon law.244  Following the election results of the 20 June 
elections, surprisingly a Kurdish-led coalition won the most seats in Nineveh, 
whilst the Sunni Mutahidoun bloc won the most seats in Anbar, although 
neither had enough seats to form a majority. This falls in to Maliki’s hands as 	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he has managed to split the Sunni vote by forming alliances – the political 
bloc of Loyalty to Nineveh, which he backed, managed to win four seats in 
Nineveh.245 Thus, further making the next national elections an important 
decider on the future of Iraq.  
To summarise the current political situation, Iraq is currently without a 
president; it has a vice president who in exile who has been sentenced to 
death; a host of Iraqiya ministers have resigned, despite their bloc having won 
the most seats in the election; there are boycotts of parliament by both Kurds 
and Iraqiya, whilst Maliki’s party is also battling fellow Shiites the Sadrists; 
Maliki is trying to take control of more power and is currently Prime Minister, 
Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior; the peshmerga and the Iraqi army 
are currently both trying to assert their dominance in Kirkuk; the Kurds are 
making oil deals that Baghdad doesn’t approve of, whilst Baghdad is making 
oil deals that the Kurds don’t approve of; and finally ethnic and sectarian 
violence is happening across the country at the highest level since 2008. 
Thus, leaving no available analysis other than that Iraq is in a serious crisis 
and with three months of extreme sectarian and ethnic violence it is hard to 
deny that Iraq has indeed entered a civil war. Although this is continuously 
denied by the politicians; when this question was posed to the spokesperson 
for the Asayesh in Kirkuk, from his experiences with security, he seemed 
certain Iraq had entered a civil war: ‘There is a civil war on the ground, but 
they haven’t declared it, but they are killing everybody, they are killing by car 
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bombs, by guns, they are killing everybody and there is a civil war on the 
ground.’246 
 
1.10. Conclusion 
Through an examination of the history of Kirkuk, it becomes evident that all 
the ethnicities in Kirkuk have exerted control over the region in some period 
over the course of its history. Consequently, conflict has emerged as they all 
claim to be the true owners of Kirkuk. For Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians, 
Kirkuk has become a symbol of their position within the region, whereas for 
Arabs, Kirkuk – as part of Iraq – is a symbol for the unity of Iraq. The process 
of Arabisation is one of the greatest causes of conflict in Kirkuk, as most of 
the tensions stem from the repercussions of this process. Not only have the 
actions of Arabisation caused animosity between the ethnicities in Kirkuk, but 
it also altered the demographics, thus causing countless issues of conflict in 
relation to the current demographic structure of Kirkuk. These include: the 
amount of returnee Kurds, the number of Arabs that should return to their 
original region, the degree of power and positions each ethnic group should 
be granted (including the level of power the Turkmen feel they should wield 
within the city), and the geographic specifics of Kirkuk (including its 
boundaries and whether it should be part of the KRG).  
 The strong position the Kurds found themselves in following the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 allowed them to begin reversing the process of 
Arabisation without the agreement of the other ethnicities. This has 
accentuated the areas of conflict mentioned above and has created an 	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alliance between a large proportion of the Turkmen and Arab parties who see 
the Kurds as attempting to disproportionately reverse Arabisation in their 
favour – with the amount of returnee Kurds and the creation of Article 140 
being of particular issue. This has resulted in the contemporary political 
situation where Turkmen and Arabs are trying to block the gains made by the 
Kurds, whilst the Kurds are trying to follow through on them. The 
consequence of this is a political stalemate that affects the overall 
governance of Kirkuk and has resulted in ethnic tension at grassroots level. 
This has culminated in the various ethnicities continually trying to undermine 
each other, which has made all areas that need agreement on a potential 
issue of conflict. Thus preventing Kirkuk from moving forward and all but 
halting the joint governance of the region, which reiterates the fact that the 
Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk need to reach a political agreement over 
the future of Kirkuk in order to avoid conflict247 – enforcing an option on the 
other ethnicities does nothing to alleviate, or indeed avoid the insurgence of, 
violence.   
 The situation in Kirkuk has not been helped by the precarious position 
that Iraq as a whole finds itself in. The battle between Kurds and the central 
government and between Sunnis and Shiites makes the task of solving the 
issue of Kirkuk all the more difficult. Moreover, the de facto civil war that has 
been created due to the issues at central level have spilt over to Kirkuk and 
increased the already strained tensions. In the next chapter the particular 
issues of conflict will be analysed in order to further understand the conflict. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 The Assyrians’ numbers are so small that they have little control over the future of Kirkuk; 
however, it would be beneficial to have them involved in reaching any agreement as it is 
important to include all parties. 
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Chapter 2: Issues of Conflict 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The issues of conflict in Kirkuk are vast and vary greatly, and have therefore 
resulted in the current position, which can best be described as a stalemate. 
Many of the issues of conflict that exist in Kirkuk prevent the implementation 
of a settlement, whilst others prevent the interaction between ethnic groups 
that is necessary for joint governance. Some of these issues additionally 
prevent dialogue and therefore need to be solved in order for talks on a 
settlement to begin, whilst others must be resolved within a settlement. 
Furthermore, there are matters – like the formation of the Iraqi government – 
that are not directly related to Kirkuk, but affect the political situation in Kirkuk 
and the bargaining powers of Iraqi politicians. The previous chapter analysed 
the emergence of the conflict in question. The purpose of this chapter is to 
use this knowledge to highlight the key issues of conflict in Kirkuk and 
analyse them in order to create a greater understanding of their dynamics, 
which can then be used and developed to create a proposed settlement in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Therefore this chapter is important in creating a solid base 
for the ensuing chapters on the methods to deal with the issues of conflict. 
2.2. Formation of Iraqi Government 
Although not directly related to the settlement of the Kirkuk conflict, the 
instability caused by not forming a national government, following the 2010 
national elections, in a timely manner has had an affect on the situation in 
Kirkuk, as highlighted in Chapter 1.6.. Firstly, this instability creates an 
atmosphere compliant towards the intensification of conflict and secondly, the 
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uncertainty created magnifies the issues of conflict. Furthermore, if Kirkuk is 
to have a consociational government, it needs a strong consociational role 
model at central level – not one that fails at the first obstacle, namely 
formation. For these reasons it is imperative that the delay in the formation of 
the government that followed the March 2010 elections is never repeated. 
Even when the government was eventually formed on 21 December 2010, it 
was not complete, with several of the ministries not decided.248 The current 
system for electing a government is not clear and can be/was manipulated, as 
is illustrated by Falah Mustafa:  
the point is former Prime Minister Allawi won the results. They came with 
manoeuvring and interpreting to say that the law says the biggest bloc, it doesn’t 
say the winning list, it does not necessarily have to be before the elections, it 
can be after the elections, all these sorts of things, so that they would have a 
Prime Minister from the Shiite camp. Otherwise we said that let’s give a chance 
to the winning list. There is a procedure, 30 days to be given an opportunity to 
form a government, if that list was not able to form a government, then it goes to 
the second list. This would have been a much easier way, but unfortunately, 
they have done all these things in order for it to be given to the Shiites.249 
Therefore, in order to minimise the consequences this political instability can 
have on Kirkuk, and indeed the rest of Iraq, a new process for deciding the 
government following the elections must be introduced and implemented. Not 
deciding a government promptly is bound to create repercussions that will 
resonate throughout Iraq, not to mention intensifying ethnic tensions in what 
is already a fragile environment. 
As it is imperative to Kirkuk that there is a strong consociational model 
at central level, the prospective methods to resolve Iraqi government 
formation will be analysed. Preventing the delay in Iraq’s government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Visser, Reidar. ‘Parliament Approves the Second Maliki Government.’ Historiae [Online] 
Available from http://historiae.org/Maliki-second.asp [Accessed 21/02/2011] 
249 Interview conducted by the author with Falah Mustafa, KRG Foreign Relations Minister, in 
Erbil, Iraq - 01/06/2013 
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formation is a relatively easy process and can be done by allocating 
ministerial portfolios through sequential proportionality rules (SPR). This 
would result in a broader coalition (in terms of parties that are not politically 
linked), as every party that chooses to join the government can, providing 
they have enough seats. In order to introduce this process, the current 
government would have to decide to implement it. Seeing as a coalition 
government consisting of all the major parties was eventually formed, 
implementing SPR is the next logical step. SPR would be a fairer process for 
dividing the portfolios and would not take nine months to complete, as it did 
following the 2010 national elections. One of the significant factors that SPR 
would prevent is the forming of coalitions after the elections. Therefore, 
through this process Maliki would not have become prime minister, as his 
party did not win the most votes. Another concern with the current system is 
that the negotiations to form the government led to the creation of yet more 
ministries in an already ministry-laden parliament. For this reason, rather than 
the 2010 cabinet, the one chosen in 2006 will be used as a benchmark 
(although even this was unnecessarily large) when analysing the use of SPR 
in allocating the ministerial portfolios in Iraq. The cabinet in 2006 consisted of 
forty ministers, including the prime minister and his deputies and not including 
the president and his deputies.250 This figure will be used to analyse the 
affects that the two leading SPR methods, d’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë, would 
have on the formation of the government following the 2010 elections. For 
this analysis the prime minister and his deputies will be chosen through SPR, 
although this could easily be changed so that they are allocated separately to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 ‘Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet.’ BBC [Online] Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/5000750.stm [Accessed 24/02/2011] 
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the parties with the three highest seats, as done in Northern Ireland. Graph A 
demonstrates the results using d’Hondt.251 Under this system al-Iraqiya would 
elect the prime minister and State of law (SLA) and National Iraqi Alliance 
(INA) would each elect a deputy. This coalition would involve five parties, 
including the KA252 and Gorran. 
 
In this system al-Iraqiya and SLA would each have 30% of the portfolios in 
the cabinet, but al-Iraqiya would elect the prime minister. This system would 
prevent the current situation where SLA and INA were able to form a coalition 
after the election, which thus prevented al-Iraqiya from electing the prime 
minister.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 This graph is calculated using the DHSLCalc.xls developed by Michael Gallagher and is 
available from 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php 
For more information on SPR systems, see Appendix V. 
252 Alliance of the main Kurdish parties, not including Gorran. 
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Graph B demonstrates the formation of the cabinet using Sainte-Laguë. 
Although by using Sainte-Laguë the allocation of the prime minister and his 
deputies remain the same, al-Iraqiya and SLA each see their percentage of 
the portfolios decrease to 27.5%. This also sees the addition of three extra 
parties to the coalition, with one portfolio each. Due to the high amount of 
positions within the cabinet in Iraq, a party with as little as 1.23% of the total 
seats could win a portfolio within the cabinet using Sainte-Laguë. For this 
reason Sainte-Laguë is not suitable for Iraq as it would result in minor parties 
gaining too much power and would create a coalition too large to operate 
successfully. Therefore, if Iraq is to prevent the situation created following the 
last two elections – where it took months to form a government – by 
distributing cabinet portfolios through SPR, d’Hondt is the system most 
suitable to the dynamics within the Iraqi context. By using d’Hondt the cabinet 
would be chosen within days and as a consequence negotiations involving 
important issues would not be able to take place before the government was 
formed. Furthermore, this would also prevent the creation of more cabinet 
portfolios and it would not allow parties that do not have the highest number 
of seats to elect the prime minister. Thus, this process would result in more 
stability within the political system and would prevent decisions being made 
on the basis of trying to gain power. Therefore, the Iraqi political system 
would benefit greatly from introducing the d’Hondt model for the allocation of 
the cabinet portfolios and the lack of a government would no longer be a 
factor in creating uncertainty. Another key benefit of SPR is that a party 
cannot threaten to leave a coalition in order to disrupt the government, as if 
they do they would merely be replaced by the next party in line.  
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This is not to say that d’Hondt does not have its own problems and that 
its installation will prevent other issues from arising. It does have its own 
issues, but the question is whether these are greater than the issues that 
exist without it. One such issue of the d’Hondt model is in the selection of 
ministries, where parties are not selecting them entirely on their first 
preference, but rather as part of a strategy to limit what ministries will be 
available to the other parties. This includes not selecting first choice ministries 
due to knowledge that this will not be selected by the party who has the next 
choice; not selecting ministries because of knowledge that a favourable party 
(usually one from the same ethnic group) will select this ministry next; and 
finally selecting a ministry purely to prevent it from going to another party 
(even when a more prestigious ministry is available). All of these issues arose 
in this process in NI and it could be said that there was a ‘playground attitude’ 
to the selecting of ministries, rather than selections based on serving the 
greater good of NI society.253 There have also been many complaints that in 
Northern Ireland this system has resulted in ministerial fiefdoms. By running 
d’Hondt immediately after the elections without deciding on government 
policies ministers can run their ministries as they see fit without any 
coherence towards an overall government strategy.254  In a speech delivered 
by Tom Elliot of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)255, he attacked this very 
issue: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 O'Leary, Brendan, Bernard Grofman and Jørgen Elklit. ‘Divisor Methods for Sequential 
Portfolio Allocation in Multi-Party Executive Bodies: Evidence from Northern Ireland and 
Denmark’ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2005, pp. 198-211.  
254 Neale, Mark. ‘Why this education mess should teach us a lesson.’ Belfast Telegraph 
[Online] Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/why-this-
education-mess-should-teach-us-a-lesson-15132182.html [Accessed 10/11/2011] 
255 Currently the second largest Unionist party in NI.  
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After the 2007 Election, the parties ran D’Hondt, divided up the government 
departments, and then agreed a Programme for Government that wasn’t worth the 
paper it was written on. Because once a party has a Department, its Minister is really 
accountable only to his or her Party, not to the Executive… It introduces the temptation 
to play party political interests ahead of the needs of the country. 256 
It has been suggested by analysts and politicians (particularly the UUP) that 
for this reason the ministerial portfolios should not be chosen through a pure 
d’Hondt system, and that rather negotiations on the government’s strategies 
should be made before deciding the ministers so that the ministers can be 
elected to implement these strategies – rather than creating their own 
ministerial fiefdoms.257 Again this idea was put forward in the same speech by 
the UUP leader: 
But next time – this May – lets switch things around, and agree the Programme 
for Government before we run d’Hondt. That way, all the parties agree what 
needs to be done first. We begin by sorting out the likes of education, RPA and 
the Maze/Long Kesh before we start wasting money disagreeing! Then we 
appoint the Ministers to make it happen. We agree how much we have to spend 
as a government, and how we want to spend it, as a government – then run 
d’Hondt, to form a government to make it happen.258 
The difference between the situation in NI and Iraq is that politics has become 
fairly stable in NI, thus allowing for the possibility of the introduction of 
negotiations prior to the establishment of ministerial portfolios. Although it still 
remains to be seen as to whether NI has evolved to the position where this 
would be a feasible action. The bottom line is that in Iraq it took nine months 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Elliot, Tom. ‘Tom Elliott keynote speech on 16 Feb 2011’ Podomatic [Online] Available 
from http://alaninbelfast.podomatic.com/entry/2011-02-16T05_26_15-08_00 [Accessed 
10/11/2011] 
257 Neale, Mark. ‘Why this education mess should teach us a lesson.’ Belfast Telegraph 
[Online] Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/why-this-
education-mess-should-teach-us-a-lesson-15132182.html [Accessed 10/11/2011] 
258 Elliot, Tom. ‘Tom Elliott keynote speech on 16 Feb 2011’ Podomatic [Online] Available 
from http://alaninbelfast.podomatic.com/entry/2011-02-16T05_26_15-08_00 [Accessed 
10/11/2011] 
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to appoint a government, therefore the country is not ready for negotiations 
prior to installing d’Hondt and any ministerial fiefdoms that are created 
through d’Hondt are a better option to not having ministries created all 
together. Therefore, although issues do arise through using this model to 
select ministerial portfolios, these issues have a lesser affect on the 
governance than the option of not using d’Hondt at all. It has been 
demonstrated here that implementing d’Hondt would be the next logical step 
for consociational governance in Iraq. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that it will be implemented. It was the responsibility of the US to leave 
Iraq with a functioning and fair system for governance before they withdrew. It 
can be argued that they could have installed d’Hondt before their withdrawal 
and thus prevented the issues of forming a government. Unfortunately, this 
did not happen and it may be too late now; as previously illustrated Maliki has 
been actively amalgamating power and he is unlikely to install a system that 
limits his party’s chance of retaining the position of prime minister. 
Furthermore, Maliki has hinted recently (see Chapter 1.9.) that he would like 
to return Iraq to a majoritarian government, which makes it less likely that he 
will sanction a process that effectively institutionalises power sharing. 
 
2.3. Article 140  
As previously discussed in Chapter 1.4., the Kurds were able to introduce 
Article 140 into the Iraqi constitution due to the relative instability in the rest of 
Iraq in comparison to the Kurdish region. This instability led to the Kurds 
being far more organised than the other parties involved in the negotiations 
on the constitution and as a result of this they were able to hire numerous 
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outside constitutional advisors, which their success can partially be attributed 
to.259 The deal to include Article 140 in the constitution was made at a national 
level and involved trade-offs with other parties for items they deemed as 
important, it also included little involvement from the Sunni community, who 
make up a large proportion of Kirkuk. It seems that either many of the parties 
involved did not fully comprehend the significance of Article 140, or that they 
always knew that they would be able to prevent it from being implemented. 
Regardless of which of these scenarios it was, it is significant that the future 
of Kirkuk was decided at a national level and not by the people of Kirkuk. A 
direct result of this is that Article 140 went against the desire of a large 
proportion of Kirkuk’s population, who, if given a choice, would have never 
used its inclusion as a bartering tool for other gains. Article 140 has created 
conflict, as it is deemed to favour the Kurds by large proportions of the Arab 
and Turkmen population. The fact that its implementation has been 
continuously delayed and that it has passed its initial deadline has created 
further conflict in Kirkuk – as it has resulted in uncertainty over Kirkuk’s future. 
This uncertainty has allowed issues of conflict to escalate, which has led to 
the current situation of there being no resolution within sight.  
Article 140 deals with the normalisation (returnees to and from Kirkuk) 
of Kirkuk, which is paired with a census to validate the actual numbers, and 
followed by a referendum on Kirkuk’s future constitutional status. Thus, to 
some extent it deals with the future governance, as this would be altered 
depending on the demographics and constitutional status. These are major 
issues in the Kirkuk conflict and to have a process developed to deal with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Brendan O’Leary – who is one of the foremost experts on consociational constitution 
design and whose work is analysed in Chapter 3.2. – was one of the consultants hired by the 
KRG. 
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them that is contested by so many can do little to ease conflict. Furthermore, 
Article 140 is not a blueprint for a conflict-regulating process, but rather for a 
conflict-creating process and if the issues in Kirkuk are managed through 
Article 140 the existing tensions will only intensify. Any settlement created to 
ease conflict must involve compromises by all factions, yet, still manage to 
ensure that these same factions make gains. The majority of Turkmen and 
Arabs feel as if they will have to make plenty of compromises through Article 
140 without gaining anything, therefore this piece of legislation can never 
successfully regulate conflict in Kirkuk. In the 2010 National Elections in Iraq, 
al-Iraqiya campaigned in Kirkuk using a nationalist manifesto, which included 
voicing opposition to Kirkuk joining the KRG. This was used to gain political 
parties to their alliance as well as to gain votes in Kirkuk. Table 1 
demonstrates that this tactic was successful, with al-Iraqiya gaining the most 
votes in Kirkuk. 
 
 
Total Votes in Kirkuk: 557037 
al-Iraqiya Votes in Kirkuk: 211336 
KA Votes in Kirkuk: 206542 
             Table	  1	  
 
 
In these Elections both the KA and al-Iraqiya won six seats in Kirkuk, with a 
further seat being granted to the Rafidayn list, through the Minority Reserved 
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Seats process.260 As seen in Chart 1, al-Iraqiya won only one per cent more 
votes than the KA.261  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  Chart	  1	  
 
Although the Kurdish vote was not as unified, as in previous national 
elections, with parties such as Gorran not forming part of the alliance, this 
graph still demonstrates that 38% of the voters voted for a party with a 
manifesto that goes against Article 140. The Kurds would have had the 
majority if they were unified, however there were also other parties who were 
against Article 140 that were not part of al-Iraqiya. When you add all the 
Kurdish lists together and all the Arab/Turkmen lists together, the Kurds only 
won 13,000 more votes.262 What all this clearly substantiates is that the 
proportion of Kirkuk’s population against Article 140 is extremely high. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 There were eight seats reserved for minorities in 2010 National Elections. Of the eight 
seats reserved for minorities five are for the Christian community and the remaining three are 
divided between Shabaks, Sabean Mandaeans and Yezidis. 
261 Independent High Electoral Commission. ‘Kirkuk’ IHEC [Online] Available from 
http://www.ihec-iq.com/ftpar/karkuk.pdf [Accessed 20/02/2011] 
262 International Crisis Group. ‘Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears.’ Middle 
East Report No. 103 – 28 March 2011, p.11. 
al-­‐Iraqiya	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38%	  
KA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37%	  
Other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25%	  
2010	  National	  Election	  Results	  in	  
Kirkuk	  
al-­‐Iraqiya	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  KA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   108	  
Therefore, this legislation cannot be used effectively to regulate conflict in 
Kirkuk. 
 
 	  	  	  Chart	  2	  
 
Chart 2 shows the results of the 2005 National Elections in Kirkuk and 
focuses on the KA and the three parties in Kirkuk that formed part of the al-
Iraqiya Alliance. This demonstrates that prior to forming an alliance against 
the Kurds (and their desire to annex Kirkuk to the KRG) the combined total of 
these three parties was only 27% and the KA managed to dominate the 
elections in Kirkuk with 53% of the votes. When this is compared to the 2010 
election where al-Iraqiya has the highest percentage of the votes in Kirkuk 
and an increase of 11% on these parties’ previous performance, it becomes 
clear just how important the opposition to Article 140 is to a significant 
number of Kirkuki residents.263 For this reason Article 140 must be replaced 
with an agreement that has the backing of all the major parties in Kirkuk – and 
by extension of the Kirkuki population. Such an agreement must include 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, p. 141. 
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options to deal with the normalisation (including an acceptance of the 
demographics by all ethnicities), and the status of Kirkuk as well as including 
details on Kirkuk’s governance, as this would be affected by the status it 
receives. Article 140 has been a significant factor in the political stalemate in 
Kirkuk, with numerous boycotts and threats of boycotts attributed directly to it. 
It was therefore also a factor in the creation of the period of uncertainty 
following the 2010 elections that saw an increase of ethnic tensions in Kirkuk. 
Many of the scholars who have analysed the future of Kirkuk, as detailed in 
Chapter 4, have argued that it would be unfair to the Kurds for Article 140 not 
to be implemented, as it is part of the Iraqi Constitution. Seen in this light, it 
cannot be argued against that it would be unfair if it were not to be 
implemented. However, as has been illustrated, its creation was unjust to the 
non-Kurdish factions of Kirkuk and therefore one can also argue that it would 
be unfair if it were to be implemented. More importantly, it is reasonable to 
predict that it would lead to an increase in violence rather than a decrease; 
therefore its implementation should be avoided. One of the main obstacles to 
this is the importance that the Kurds have placed on Article 140 and their 
denial of the legitimacy of the past deadline. This is illustrated by Falah 
Mustafa:  
This is the most important article in the constitution, because we want to know 
our boundaries; if you buy a house, when you go to the registration office you 
want to know how much land you have, you can’t have a house without them 
telling you and saying that later on we will decide later on, Kirkuk is like this. So, 
therefore whether it’s a federation, a confederation, independence, you need to 
know your boundaries, so for us this is the most important thing.264  
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However, if the Kurds allow for Article 140 – which has past its constitutional 
deadline and has no hope of resolving conflict – to be rescinded once and for 
all they put themselves in a strong negotiating position to gain other 
concessions. Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish lawmaker, shares 
this idea and believes that the Kurds should relinquish Article 140 and 
negotiate towards a settlement before having a referendum. According to him 
the all or nothing approach taken by the Kurdish leadership will result in them 
gaining nothing.265 Without the Kurds relinquishing Article 140, there will be no 
end to the conflict and violence will escalate as a large proportion of the 
population will feel that they have been forced to join the KRG against their 
will. That is to say if Article 140 was actually ever implemented and not 
continuously impeded and delayed, leaving Kirkuk in a continual state of 
unstable limbo. In an interview with ICG, a high-level government official, 
linked to Maliki, suggested that Article 140 would not be implemented within 
ten years and Maliki himself suggested that Article 140 could not be 
implemented without changing the constitution. 266  If Article 140 is to be 
replaced in a new broader agreement, there must be new mechanisms put in 
place to deal with returnees, decide the districts and sub-districts and to 
decide on the future status of Kirkuk. However, as illustrated, a new 
agreement needs to be broader than just a mere replacement of Article 140 
and must deal with the other issues of conflict mentioned in this chapter. 
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2.4. Rival Ethnonationalisms 
As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the symbolic value that 
Kirkuk holds to the various ethnonationalisms causes conflict, as they are 
intent on claiming ownership. This prevents an agreement being reached on 
the future of Kirkuk, as the protagonists involved are not willing to make 
compromises. Therefore this is an issue that needs to be addressed in order 
for an agreement to be reached. As highlighted by Paul Arthur, the stage of 
negotiation towards a settlement is reached either through desperation, due 
to the longevity of the conflict, or through exogenous factors.  
There is a view that the conflict must "ripen" to the point at which the parties 
have reached mutual exhaustion or one side has been forced to capitulate. On 
the other hand, third parties have to make the crucial decision as to whether the 
price of doing nothing at all is greater than that of the "least bad" form of 
intervention.267  
 
The issue of rival ethnonationalisms is not one that can be solved overnight, 
but rather its affects must be counteracted in order for an agreement to be 
reached. Learning from the advances of other conflicts can be a factor in 
helping the protagonists see the need to negotiate, but this is often paired 
with exogenous pressure on the actors to reach the stage of all-inclusive 
negotiations with no preconditions. Unlike the situation that existed in 
Northern Ireland, there is no intense pressure from Baghdad and the KRG on 
the various factions of Kirkuk to reach a settlement. In the Northern Ireland 
conflict, Westminster and Dublin had reached an agreement that a settlement 
was imperative for peace in Northern Ireland – regardless of their personal 
desires for the region. In Kirkuk, the same political parties that operate in 	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Baghdad and the KRG are the ones responsible for negotiations on Kirkuk 
and their position on the future is clear and rather intransigent. Therefore, 
there is not the same pressure to negotiate, as the higher entities in the 
region are involved in the outcome and therefore cannot enact a sense of 
looming consequences on themselves if they do not negotiate. Similar to 
Northern Ireland, there cannot be the threat of international sanctions and 
embargoes forcing the actors in Kirkuk to negotiate, as it is a region and not a 
country. Without the pressure of having the future of Kirkuk decided without 
them, there is nothing currently forcing the factions of Kirkuk to make 
compromises and negotiate towards a settlement and instead there seems to 
be a culture of stalling and short-sighted attempts to manoeuvre one’s own 
bloc into a better position. This is evident in the continual boycotts and threats 
of boycotts by the various factions of the Kirkuk Council; this type of action 
does nothing towards establishing peace and is reminiscent of the political 
situation in Northern Ireland that existed in the decades before serious 
negotiations began in the 1990s.268 Further evidence that the actors in the 
Kirkuk conflict have not reached the stage necessary to make use of the 
advances made in other conflicts is seen with the Kurds insistence on the 
implementation of Article 140; it is clear to see that this will eventually lead to 
violence in Kirkuk, as it favours one ethnicity over the others. However, the 
other parties are not free from blame, as instead of attempting to negotiate a 
new settlement that involves compromises from themselves, their main focus 
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Unpublished essay from MA Kurdish Studies, University of Exeter, 2009. 
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is on blocking Article 140.269 The fact that both the Article 23 and the Article 
140 Committees – which both had representatives of all the ethnicities 
present in Kirkuk – failed in their tasks and were unable to work together, 
proves that Kirkuk has not reached the political stage where its political elites 
can visualise that it is imperative to compromise and to negotiate with no 
preconditions until results become evident. Although Kirkuk has not reached 
this stage, it is entirely unfeasible to wait for the conflict to ‘ripen’. Not only 
would there be the loss of unnecessary lives in Kirkuk, but – as discussed in 
the introduction – a violent conflict in Kirkuk could have a devastating affect 
on the whole region. In the case of Kirkuk, the price of third parties doing 
nothing is far greater than the price of intervention. Therefore, the stage of 
readiness to negotiate must be achieved through pressure from the US and 
UN. Thus forcing a self-realisation upon the protagonists that the current 
methods are achieving nothing. 270  The methods of addressing the rival 
ethnonationalisms can be developed by including: (1) security for the survival 
and prominence of each of the ethnonationalisms (2) examples of how these 
methods of regulation have worked in previous conflicts with similar issues (3) 
exogenous pressure from the US and the UN on Kirkuk and also on both the 
KRG and Baghdad. 
2.5. Governance 
The issues with the governance of Kirkuk are closely linked to that of the rival 
ethnonationalisms, as due to the fact that each ethnicity is trying to 	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manoeuvre themselves into the best possible position, the efficient 
governance of the region is sidelined. These issues started right from the 
beginning of the ‘new Iraq’, in 2003, when the PUK peshmerga forces 
invaded the city, took over the municipal headquarters and appointed their 
own mayor. Following the US’ arrival in Kirkuk the Kurdish mayor was 
dismissed and the peshmerga were evicted from the city. The US then 
appointed a new twenty-four member council, consisting of six members from 
each ethnicity – including the minority-Christians. This caused problems, as 
groups who perceived that they had larger numbers within the city, 
particularly the Turkmen, felt they were not being adequately represented. 
This problem was further perpetuated by the US’ reliance on the Kurds for 
help in managing the city. According to the KDP’s media outlet, 1500 officials 
had been sent to Kirkuk to help the US forces to manage the city. As a result, 
the other ethnicities saw the US as favouring the Kurds, which caused conflict 
within the council. Furthermore, after complaints from numerous Turkmen 
parties and the two main Kurdish parties, five of the six ITF members were 
suspended and replaced by Turkmen with closer links to the Kurds. This 
resulted in the remaining ITF members boycotting the committee meetings 
and eventually being removed by the US, which further disrupted the 
committee’s ability to govern the limited responsibilities that they were given. 
When the US created a more permanent assembly 39 delegates from each 
ethnic group were chosen, as well as 144 independent delegates. Each group, 
including the independents, then nominated six representatives to the council. 
Prior to the selection of the council the Arabs had five delegates arrested for 
being members of the Ba’ath Party. As a result of this the Arabs boycotted the 
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vote, and withdrew their candidates for the election of the mayor. The six 
independents elected consisted of five Kurds, which gave the Kurds 11 
members (as well as many pro-Kurdish members within the Christian group) 
in the council and the minority-Christians a grossly unrepresentative seven 
members. Furthermore, two of the Turkmen members elected were seen to 
have close links to the Kurds. The fact that the council was pre-determined 
caused anger from the Arabs and Turkmen who saw the results as pre-
decided by the US and largely in favour of the Kurds. Although the council 
had minimal responsibilities – due to the discontent with its establishment 
process by the Arabs and Turkmen – its effective operating was hindered, as 
Turkmen and Arabs set about disrupting what they saw as Kurdish 
governance rather than helping to govern the city as a unified entity. Turkmen 
also saw themselves marginalised in national governance, which made it all 
the more important to try to wield more power within Kirkuk. Thus making 
their main focus the pursuit of power, rather than the governance of Kirkuk. 
Even when the US reorganised the council by adding six more Arabs, two 
more Kurds and two more Turkmen, there were still issues as those 
considered to be pro-Kurdish were in the majority. The matter of the pre-
determined council did not go away and there was still an impression of 
unfairness, which detracted from the actual governance, as manifested by 
two of the Arab councillors boycotting the council.271  
 Article 58 of the TAL was perceived as granting the Kurds future 
ownership of Kirkuk.272 As a result of this both Arab and Turkmen members of 
the Kirkuk Council walked out, which resulted in the council being suspended 	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in April 2004. Once again due to the battle for power the governance of Kirkuk 
suffered. In the run-up to the 2005 federal and provincial elections the Kurds 
wanted elections in Kirkuk to be suspended until Article 58 of the TAL was 
implemented. Although they were not successful in gaining this, they did gain 
the right to vote for the returnee Kurds – due to the threat of a boycott of the 
elections in Kirkuk.  As a direct result of this development the United Arab 
Front (Sunni party) withdrew from the elections. Once again resulting in an 
unrepresentative council being elected in Kirkuk, which affected its ability to 
govern. Due to boycotts, unrest in the non-Kurdish areas, and the 
organisational strength of the Kurdish parties, the Kurdish list managed to 
gain 26 seats in the 41-person council. When it came to forming a council the 
same issues arose – as analysed in Chapter 2.2. – in that the battle for power 
prevented the formation of the executive (particularly due to the fact that the 
Arabs and Turkmen felt that the Kurds had gained more votes than their 
numbers warranted). Consequently, a council was not elected for six months, 
all the while preventing effective governance. Finally, due to the Kurds’ 
majority in the council they elected an executive without the approval of the 
Turkmen and Arabs, giving the Kurds the top positions and leaving the deputy 
and assistant positions open for the other ethnicities. Subsequently, the Kurds 
could not effectively govern Kirkuk and the legitimacy of the council was void. 
This status quo was further cemented by the boycotting of the council 
meetings by Turkmen and Arabs. The lack of effective governance resulted in 
an inability to collect taxes and most of the finances, as well as the big 
decisions, came from Baghdad. In the drafting of a new constitution the Kurds 
managed to negotiate the inclusion of Article 140 and due to their power as 
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‘kingmakers’ in the December 2005 elections they managed to gain a 
guarantee that this would be implemented. As described in Chapter 1.4., this 
created issues which further resulted in the protagonists blocking each other, 
fighting for power and preventing effective governance. 273  The lack of 
progress in the governance of Kirkuk, due to the rival ethnonationalisms, is 
described by Tahseen Kahya, a leading member of the Turkmen bloc in the 
council: ‘We are suffering from political infighting. The problem with the 
council is the lack of trust, because any initiative from one group is always 
opposed by the others.’274 The International Crisis Group (ICG) also noted the 
blocking of the effective governance of Kirkuk in their 2006 report on Kirkuk. 
According to ICG, although Arabs and Turkmen participated in council 
debates they deliberately didn’t turn up for votes in order to not legitimise the 
result, thus preventing it from being implemented throughout Kirkuk. Although 
both Arabs and Turkmen were aligned in their opposition to Article 140, they 
could not agree as to who would receive the position of deputy governor. This 
further shows that even when alliances were made in Kirkuk, they were only 
made to prevent the gains made by another ethnicity and did not prevent the 
battle for power within this kind of instrumental alliance. Apart from the 
obvious divide within Kirkuk politics, the lack of funding also made the Kirkuk 
Council entirely ineffective as there was external funding/programmes in 
Kirkuk from the KRG and US, thus undermining the Kirkuk Council.275 By late 
2006 the problem of governing Kirkuk deteriorated further when Arab and 
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Turkmen officials began a boycott of Kirkuk’s council due to what they saw as 
Kurdish dominance of the council.276 Following more than a year of boycott of 
the council the Kurds and Arabs reached a deal in December 2007 for equal 
power sharing based on the 32/32/32/4 division of power. This saw the Arabs 
end their boycott, although despite the fact that this gave Turkmen the equal 
power sharing they were seeking, their boycott of the council remained 
intact.277 It was not until May of 2008 that the Turkmen finally ended their 
boycott.278  
Although provincial elections were supposed to be held in 2008, owing 
to a lack of agreement on an election law – due mainly to the issue of Kirkuk 
– these were continually delayed. It was eventually decided that Kirkuk would 
be excluded from these elections and they went ahead in January 2009 
without the participation of Kirkuk, despite the fact that provincial elections 
had not been held since 2005 and that the Kirkuk council was constantly 
being boycotted.279 As part of the new election law, Article 23 was created, 
which related directly to the Kirkuk issue.280  Despite the previous agreement 
for power sharing following the 32/32/32/4 division of power, the Kurds now 
saw this as something to be negotiated on through Article 23 and went back 
on this agreement. They further angered the Arabs by resigning both the 
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Governor and President as part of a private deal with the Turkmen, in order 
for a Turkmen to be elected as President. This demonstrates the instability of 
the council due to the lack of elections and the problems caused by not 
having a just and agreed upon method for deciding the allocation and election 
of positions.281 Due to battles within the Article 23 Committee, by the rival 
ethnonationalisms, no consensus was reached and it was deemed as a 
failure.282 As a result of this on 8 November 2009 an election law was agreed 
upon that gave a year-long review of Kirkuk’s results in order to scrutinise any 
irregularities.283 When the national elections were eventually held in Kirkuk, 
Turkmen and Arabs aligned themselves together against the Kurds and their 
desire to annexe Kirkuk to the KRG. The fact that they won the most seats 
with their al-Iraqiya alliance saw a further fracture of the political process in 
Kirkuk with the political battle between the rival ethnicities heating up, thus 
further affecting the governance of Kirkuk. 284  
 As is evident the governance of Kirkuk has suffered due to the rival 
ethnonationalisms’ battle for power. There have been constant boycotts and 
the blocking of proposals made by other ethnicities and a continuous battle 
for positions. According to Khadir Gihan of Gorran, those in power have not 
ruled for the people: 
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I believe that if any city is ruled based on citizen rights, the ideas of ethnic 
ownership, etc. will get lost. I think that if in the past ten years they [KDP & PUK] 
had served Kirkuk properly I think the Turkomen and Arabs would have no 
problem in joining the KRG, but they didn’t serve properly.285 
 
The power sharing that exists in Kirkuk does not work, from the division of 
power to the election of positions, the system is flawed and therefore a new 
system needs to be introduced. Under the current system ethnic groups do 
not see any adverse effects as a result of the boycotts they stage, which 
effectively allows them to block the system, which thus denies Kirkuk proper 
governance. The political parties use boycotts and withdrawal from the 
council as a tool of political manipulation, as seen when Arab members 
withdrew from the Council in September 2011 demanding that the Asayesh 
forces be removed from Kirkuk.286  In order to prevent this political wrangling a 
new power sharing system needs to be created that addresses these issues 
and, most importantly, is agreed upon by all the ethnicities so that there can 
be no grievances. It is also important that elections are held and an agreed 
system is set in place for the division of power (see Chapter 2.2.) so that it 
cannot be continually contested and used as a method to block the 
governance of Kirkuk. 
2.6. Resources 
Neighbouring countries and rival ethnonationalisms within Kirkuk and 
Baghdad see the Kurds’ aspiration for annexing Kirkuk as a desire to control 
its vast natural resources and in some cases as a means to secede from Iraq. 
Regardless of the inaccuracy of these accusations (these are discussed 	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throughout this thesis) they create an obstacle that prevents the development 
of a settlement for Kirkuk. This issue is further exasperated by the fact that 
Baghdad and the KRG are both backing different versions of the Hydrocarbon 
law and have different readings of the constitution on this issue. Still further 
strain is caused by the fact that the KRG has the ability to halt exports 
through the northern pipeline, as seen in 2009 over a disagreement related to 
this very issue.287 Without the creation of further agreements that guarantee 
Kirkuk’s natural resources and the profits thereof will remain within Iraq – 
including a finalised agreement on a new Hydrocarbon law – this will always 
remain an issue that will prevent Kirkuk moving forward. Despite the fact that 
the constitution states that all previously discovered oil deposits, which Kirkuk 
is, will be controlled by Baghdad, this does not seem to be enough to satisfy 
non-Kurds and further guarantees might be required.  
There is also the additional issue of there not being not enough money 
from the vast natural resources in Kirkuk making its way back to the province. 
Kirkuk needs more finances to deal with the returnee situation, as well as with 
the rebuilding of an area that has seen so much devastation over a long 
period of time. Although since the 2010 budget Kirkuk receives an extra $1 
from each barrel of oil produced, its infrastructure is so far behind that this 
entire fund went towards paying for the provision of electricity for Kirkuk.288  
As well as the issue of natural resources within Kirkuk, there is also the 
issue of those shared with the KRG. This mainly concerns the very scarce 
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resource of water with the KRG controlling the flow of water into Kirkuk 
through the Dukan dam. Arab farmers accused the Kurdistan region of ruining 
them by closing the valves to their water supply, the Dukan dam, in the winter 
each year. Sheikh Khaled al-Mafraji, a leader of the Arab Political Council, 
claimed that this was evidence of Kurds trying to harm the Arabs, as shown in 
the following statement:  
We are harmed by the Kurds, and the officials responsible for Baghdad and 
Kirkuk will not lift a finger. They release too much water from June to September 
while from October it is the opposite: there is not enough drinking water and 
even less to irrigate our lands. 289 
 
 The KRG claimed that the dam gates needed to be closed in the winter to 
ensure sufficient water for crops in the spring and summer. They stated that 
these actions were not carried out to harm those in Kirkuk, but instead were 
necessary due to a shortage of water. Evidently, this problem is caused 
through a lack of interaction and cooperation between the KRG and non-
Kurds in Kirkuk on the provisions of water.290 There have also been disputes 
over the amount of electricity produced in Kirkuk going to Baghdad, whilst 
Kirkuk battles to have enough electricity itself.291 This matter was dealt with 
through the purchasing of electricity from the KRG grid, which caused further 
issues with the non-Kurds wary of an additional link with the KRG. This 
development can actually be seen as a positive as it gives the KRG an 
opportunity to prove to Kirkuk the benefits of links to the Kurdish region. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 ‘Iraq water shortages raising ethnic tensions.’ Peyamner News Agency [Online] Available 
from http://www.peyamner.com/details.aspx?l=4&id=221370 [Accessed 29/01/2011] 
290 ‘Iraq water shortages raising ethnic tensions.’ Peyamner News Agency [Online] Available 
from http://www.peyamner.com/details.aspx?l=4&id=221370 [Accessed 20/09/2011] 
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However, without politicians in Kirkuk having other formal links (these are 
discussed in Chapter 5), they will always feel under the KRG’s control, rather 
than as interacting with the KRG.292  
Closely related to the problem of water shortage, there is also the issue 
of the agriculture sector, which was seriously eroded during the time of 
Saddam Hussein and has not been redeveloped in the ten years since his fall. 
Khadir Gihan from the Gorran party outlines the problem of the agricultural 
sector in Kirkuk: 
he [Saddam Hussein] displaced people from the countryside to urban areas and 
when they came back they couldn’t support the agriculture… and did not have 
the materials or education to redevelop these villages and for this reason in 
these 10 years we have seen no improvement in the agricultural industry. For 
example, the farmer used to be part of a production system, but right now he is 
just able to feed his family and no more. The agricultural goods we get right now 
are from Iran and Turkey.293 
As the soil surrounding Kirkuk is fertile it is imperative that there is investment 
towards the agriculture sector in order to not only supply Kirkuk with local 
produce, but also to support the section of the population that relies on 
agriculture for its livelihood. Furthermore, agricultural matters have become 
politicised as in the case of Arab farmers complaining about the unfairness of 
having their farming contracts in Kirkuk cancelled, as part of the process to 
restore Kirkuk’s demography. This created a rift between the al-Iraqiya list 
and the Kurdistan Blocs Coalition (KBC) over the legality of cancelling these 
contracts. To ease the tension created, Kirkuk’s provincial council launched 
an initiative to pay compensation to both the farmers who cooperated with the 	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293 Interview, conducted by the author, with the Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 
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scheme willingly and to those whose contracts were not renewed legally. This 
included allocating similar agricultural land in their areas of origin to those 
who did not want their contracts cancelled.294 However, this initiative did little 
to ease tensions, as Arab farmers, supported by their political parties in 
Kirkuk, demanded the return of their agricultural lands.295 
As is evident, the natural resources in Kirkuk cause fear amongst the 
rival ethnonationalisms over control of them going to another rival. Therefore, 
it is important that any agreement developed includes significant 
reassurances that these essential resources will remain the property, and 
under the control, of Iraq. 
2.7. Security 
Currently there are numerous security forces operating in Kirkuk, these are: 
the police force (and its various subsidiaries), the Iraqi Army, the 
peshmerga296, the US Army (prior to withdrawal), the Asayesh297, and finally 
the Sahwa.298 Understandably, with this amount of security forces operating in 
Kirkuk there is a problem with communication between all the groups, which 
causes confusion and a lack of unity and consistency in the policing of Kirkuk. 
With no overall command there is a lack of trust and transparency and on the 
rare occasion when vital information is passed on it is not used, as opined by 
the KDP Asayesh spokesperson for Kirkuk: ‘we have some people working 	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up by the US to give disenfranchised Sunnis an option other than the anti-US groups and is 
used to maintain security in Sunni-majority areas.  
	  	   125	  
with us and giving us information and we are passing that on to the army, but 
we are sure they are not using it.’299 Along with the lack of cooperation 
between these groups, there is also negative competition, which at times 
leads to the arrest of members from rival organisations.300 
According to UNAMI there are as many as 7800 Asayesh forces from 
the KDP and PUK operating in Kirkuk. Whilst the Asayesh are important in 
fighting terrorism in Kirkuk, they create an issue as the Arabs and Turkmen 
largely oppose their presence. Arabs and Turkmen claim that they are 
unaccountable, act above the law and are used as a force to intimidate 
political opponents. They also claim to fear the Asayesh, with many Arabs 
complaining of extra-judicial arrests and transfers to the KRG for 
interrogations and imprisonment. 301  Non-Kurds see the Asayesh as wrongly 
controlling the policing in Kirkuk and disagree with its interference with the 
other security forces. Additionally, Kurds who do not belong to the KDP and 
PUK claim that these forces are militias for the political parties rather than a 
security service for Kirkuk. This point is highlighted by Khadir Gihan, Gorran 
Leadership Council Kirkuk: ‘We want the Asayesh as national security not as 
political security, if the Asayesh belongs to a party it is a militia, but if it 
belongs to a government it is not a militia.’302 Arabs and Turkmen also resent 
the peshmerga operating in Kirkuk as it is a Kurdish army and they see its 
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involvement as an attempt by the KRG to gain control of Kirkuk.303  The 
following statement from the leader of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party, 
Jamal Shan, highlights these fears:  
We are afraid that this small Kurdish force will grow in size and take absolute 
control over the city’s security as part of a plan to incorporate Kirkuk into 
Kurdistan, whether legally or by force.304 
At the same time, the Kurds denounce the need for the Iraqi Army to operate 
in Kirkuk and are particularly sensitive to its operations in areas that were part 
of the Anfal campaign. Moreover, the Iraqi security forces are dominated by 
members who have strong political party links, which allows these parties to 
influence the policing of Kirkuk. In addition, in a multiethnic area like Kirkuk, it 
is important that the police are multi-lingual in order for them to communicate 
effectively with the population they are policing. However, many of the police 
in Kirkuk can only speak one language, which hinders effective 
communication and by extension effective policing.305 Furthermore, instead of 
Kirkuk moving forward towards a unified multiethnic police force, things are 
going in the opposite direction and more fractures are being created. This 
was seen in September 2011 when first the Turkmen announced that they 
would create a special security force to protect Turkmen citizens in Kirkuk, 
and then Arab members of the Council demanded the removal of the 
Asayesh forces from Kirkuk or they too would create their own security 
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force.306  Finally, the only factor that kept communication and cooperation 
between these various factions was the US Forces and this diminished 
notably following their withdrawal, in December 2011, which led to an 
increase in violence. For this reason many members of the security forces in 
Kirkuk did not want the US to withdraw, as highlighted by the following 
statement by the Deputy Police Commander, General Turhan Yousef, 
‘American troops should stay, or there will be civil war.’307 The bad state of the 
security forces is further highlighted by the amount of violence in Kirkuk, as 
exhibited in Chapter 1.7.. This violence has caused many to leave Kirkuk, 
particularly the minority Christians.308 To sum up, it is clear that the current 
situation of the security services in Kirkuk causes conflict, and thus a new 
system with cooperation, equality, accountability and with less factions, needs 
to be implemented. It is worrying that there is no attempt to even implement a 
system along these lines and instead the security services in Kirkuk are 
regressing. 
 
2.8. Employment 
As is evident from this chapter the employment within the security services 
and the council is highly contested, with both being seen as dominated by the 
Kurds. There are also issues of contention with the nationally-owned Iraqi 
Northern Oil Company (INOC), which operates in Kirkuk. Namely, Kirkuk's 
Kurds have complained about the ethnic and political dominance of Arabs in 	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INOC. According to Adil Chawshin, deputy chief of the Kirkuk Oil Syndicate, 
INOC had 11,733 permanent employees at the time, and amongst them, only 
805 were Kurds. Employees with temporary contracts – appointed after 2003 
– amounted to about 4,400 employees, and only 225 of these were Kurds. 
Kurdish officials in the Kirkuk Provincial Council complained that INOC and 
the Iraqi Oil Ministry were ignoring the role of Kirkuk’s local government in 
making decisions on the province's oil issues. 309  Again, the issue of 
employment is a highly politicised one, as it is closely linked to the matter of 
the acceptance of returnees and the wider situation of electing officials, as 
until agreements are reached on these the proportional representation of 
posts cannot be decided. Under the Berlin Accord (see Chapter 4.4.) a group 
of Kirkuki politicians signed an agreement to rank the positions available 
within civil employment, in order to distribute the top positions fairly; to 
distribute employment proportionally with regards to the demographics of 
each region; and to distribute civil employment under the 32/32/32/4 ratio.310 
Although the first two points are important, the final point would create 
problems. If the Kurds are in the majority, it would be unfair for them to only 
have 32% of the police force as they would have a larger population to police, 
and so on. Or alternatively if an ethnicity only amounts to 20% of the 
population, but are gaining 32% of all civil positions this would result in a 
class system where this ethnicity is better off than the rest.  The unfairness of 
this system is further highlighted by the Turkmen being the most vocal 
supporters of it, as they would have the most to gain when taking their 	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numbers into consideration. 311  However, if a proportionate representation 
system was chosen, the returnee Kurds and the planted Arabs who have not 
returned to their area of origin would have to be accepted in order for the 
distribution to be recognised by all. Therefore, resolving this issue of 
employment depends on the steps taken on issues such as returnees, but the 
likely action would be based on the power sharing within the council, which 
itself is based on other factors (like the constitutional status). 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
There are many important issues that are mentioned in this chapter that are 
preventing Kirkuk from moving forward. As has been displayed, the various 
rival ethnonationalisms have different ideas of how to resolve the matters 
highlighted, hence the fact that these issues create conflict. As already stated, 
in order for a settlement to be developed these concerns must be tackled in a 
way that will result in all the ethnicities making equal compromises, yet feeling 
as if they have made relevant gains. Many of these issues are intertwined 
and consequently the method used to resolve them is dependent on the 
method used to resolve another related problem. It is therefore important that 
these are addressed in one package and that they are linked in a way that the 
necessary compromises are shared amongst the ethnicities. This chapter 
helps to understand what the key issues that need resolving are and gives 
the stance of each ethnic group on these, thus paving the way for a 
settlement to be developed in the succeeding chapters. In Chapters 5 and 6 	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the analysis in this chapter will be used to develop a proposed agreement 
that takes into consideration that all these issues must be addressed in order 
to be accepted and, in fact, succeed. Furthermore, the analysis of the issues 
of conflict in this chapter will be used when deconstructing and exposing the 
weaknesses of previous proposals for Kirkuk in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: Methods of Power Sharing 
3.1. Introduction 
As already stated in the introduction, it is impractical for areas that are 
involved in ethnic conflict to dissolve into ethnically homogenous countries. 
Not only would these self-determination disputes lead to much bloodshed, 
there would also be a proliferation of small states without the capacity to 
function on their own. At the same time majoritarian and authoritarian regimes 
have their own problems, but most of all they are shrouded in unfairness 
towards minorities. Therefore democratic power sharing offers the greatest 
prospect for long-term peace, even though it is evidently a difficult practice to 
introduce to a deeply divided society. Power sharing allows for inclusive 
governance where all the major ethnic groups have some form of 
representation within the government.  According to Timothy D. Sisk there are 
two types of broad methods of power sharing for deeply divided societies – 
the consociational method and integrative method (centripetalism). There is a 
depth of literature on these two theories, with the main focus being on: which 
theory is better for conflict management, examining regions that have 
introduced one of these theories to analyse the successes and failures, and 
developing these theories within the dynamics of a particular conflict. One of 
the key reasons for the majority of the literature focusing on the conflicts 
rather than the theories is because the latter can be implemented differently 
depending on the dynamics of the situation where they are introduced. For 
this reason the majority of the literature on these theories does not make any 
direct developments to the theories as a whole, but rather on the specific 
conflicts that are examined. This should not be viewed as a negative, as 
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these theories need to remain broad in order for them to remain relevant to a 
vast array of conflicts. The refinements should take place once a specific 
conflict has been chosen, rather than before. As Michael Kerr states:  
in societies deeply divided by ethno-national conflict, it is not the use of power 
sharing as a model for regulating political violence that is inherently problematic. 
For governments, policy makers, and academics alike, the great challenge is to 
construct institutional frameworks which address the constitutional issues that 
invariably lie at the kernel of ethno-national divisions, whilst maintaining a 
political process capable of providing the incentives and motivations to bring 
together all the major parties to the conflict.312  
 
Therefore this chapter will not attempt to examine all the leading literature on 
power sharing, but rather its aim – with regards to power sharing – is to give 
an understanding of the key principals as well as the advancements that have 
been made that are relevant to Kirkuk.  
 Both centripetalists and consociationists often use the terms ‘deeply 
divided societies’ and ‘divided societies’ interchangeably when referring to 
particular contexts they analyse. Despite this, protagonists of each method 
refer to the other as not being feasible for deeply divided societies, but rather 
for those where the divide has not reached this extent.313 If a society has a 
lesser divide than a deeply divided society, but a divide nonetheless, then by 
deduction it would have to be a divided society. The fact that these terms 
have not been sufficiently differentiated has resulted in a lack of clarity 
between the classifications of many conflicts; some authors have referred to a 
number of societies as being divided, whilst others differentiate societies 
within the same list as being deeply divided. For this reason it is important 	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that these two terms are defined separately and not used interchangeably, 
therefore allowing for a differentiation between societies that are deeply 
divided and those that are merely divided. In this thesis Kirkuk is viewed as a 
deeply divided society and methods for its regulation are chosen based on 
this premise, whilst others are rejected due to their suitability for divided 
societies. Thus, reinstating the fact that it is imperative that these two terms 
are defined separately. Ian Lustick defines a society as deeply divided if: 
ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on 
terminal identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period 
of time and a wide variety of issues. As a minimum condition, boundaries 
between rival groups must be sharp enough so that membership is clear and, 
with few exceptions, unchangeable.314 
 
Whereas Arend Lijphart defines it as ‘a society that is sharply divided along 
religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually 
separate subsocieties’ 315  Although Donald Horowitz does use the terms 
‘deeply divided’, ‘severely divided’ and ‘divided’ interchangeably when 
discussing societies with divides, he does differentiate European conflicts316 
as not being severely divided and therefore being ‘less ascriptive in character, 
less severe in intensity, less exclusive in their command of loyalty, and less 
preemptive of other forms of conflict.’317 If one works on the premise that a 
divided society is one where the divide is less than that of a deeply or 
severely divided society, Horowitz’s definition of European conflicts thus 
becomes his definition of a divided society. This definition demonstrates a 	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clear difference between a deeply divided society and a divided society, and 
based on this, these terms can be defined for the purpose of this thesis, 
where the focus is on ethnic conflict. A deeply divided society will be defined 
as having ethnic groups with a high level of political salience that transfers to 
the society by creating ethnic divides at a local level which can lead to 
voluntary ethnic segregation. Whereas, in divided societies there may be 
issues that ethnic groups are divided upon, but political salience does not 
occur in the majority of the political parties and there is a greater interaction 
between ethnicities at a local level. Therefore, Kirkuk can be considered a 
deeply divided society as the ethnic divide between Turkmen, Arabs and 
Kurds is represented within the political parties and there is a high level of 
animosity between these parties, which is often displayed within the society 
as a whole.  
 A power sharing arrangement does not emerge on its own, but rather 
stems from a long history of violence and failure to reach accommodation, 
which results in rational calculations being made about the groups’ future 
(thus leading to negotiations for a settlement), and often involves exogenous 
pressure upon the ethnicities to reach a settlement.318 It has been identified in 
the introduction to this thesis that power sharing is the leading form of 
governance to minimise conflict in divided societies, and Kirkuk is seen as a 
deeply divided society in need of institutional design. Consequently, it is 
important to examine the theories of power sharing, which differ greatly, in 
order to analyse which is more suitable for Kirkuk. It is also vital to identify 
what are the leading aspects of theses theories that make them feasible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 See section on Northern Ireland. 
	  	   135	  
Kirkuk. At the same time, it is crucial to analyse the main criticisms of these 
theories in order to create an awareness of them so that there can be an 
attempt to minimise their effect in any potential agreement relating to Kirkuk.  
3.2. Consociation 
Consociational theory was derived from Arend Lijphart’s examination of the 
political systems operating in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and 
Austria. Lijphart observed that despite having divided subcultures and strong 
cleavages, these countries were stable. When examining how these 
democracies managed to remain stable, despite their fragmentation, Lijphart 
raised the hypothesis that this was due to the ‘overarching cooperation at elite 
level.’319 In order to prove this hypothesis Lijphart uses the example of Austria, 
amongst others. He demonstrates that following the Second World War the 
leaders of the rival segments in Austria were so intent on not repeating the 
civil war and dictatorship of the First Republic that they decided to form a 
grand coalition. Lijphart emphasises that elites learned from the past to form 
mutual tolerance, and this elite cooperation transferred into universal 
participation in governance, thus forming a consociational democracy. He 
identifies that this universal participation should preferably be a grand 
coalition, but can also be a cartel of elites. Hence in examining consociational 
democracies Lijphart places elite cooperation at the centre. It is the elites 
ability to accommodate rival subcultures and prevent political fragmentation 
that leads to the creation of a cartel of elites/grand coalition, which in turn 
leads to a consociational democracy.320 After Lijphart’s initial examination of 
the use of, what he coined as, consociation he progressed to advocating its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Lijphart, Arend. ‘Consociational Democracy’ World Politics 21(2), 1969, p. 212. 
320 Lijphart, Arend. ‘Consociational Democracy’ World Politics 21(2), 1969, pp. 207-225. 
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usage in deeply divided societies. This led to Lijphart further defining 
consociation and developing the principles necessary for its 
implementation.321 According to Lijphart: 
In a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural 
society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behaviour of the 
leaders of the different segments of the population. Elite cooperation is the 
primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy…322 
 
In order to successfully govern these antagonistic groups, Lijphart identified 
four consociational principles. 
1. Executive power sharing323 (with a grand coalition being preferred) 
where each of the main segments of society is represented.324 
2. Mutual veto, giving minorities political protection from decisions that 
affect their vital interests. 
3. Proportionality in political representation, expenditure and public sector 
employment. 
4. Segmental autonomy in the internal affairs of each group.325 
The fact that consociational theory is quite broad – in that each of these 
principles can be implemented to varying degrees – allows for a great deal of 
institutional forms to be developed within its framework. Thus, when applying 
this theory to a specific context it is important to examine the details of the 
case at hand and to tailor make a package specific to the needs of the 
particular conflict. Despite the broadness available in the interpretation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Taylor, Rupert. ‘Introduction’ in Rupert Taylor (ed.) Consociational Theory: McGarry and 
O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 2-5. 
322 Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1977, p. 1. 
323 Although Lijphart did initially call for a grand coalition, in his later works he states that this 
is not a necessary requirement, but rather that there is universal participation. 
324 Lijphart, Arend. Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory 
and Practice. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, pp. 28-30. 
325 Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 25-52. 
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each principle, there is still an issue; a deeply divided society may not be in 
favour of installing all these principles. Lijphart, initially, stated that all four 
principles were required for consociation to occur, whereas they are not all 
necessary to install elite cooperation between the different segments of the 
society. By stating that consociation must include all four principals you limit 
the empirical cases available to study, but by giving different levels of 
consociation you open up the theory to more cases. In Lijphart’s later works 
on consociation he differentiates between primary and secondary 
characteristics of consociational democracy. Lijphart labels the sharing of 
executive power and group autonomy as primary characteristics and 
proportionality and minority veto as secondary characteristics.  Therefore, it 
can be said that the role of the secondary characteristics is to strengthen the 
primary characteristics. It should be stated however that these principles are 
important in developing an agreement that has the best possibility of stability, 
therefore any settlement created should try to include all four, but it is not 
imperative that all four principles are included in order for it to be called a 
consociational settlement.326 
 As the key element of consociation is elite cooperation, Lijphart has 
examined some of the favourable conditions that he sees as facilitating this 
cooperation. According to Lijphart these conditions make it easier for elites to 
cooperate whilst still maintaining the support of their grassroots, however, this 
does not mean that consociation cannot occur when these conditions are not 
present. The favourable conditions are: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Lijphart, Arend. ‘The Wave of Power sharing Democracy’ in Andrew Reynolds. (ed.) The 
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• Proportionality of segments: There should be a balance between the 
segments, with no segment having a large majority. In a society where 
there is a clear majority segment, this segment will usually try and 
dominate the rest, as there is no clear incentive for the majority to 
share power. There should also not be too few or too many segments, 
with an ideal amount being between three and four. In a society where 
there are two equal segments, the leaders of each segment will always 
aim to win the majority. Having two equal segments can also reinforce 
the antagonisms, because in negotiations a win for one group is seen 
as a loss for the other. However, having two equal segments is 
preferable to having a segment with a large majority. The reason why 
too many segments are a problem is because the more there are, the 
longer it takes to negotiate, which can thus create instability. 
• Multiparty systems: There should be a multiparty system, where each 
segment is represented by a party; this way leaders can be 
distinguished to represent each segment in a coalition. This is not to 
say that each segment shouldn’t have more than one party, but rather 
that they should each have a clearly dominant party. Thus each 
segment is politically represented, preventing minorities from having to 
seek representation in lager multi-representative parties where they 
may feel isolated. 
• Size of the entities: The size of the entity has an effect on the success 
of consociation; as the smaller they are the more likely the elites are to 
meet, which in turn enhances the chances of cooperation and 
accommodation. The size also effects their position on the international 
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arena, with smaller entities more likely to feel threatened. As a result of 
this there is a greater need for internal solidarity, therefore smaller 
entities are more likely to come together in a consociational 
government. The size also has an effect on the actual governance, as 
consociational democracies involve numerous negotiations between 
the segments. Therefore, the smaller the entity, the quicker these 
negotiations tend to be, thus allowing for more stability. 
• Structure of cleavages: The way the cleavages are formed can have 
an effect on the success of consociation. This refers to the number of 
cleavages, their fragmentation, whether they cross-cut, the overarching 
loyalties and their representation within the parties. If there are 
numerous cleavages and they are equal in size, this can result in a 
further fragmentation of society; as people no longer classify 
themselves under a larger segment, but rather a smaller specific 
cleavage. This can only be viewed as positive if it transfers the society 
from having a specific majority group, to an all minority society. If the 
cleavages are unequal, they are more prone to cross-cutting and 
therefore, cross-pressures. This can result in more moderate attitudes. 
This interaction of the cleavages, paired with the overarching loyalties 
determines the amount of segments in the society. Overarching 
loyalties can form cohesion within the segments, or across the entire 
society. Cross-cutting of the cleavages within the party systems is 
conducive to consociation. However, it is important that the significant 
issues of each cleavage are represented within the parties, thus 
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institutionalising them and helping to resolve them. If these issues are 
not represented, violence can erupt.  
• Segmental isolation: In a plural society it is beneficial to have clear 
boundaries between the segments. This limits the contacts between 
the segments at grassroots level, which in turn limits the chances of 
conflict. Consociation allows for the segments to stay apart, yet still 
allows for the creation and maintenance of organisations of 
governance. For this reason federalism is also favourable for 
consociation, as it helps further this segmental isolation, whilst still 
managing the organisations of governance. 
• History of elite accommodation: Consociation relies on elite 
cooperation; one of the reasons elites cooperate is because a failure to 
do so could have vast consequences for all the segments of the 
society. If there is a past tradition of elite cooperation, these elites are 
then more likely to cooperate again and the process of cooperation is 
easier to promote to their grassroots support. This tradition of elite 
cooperation is possibly the most important of the conditions that are 
favourable to consociation. However, like the other conditions, it is not 
compulsory.327 
Many of the favourable conditions developed by Lijphart have received 
criticism and others are seen as contradictory. These criticisms include the 
fact that he favours a smaller entity for power sharing so that elites can meet 
often, yet also argues that there should be segmental isolation and that the 
size of the country has nothing to do with the stability. Furthermore Lijphart 	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favours a history of cooperation, yet this does not necessarily lead to 
successful consociation, e.g. consociation in Northern Ireland is more 
successful than in Lebanon despite the fact Lebanon has a history of 
cooperation.328 Furthermore, the empirical case of Kirkuk deviates from the 
favourable conditions set out by Lijphart due to the fact that the overarching 
loyalties do not benefit consociation. The sizeable ‘nationalist’ cleavage 
(nationalist in that they want Kirkuk to remain under direct governance of 
Baghdad) creates overarching loyalties between a large proportion of the 
Turkmen and Arab segments in a desire completely opposite to the rest of 
society. Therefore, although this overarching loyalty creates unity, it also 
creates conflict with another cleavage, that of the one which desires to join 
the KRG. Although this does alleviate the problem of Kurdish dominance in 
Kirkuk province by creating two relatively equal cleavages (as seen in the 
2010 national elections where just 4794 votes split the leading blocs 
representing the two cleavages329) it is also an issue of conflict and somewhat 
transfers the society into two segments, which therefore make negotiations 
harder. Therefore, contrary to what Lijphart identifies, having cleavages with 
overarching loyalties is not always favourable to consociation; the ‘nationalist’ 
cleavage in Kirkuk is bigger than the Arab and Turkmen segments and has 
created two groups seeking exactly the opposite outcome in any settlement. 
Although many of these conditions have received criticism, the proportionality 
of the segments remains important and has been reiterated by McGarry and 
O’leary as they see the balance of power between the segments as being an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Kerr, Michael. Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and 
Lebanon. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005, pp. 179-200. 
329 Independent High Electoral Commission. ‘Kirkuk’ IHEC [Online] Available from 
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important condition for consociation.330 In Kirkuk the Kurds are seen as a 
large majority, however, in Kirkuk city itself there is a far more even 
distribution of the various segments within the population. This therefore 
makes Kirkuk city more favourable to consociation than Kirkuk province, 
which should be addressed in a settlement for Kirkuk.  
 McGarry and O’Leary have developed consociational theory further 
and whilst Lijphart has largely influenced them, they do disagree with him on 
a number of points. The works of McGarry and O’Leary have helped to clarify 
a number of issues within consociational theory and have addressed many of 
the criticisms that consociation has received. Consociational theory has thus 
become a governance method in ethnic conflicts and is supported by the 
United Nations (UN) and seen as the go to method of governance for ethnic 
conflicts.331 The reason McGarry and O’Leary have advanced this theory so 
much, despite the fact that it was described in the introduction as a 
necessarily broad theory, is because it previously concentrated on religious 
and socioeconomic, rather than ethnic conflicts. Although Lijphart is known as 
the ‘father of consociation’ it is important to examine the developments made 
by McGarry and O’Leary, as they are far more relevant to the contemporary 
global political situation where a large amount of ethnic conflicts, often 
involving self-determination disputes, exist. Seeing as Kirkuk falls into this 
category, these advances are also relevant to the development of a 
settlement for Kirkuk. There are seven main areas where McGarry and 
O’Leary’s ideas on consociation differ from that of Lijphart – although it is also 	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worth mentioning that in Lijphart’s more recent work he has aligned himself 
with the ideas put forward by McGarry and O’Leary. 
• According to McGarry and O’Leary traditional consociational theory is 
overly endogenous and ignores important exogenous factors. Lijphart's 
initial ‘favourable conditions for consociational democracy’ completely 
ignore the exogenous role, in that only one of the conditions (size of 
the entities) contains exogenous factors. It therefore ignores the role 
that outside entities can play in facilitating an agreement, for example 
the way Ireland, Britain, the United States (US) and South Africa did for 
Northern Ireland (NI). Exogenous action has become a very important 
factor in the establishment of contemporary consociational settlements; 
it had a role to play in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and many more.332 Although exogenous forces can help facilitate 
an agreement, they must be paired with endogenous ones, or else the 
longevity of the agreement could be questioned. This external help is 
not only important in the implementation, but can also have an 
important role to play in the operation of a consociational settlement. It 
can involve external actors or organisations taking roles that hold 
contention, therefore preventing conflict. Some examples of this 
include the overseeing of the implementation of police reform in NI, 
which was done by an American, Tom Constantine; and the Bosnian 
Supreme Court and Central Bank, which are presided over by external 
high representatives. Concurrently, these exogenous factors are very 	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important to Kirkuk, as the US and UN wield a great deal of influence 
there. Also no deal could be made, or would be allowed to be made, 
without the backing of the KRG and Baghdad – one could go further 
and say that the deal would be made by the KRG and Baghdad – 
however incorrect this may be – with the backing of Kirkuk. In fact 
these external entities are so important that it could be said that 
consociation may be impossible without them. 
• As already stated, Lijphart’s consociational theory was based on 
European countries (pre-1970) and therefore focused on religious and 
class divisions. Whereas the majority of contemporary internal conflicts 
are ethnic conflicts and involve self-determination disputes. Thus, to 
address these issues territorial autonomy is needed, as cultural 
autonomy is not enough. In cases that involve trans-state self-
determination, new issues arise. In NI cross-border institutions were 
set up, giving both Unionists and Nationalists links to their favoured 
entity. A future chance for self-determination was also introduced in the 
Agreement, with both the majority of the ‘North’ and ‘South’ having to 
be in favour of this in separate referenda. As part of the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA), new institutions (like the police and parliament) 
were made nationally impartial, thus demonstrating that it was an 
agreement between national communities. Again such cross-border 
institutions may be important for the future of Kirkuk, although these 
institutions would exist within the regional borders of Iraq. 
• Traditional consociation tends to focus on the design of political 
institutions, and forming an agreement on these. It therefore ignores 
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numerous other factors that need agreement on, such as: the design of 
the police, demilitarisation, return of exiles, educational reform, 
economic policy, promotion of language and group rights, etc. Without 
designing an agreement that takes these factors into consideration, the 
settlement will be under pressure once these factors arise, that is if it is 
even possible to reach an agreement without addressing these issues.  
• Lijphart favours proportionate representation (PR)- Party List electoral 
systems333, whereas McGarry and O’Leary are supporters of PR-single 
transferrable vote (STV).334 They see PR-STV as a better option for 
maintaining an agreement, as parties are more likely to remain unified. 
Whereas, in the PR-Party electoral system hardliners can form their 
own parties without threatening the total vote and seat share of their 
ethno-national bloc, yet at the same time penalising the more 
moderate parties. They do however state that either option is valid and 
the best option should be chosen with regards to the dynamics of the 
conflict.335 
• Lijphart initially saw a grand coalition as the key principle to a 
consociational settlement and although he has slightly moderated this 
to ‘universal participation’, McGarry and O’Leary still see this as too 
high a demand. Instead they seek ‘joint consent across significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 In this system seats in each electoral district are given in proportion to the votes won, but 
voters vote for a party list, rather than individuals within the party. 
334 In this system voters from each electoral district rank candidates in order of preference. In 
order to get elected candidates must reach the desired quota, [votes / (seats +1)] +1, those 
who reach this quota with their first preference votes are automatically elected and their 
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335 McGarry, John & Brendan O’Leary. ‘Under Friendly and Less-Friendly Fire’ in Rupert 
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communities’, deeming this as a necessary factor to create a working 
consociational settlement. From this they distinguish three types of 
consociation: (1) unanimous consociation – grand coalition; (2) 
concurrent consociation – majority support of each segment; (3) and 
lastly weak consociation – plurality in one or more segments, but not 
all. They opine that there is no theoretical or empirical evidence that 
consociations are undemocratic when elites govern with factional or 
lower levels of support within their segments, as they are elected 
democratically and are involved in democratic governance. 
• Traditional consociation relies on the formation of a government 
through negotiations over coalitions and government positions. This 
can result in political impasse over the formation of the government (an 
example of this is the 2010 Iraqi elections, see Chapter 1.6.) or the 
instability of a government that can easily be dissolved if a large bloc 
chooses to withdraw. Thus, McGarry and O’Leary favour allocating 
ministerial portfolios through sequential proportionality rules. Therefore, 
forming coalitions and allocating the positions without having to 
negotiate and preventing blocs from withdrawing, as their positions will 
merely be allocated to those next in line. The Good Friday Agreement 
uses the d’Hondt system336 for this allocation, although McGarry and 
O’Leary favour the Sainte-Laguë method337.338 	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analysis see Appendix V. 
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As is evident McGarry and O’Leary have developed consociational theory 
towards ethnic conflicts involving self-determination disputes in deeply divided 
societies. Consequently, the additions that they have made to consociational 
theory are highly relevant to the contemporary cases of conflict. Although 
these developments have been made with particular attention to Northern 
Ireland, they are relevant to ethnic conflicts the world over. This is due to 
proliferation of ethnic conflicts that involve self-determination disputes, and 
more importantly due the broadness of the theory, with different options 
available depending on the empirical case. Therefore, although it can be said 
that the contributions made by McGarry and O’Leary are favourable to Kirkuk, 
they should be developed further according to the dynamics of the Kirkuk 
conflict – as no two conflicts are exactly the same.  
 Another significant development to consociational theory was the 
development of liberal consociation by O’Leary, in his article ‘Debating 
Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments.’ McGarry and 
O’Leary, as well as Lijphart, have since become advocates of liberal 
consociation. Liberal consociation follows self-determination, in that any 
political identity that wins enough votes in the election may choose to join the 
power sharing coalition. Whereas, corporate consociation follows 
predetermination by having an ascriptive criteria where group identities are 
fixed. Under corporate consociation segments of the society are often obliged 
to vote within their own group.339 Corporate consociation predetermines the 
percentage each ascriptive group has in the cabinet and reserves certain 
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positions for specific groups.340 This excludes other groups that do not fall 
within this criterion, as well as those who wish to be classified as having no 
group. It also does not address the ever-changing population and can 
therefore give groups privileges above that of which their numbers warrant. In 
this way corporate consociation can produce instability, as it ignores 
segments of the society as well as failing to adapt to the demographic 
changes. Under liberal consociation there is no provisions for groups within 
the government. Rather democratic political parties are elected to the 
government based on their strength through a proportionate representation 
voting system. It is then preferable that the cabinet is decided through 
sequential proportionate rules. Liberal consociation is a lot less formal in its 
power sharing than that of corporate consociation and therefore more 
decisions are left to the individual groups. Under liberal consociation federal 
regions (if they indeed exist within the agreement, which is decided based on 
the dynamics of the situation) are decided at a local democratic level, 
whereas corporate consociation has a preference for dividing the 
predetermined segments of the society into federations. Thus liberal 
consociation allows for both decentralised and centralised governments to 
operate to different extents in the various regions, rather than following the 
decentralised model that corporate consociation favours. Liberal consociation 
offers more stability than corporate consociation because it allows the groups 
to decide if they want a federal region or if they want to fall under the central 
government. Liberal consociation also counters centripetalist’s main criticism 
of consociation – that it entrenches the divides in the society. It does this by 	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allowing for whatever significant identities emerge following the elections to 
partake in governance, including cross community parties. Therefore, the 
development of liberal consociation has offered more stability, and thus 
longevity, to the consociational arrangement and has allowed the society to 
progress beyond the ethnic divide by representing whichever identities 
emerge.341  
 Despite the above-discussed advances in consociational theory, 
scholars such as Donald Horowitz remain highly critical of this model of power 
sharing. As a critic of consociational theory Horowitz has many issues with 
the very notion of elite cooperation. He does not see why a group with a 
majority would cooperate and share power; if the elites did decide to share 
power, he questions what would make them tolerant of other ethnic groups 
and prevent them from only pursuing the advantage of their own group; and 
finally if the elites were to make compromises, this would create counter-elites 
who would try to block these compromises, thus breaking the group 
allegiance that consociation relies on. Horowitz doesn’t mention that these 
same issues are likely to occur in any type of power sharing and that they are 
even more accentuated in centripetalism where elites are in the same party. 
The failure to mention this could be because Horowitz sees cooperation 
between elites as being enforced through institutional designs in 
centripetalism, which is hardly a democratic form of governance.342 In answer 
to Horowitz, McGarry and O’Leary have pointed out that elites have chosen to 
cooperate in Northern Ireland and the so-called ‘radical’ parties have 	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moderated through consociation and it is now difficult to differentiate their 
policies from that of the so-called ‘moderate’ parties. They also point out that 
it was the centripetal features of the Agreement, electing Premiers that both 
segments support, that led to the failure and instability of the power sharing 
arrangements. Once these were removed, in the St Andrew Agreement, a 
more stable power sharing arrangement was established, which has been in 
place since 2007. Furthermore, there has been a marked decrease in 
violence with 509 people dying through political violence in the nine years 
prior to the agreement, in comparison to the 134 in the nine years after. 
Therefore, not only have the elites cooperated and moderated their policies 
through consociation, this accommodative behaviour has also transferred to 
the grassroots. Although there were many other factors that led to this 
accommodative behaviour, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire 
and the Anglo Irish Agreement, the successful governance of Northern 
Ireland through consociation plays a large part in maintaining the stability.343 
Furthermore, Horowitz raises an additional criticism that cultural autonomy is 
only possible once the conflict is reduced, as it is at the core of the conflict 
and that by having post-electoral coalitions there is no compromise on ethnic 
issues, just on cabinet portfolios. The majority of Horowitz’s criticisms stem 
from the fact that he sees consociation as strengthening the divide of the 
society and does not see this as a positive approach to ending conflict. 
Consociational power sharing has far more empirical cases than that of 
centripetalism, and for this reason many of these criticisms have been 
addressed as it has developed. The fact that it is more widely used gives it 	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more credit as a practical method of institutional design to end conflict and 
there is also therefore more evidence of its success – although many of its 
critics put this down to the UN polices of adopting a consociational approach 
to ending ethnic conflicts.344 Despite all this, there is one criticism that will 
always remain because it can be argued that it is what consociational theory 
is built upon, namely that it strengthens the divides in the society – although 
the word strengthen is too strong and should be replaced with ‘it is based on’. 
The question that remains is whether reinforcement of divides within a society 
is necessary to end conflict, or whether an option that weakens the divides 
could be just as successful. As already stated the empirical evidence points 
towards consociation as a more successful model showing that over time 
divides have weakened through consociation. However, more evidence is 
needed before being able to make an adequate comparison, with the stakes 
being so high ethnic conflict is not something to experiment with in order to 
prove the worth of political science theories. An important point to make is 
that although consociation does strengthen the divides at a political level by 
creating parties based on ethnicity, this divide is no greater than with a 
society that is in conflict, and is in fact less as there is a positive interaction at 
a political level. The problem that centripetalists have with consociation is that 
by it being based on ethnicity there is no chance for developing significant 
cross-communal relations in the society. This is where liberal consociation 
comes in; although it still focuses on the divides in the society, it leaves it up 
to the society to decide what these divides are, thus allowing the introduction 
of cross-community parties. Therefore, although liberal consociation still 	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follows the principles of consociation, it is the society that chooses these 
divides, thus allowing them to evolve with the society.345 
3.3. Integrative Power sharing 
 
Integrative power sharing is also known as centripetalism, because its aim is 
to pull the political parties to the centre, i.e. to make them become more 
moderate. Centripetalists aim to do the opposite of consociationalists, in that 
rather than using the very plurality of the society to govern, their aim is to 
minimise the ethnic character of politics by creating institutional designs that 
promote and encourage interaction between the cleavages. Centripetalists’ 
aim is to moderate politics through creating multiethnic parties, thus leading to 
accommodation between the segments of the society. Donald L. Horowitz 
gives five integrative mechanisms to reduce conflict: 
• Disperse the power, in order to take the strain off the central politics. 
• Create arrangements that encourage intra-ethnic conflict, such as 
territorial devolution. 
• Introduce incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation, such as electoral laws 
for pre-election coalitions. 
• Initiate policies that encourage the formation of groups based on social 
forces, rather than ethnicity. 
• Reduce the differences between the groups, thus reducing the areas of 
conflict. 
Centripetalists believe that their form of power sharing is the best way to 
govern a deeply divided society, as it bridges the divides – thus ending the 	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ethnic conflict. 346  However, this view can be seen as highly utopian. In a 
deeply divided society, like Northern Ireland or Kirkuk, it is highly fanciful to 
expect antagonistic segments of the society to come together in one party, or 
for voters to vote across the divide for different segments with which there is a 
long history of animosity. Although this would be a definitive step forward in 
bringing the society beyond the conflict and would be a transition to a unified 
society, it is just not feasible in a deeply divided society. If it were, there would 
not be such a big divide in the first place. Due to the fact that a deeply divided 
society is unlikely to follow a centripetalist path on its own, a strong outside 
power would have to enforce these mechanisms. Not only this, it would have 
to also monitor their practise, as a deeply divided society is unlikely to follow 
the mechanisms of centripetalism of its own accord. Enforcing centripetalist 
processes goes far beyond the exogenous pressure recommended in 
consociation and can be seen to overstep the mark, as the population is 
exposed to a new kind of domination, which is not necessarily better than the 
ethnic conflict that existed and is unlikely to stop violence.  
 Vote-pooling is seen as the central feature of integrative power sharing, 
as it is key to introducing the integrative mechanisms. By giving electoral 
rewards to those who make concessions to other groups, vote-pooling is 
supposed to maximise the incentives for accommodative behaviour. Thus, a 
key feature, and the overriding principle of centripetalism, is that it makes 
politicians compromise in order to gain the support of other groups.347  The 
purpose of this is to create interaction between the ethnic groups, as their 	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dependence on votes from other factions enforces communication and 
cooperation. In order to achieve this, institutional devices are introduced. 
Benjamin Reilly distinguishes the following options: 
• The use of preferential or cross-regional voting rules: An example of 
cross-regional voting is Nigeria; where cross-regional politics is 
encouraged by requiring the president to not only win the majority of 
the votes, but also to win 1/3 of the votes across 2/3 of all states. An 
example of the preferential voting rule is the use of alternative vote 
(AV) or of single transferable vote (STV). In these systems voters must 
register their second, third choices, etc. thus making politicians attempt 
to appeal to all voters.348 
• Political party laws that require multi-regional party organisations: An 
example of this is Singapore, where parties contesting the fourteen 
multi-member districts must include designated ethnic minorities on 
their list and the voters must choose parties rather than individuals – 
thus ensuring cross-ethnic voting. 
• The installation of legislative selection procedures that encourage 
moderate outcomes: This is done by creating larger aggregative 
parties with more moderate policies, i.e. parties must be nationally 
orientated and have a cross-regional organisational base. Likewise the 
creation of cross-ethnic parties/coalitions paired with the majoritarian 
electoral rules of integrative power sharing encourages the creation of 
larger moderate parties, as voters tend not to want to waste their vote 
on small parties. 	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Through these principles, centripetalists aim to bring the society together by 
interaction with, and dependence on, other groups. By creating coalitions 
before elections and by forcing politicians to win votes across the divide, they 
see this as an accommodative method to end conflict and bring the society 
together, thus making the longevity of the agreement more feasible. 
Therefore, centripetalism is a political system based on an integrative identity, 
rather than a group identity. An important point to raise in relation to this is 
that any system that is introduced has to have the support of the people who 
operate within it. Therefore, it can be argued that if the population wanted an 
integrative system multiethnic political parties would exist or indeed be widely 
supported – this is neither the case in Northern Ireland nor in Kirkuk where 
instead the political systems mirror the divides within society. The issue here 
is that yet again centripetalists discuss implementing systems that are unlikely 
to be accepted in a deeply divided society. Accordingly, the examples that 
Reilly gives in his writings are usually not considered to be deeply divided 
societies, such as Singapore and Malaysia, and the ones that are, Nigeria, 
can hardly be considered as good examples for resolving ethnic conflict, as 
ethnic conflict still persists within them. This just reinforces the opinion that 
centripetalism is not feasible for a deeply divided society and can only work 
when the divides have not reached such a critical point. Unfortunately – as if 
centripetalism was feasible it would do a great deal to end conflict – this is 
one of those cases where theory cannot transfer into reality and 
centripetalism should be kept for divided societies, not deeply divided ones.349 
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 Centripetalism also favours a presidential system, where the president 
is elected separately through a distributed support system, i.e. vote-pooling 
formulas. This way a strong moderate candidate, who has the support of the 
majority of the society, is elected as president. Thus leading to the selection 
of a moderate cabinet. The main aim behind this presidential system is to 
prevent ethnic exclusivity and to give members of all groups a claim/link to the 
president as they helped elect him/her. Horowitz sees the president, elected 
in this manner, as a strong centripetal force that will pull moderate parties to 
the centre and create a strong executive with the ability to make decisions. 
Horowitz’s preference is for a multiparty system in the centripetalistic manner, 
however, he believes the president should be elected separately in order to 
create a coherent, powerful executive. Again this puts far too much faith in the 
ability of the segments in a deeply divided society to work together and to 
accept that a member of another segment, with whom they have an 
antagonistic history, holds the highest office. Understandably this is likely to 
make the losing segment/s feel vulnerable and can therefore destabilise the 
government.350 One could argue that centripetalists seem to have a habit of 
not taking the factors on the ground into consideration when developing their 
theories. The idea of a president supported by the entire society, who works 
for the best interests of the population without bias to bridge the divides within 
the society, is just that, an idea – as in reality this is highly unlikely to occur in 
a deeply divided society. In the case of Kirkuk, if an Arab president/governor 
were to win the support of the Arabs he would have to campaign for Kirkuk to 
remain under central control and if he were to gain the support of the Kurds 	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he would have to support Kirkuk joining the KRG – he cannot do both, 
therefore bringing into question the feasibility of having one president 
representing the whole society. In the case of Northern Ireland there is a First 
Minister and a deputy First Minister (note that deputy does not have a capital) 
both with equal powers, thus giving the two main segments of the society a 
connection to the leadership of the country. Centripetalists like to highlight the 
case of Nelson Mandela as a president who was supported by the majority of 
the country and was a force that moderated the society. However, the case of 
South Africa is very different as it was a majority that was oppressed through 
the conflict and it was this weighted majority that supported the African 
National Congress (ANC), whereas these circumstances don’t usually exist in 
deeply divided societies (a minority oppressing a majority where the majority 
supports mainly one political party). Furthermore, Nelson Mandela is an 
exceptional individual, who has reached an iconic status through his 27 years 
of imprisonment, and most deeply divided societies do not have protagonists 
with his qualities in a position of power. 
  Federalism is another important aspect of integrative power sharing. 
Centripetalists see it as being important in a deeply divided society, due to the 
following factors:  
• The combination of electoral systems and federalism in integrative 
power sharing allows for the proliferation of parties, which in turn 
makes inter-ethnic accommodation easier as there are no majorities 
• Federalism allows ethnic groups to direct their political ambitions at a 
federal level, thus taking pressure off the central government 
	  	   158	  
• In a homogenous federal system competition is created within the 
group, which detracts from the inter-group competition. In a 
heterogeneous federal system politicians gain experience dealing with 
different ethnic groups and creating ties at a local level, which can then 
be transferred to the central government. 
• The granting of early devolution, with strong links to the central 
government, averts separatism.351 
Federalism is seen by many as a method to reduce ethnic conflict in a deeply 
divided society and this view is not unique to centripetalism. In fact, it is far 
more associated with consociational theory, where group autonomy is one of 
the leading principles.  
  Centripetalism has amassed a large number of critics, and some might 
say for good reason. Critics of centripetalism question the reality of it 
functioning in deeply divided societies, as they see it as unlikely that these 
groups will form coalitions across the ethnic divides and that the voters will 
vote for someone outside their group. McGarry and O’Leary use the regional 
elections of Northern Ireland in 1996 and 1998 as an example – in both these 
elections non-sectarian parties received less than 9% of the votes.352 Another 
criticism of centripetalism is that it is exclusive, in that the winning coalition 
does not necessarily include all the parties and those parties excluded could 
possibly become radicalised in order to get their voice across.353 The AV 	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system favoured by centripetalists creates what consociationalists see as a 
majoritarian government because one coalition takes power and makes the 
others opposition, their worry is that this can then lead to unrepresented 
minorities who are likely to turn to means other than political.354 Centripetalists 
answer these criticisms by pointing out that the most moderate parties will 
form coalitions, and this is the whole point of centripetalism, in affect the 
moderate parties are rewarded and the radical parties are penalised. 
Centripetalists have no problem with the accusation that their model is 
majoratarian, their aim is to form an aggregative party system consisting of 
two parties. This way inclusive coalitions take up the majority and are in 
competition with other inclusive coalitions, therefore creating more likelihood 
of power changing between them. The main issue with the centripetalists’ 
reply is that there is not enough empirical evidence for them to back this up, 
which is another criticism of centripetalism. Reilly, however, points to the 
emergence of centripetalist systems in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, 
which have not entered comparative centripetalist literature yet.355 Despite this, 
the fact is that there are numerous criticisms of the use of centripetalism in a 
deeply divided society and their response to this criticism does not stand up 
to scrutiny. When this is paired with the lack of empirical cases documenting 
the success of centripetalism, it can be questioned as to whether the theory 
can be successfully transferred into practice. Whether it may be feasible to 
certain divided societies is questionable, however it is clear that it has no 
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future in Kirkuk as in the context of this conflict the divides are too strong to 
accept its basic principles. 
 
3.4. Complex Power sharing 
 
Stefan Wolff sees complex power sharing as a necessary action to address 
self-determination disputes in ethnic conflicts and defines it as: 
a practise of conflict settlement that requires a relatively complex institutional 
structure across different layers of authority from the centre down to local 
government and that cannot be reduced to autonomy/(ethno-) federation, 
(traditional) models of power sharing, centripetalism or power dividing, but rather 
represents a combination of them.356 
 
Wolff believes that power sharing theories are often confined within a fixed 
idea, whereas conflicts are not fixed and all differ greatly. Therefore, for him, 
conflicts involving self-determination disputes should have some form of self-
governance (preferably territorial) at the core and then the dynamics of the 
conflict should dictate which aspects from the various theories of power 
sharing are used in the institutional design.357 In an article written with Karl 
Cordell, Wolff does state that complex power sharing is highly compatible with 
liberal consociation as the latter is open to the incorporation of many 
elements.358 Although McGarry and O’Leary see the need for consociational 
theory to go beyond the design of political institutions, they argue that liberal 
consociation should be at the core. They disagree with Wolff’s comparison 
between complex power sharing and their form of liberal consociation for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff. ‘Power Sharing’ in Karl Cordell & Stefan Wolff (eds.) 
Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 307. 
357 Wolff, Stefan. ‘Complex Power Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in 
Contemporary Conflict Settlements.’ Ethnopolitics Volume 8, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 27-45. 
358 Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff. ‘Power Sharing’ in Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff (eds.) 
Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 300-310. 
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conflicts involving self-determination disputes (they have named this 
‘consociation plus’ when it is paired with elements from other methods of 
power sharing). This is because Wolff differs from McGarry and O’Leary as 
he sees complex power sharing as compatible with all forms of power sharing, 
therefore, for him, complexity is added to some form of self-rule. Whereas, 
McGarry and O’Leary see consociation as the core, which can then be 
surrounded by other aspects to address the issues of a particular conflict. 
They therefore do not see complex power sharing as being able to address 
intermixed deeply divided societies, as they opine that consociation is 
necessary for this. Here, McGarry and O’Leary seem to be missing the point 
of complex power sharing, as Wolff intends for it to use liberal consociation, 
whilst ensuring self-rule and not preventing the use of other methods of power 
sharing. Therefore, complex power sharing would use the very same aspects 
that McGarry and O’leary see as necessary to address intermixed deeply 
divided societies, thus giving it the same chance of success as liberal 
consociation.359 Although these authors have different starting points, use 
different terms and differ on certain principles, the similarity is that they see 
the need for any agreement aimed at ending conflict to go beyond the mere 
creation of political institutions.  
 In Wolff’s chapter in Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and 
the Northern Ireland Conflict, he uses the Northern Ireland Agreement, and 
the later modifications made to it, as empirical evidence to base his argument 
that an agreement needs to go beyond political institutions. According to Wolff, 
the conflict in Northern Ireland is about national belonging – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 McGarry, John & Brendan O’Leary. ‘Response’ in Rupert Taylor (ed.) Consociational 
Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, 
pp. 343-347. 
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nationalist/republicans who want to be part of the Republic of Ireland and 
unionist/loyalists who want to remain part of the UK. He also states that 
secondary tensions exist over religion, language and culture. On the basis 
that this is the root of the conflict, Wolff states that a settlement must address: 
the relationship between the communities, the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland’s relations with Ireland and the UK and 
relations between all the entities involved. According to Wolff the settlement in 
Northern Ireland addresses these by: establishing a consociational 
government where ministers are elected through the d’Hondt system; 
ensuring that all sections of the society can participate in the functioning of 
each ministerial body; making the Executive a collected organ of government; 
allowing for the constitutional status to be changed by separate referendums 
in both Northern Ireland and Ireland; and by forming cross-border institutions 
that link Northern Ireland to Ireland and Ireland with all the self-governing 
entities in the UK.360 Wolff fails to mention some important aspects relating to 
the transition of the society – mainly the creation of an independent 
commission on policing in Northern Ireland, which led to the establishment of 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the replacement of the 
Unionist-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) – however, he 
demonstrates that the Northern Ireland agreement goes beyond traditional 
consociational theory to address the issues of conflict in the settlement.361 By 
comparing the settlements of other conflicts involving self-determination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Wolff, Stefan. ‘Peace by Design? Towards “Complex Power Sharing”’ in Rupert Taylor 
(ed.) Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 110-113. 
361 Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. ‘A New Beginning: Policing in 
Northern Ireland.’ CAIN [Online] Available from 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf [Accessed 10/11/2010] 
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disputes, Wolff establishes a growing trend of combining self-governance, 
power sharing362 and further mechanisms to address the particular issues of 
the conflict in contemporary conflict resolution. This is an important factor for 
Kirkuk, which involves self-determination disputes, in that a settlement needs 
to go beyond the creation of political institutions.  
 McGarry and O’Leary have already addressed self-determination 
disputes by examining a form of liberal consociation that goes beyond the 
creation of institutions. However, complex power sharing attempts to go 
beyond the realms of individual power sharing theories by introducing self-
rule and then addressing the issues through the introduction of mechanisms 
that can have their roots in any of the available theories. Although Wolff 
admits that complex power sharing needs further defining and a more 
thorough examination of the empirical evidence, he does reinstate that the 
creation of an agreement to end conflict must address the dynamics of the 
situation and must not be stifled by trying to remain within any particular 
power sharing theory.363  Ultimately the use of complex power sharing in an 
agreement is likely to be highly influenced by liberal consociation, the 
important factor is that it does not allow it to dictate the mechanisms that are 
implemented and rather allows the dynamics of the situation to do this.  
3.5. Conclusion 
Through this chapter some ideas surface on the direction a future resolution 
for Kirkuk should take. By examining centripetalist theory it becomes evident 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 In consociational settlements there is already power sharing and some form of self-
governance, so, in the language of Wolff, the ‘complexities’ are added to existing principles of 
consociation. 
363 Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff. ‘Power Sharing’ in Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff (eds.) 
Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 300-310. 
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that it would not be suitable for Kirkuk, as the people of Kirkuk would be 
unlikely to accept its general principles. Conversely, consociational theory is 
more in line with the needs of Kirkuk, particularly the liberal consociation 
developed by McGarry and O’Leary (as Lijphart’s early work is tailored 
towards non-ethnic conflict and is less flexible in the components necessary 
for consociation). Also, through an examination of the favourable conditions 
for elite cooperation that were developed by Lijphart, it becomes evident that 
Kirkuk city is more favourable to consociation than the province. This 
therefore encourages the development of options that split the city from the 
province. The developments to consociational theory made by McGarry and 
O’Leary demonstrate that a consociational settlement needs to go beyond 
institutional design and needs to provide resolutions to the various issues of 
conflict in Kirkuk. This is reaffirmed through examining complex power 
sharing, although a further lesson to draw from complex power sharing is that 
any agreement developed for Kirkuk must take into consideration the 
dynamics of the conflict and must be open to introducing elements from any 
of the power sharing theories and not be constrained by strictly following 
liberal consociational theory. Besides implementing the basic principles of 
consociation and developing resolutions for the various issues of conflict, a 
liberal consociation settlement in Kirkuk should include: the creation of 
institutions that encourage cross-communal relations; exogenous factors, i.e. 
Baghdad, Erbil, US, and Unami will have an important role in reaching an 
agreement; cross-border institutions linking Kirkuk to the KRG and Baghdad; 
and finally election rules that create stability, i.e. choosing seats through 
either PR-STV or PR-Party and choosing a cabinet through sequential 
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proportionality rules. In the next chapter the previous proposals that have 
been put forward for Kirkuk will be analysed and the theoretical understanding 
created in this chapter will be used in order to better understand the feasibility 
of these proposals.  
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Chapter 4: Perspectives on Kirkuk’s Future 
4.1. Introduction    
Over the past few years academics and organisations alike have begun to 
examine the possible options for the governance of Kirkuk. The various 
options developed will be the focus of this chapter. To begin with, it is 
important to note that the main issue with these proposals is that they are 
lacking in detail; most analyses on Kirkuk’s future are short articles that give 
very broad outlines on what the authors think is the most viable option/s for 
Kirkuk. Although these analyses examine the options, they do not give the 
specific details that are needed to implement them. At the same time, Kirkuk 
is a complicated issue and cannot be solved by just giving suggestions – 
these suggestions need to be thoroughly analysed to examine their chances 
of success. The thorough examination, by academics and organisations, of 
proposed settlement options can be an important factor in the protagonists of 
the conflict finalising the details involved in the implementation of an 
agreement. Evidence of this can be found in how influential the works of John 
McGarry and Brendan O’Leary were for the Good Friday Agreement (GFA)364 
and the St Andrews Agreement in Northern Ireland. 365  Not everything 
recommended was followed, but many of the ideas put forward by McGarry 
and O’Leary were included in these agreements.366 McGarry and O’Leary 
wrote several books on the subject, and the problem with the literature on 
Kirkuk is that its focus consists of small articles that tend to leave more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Also known as the ‘Agreement’ and the ‘Belfast Agreement’. 
365 Taylor, Rupert. ‘Introduction’ in Rupert Taylor (ed.) Consociational Theory: McGarry and 
O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 7-11. 
366 O’Neill, Shane. ‘Recognition, Equality, Difference: Achieving Democracy in Northern 
Ireland’ in Rupert Taylor (ed.) Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern 
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questions than answers. Although these findings lack detail, they can play a 
role in examining the various options available for Kirkuk. Therefore, it is 
important to analyse the work of scholars who have addressed the future of 
Kirkuk in order to address the advancements they have made on the 
understanding of the conflict and its resolution. Through an examination of 
other scholars’ work on a resolution for Kirkuk it is possible to identify what 
areas their analyses are lacking in, therefore avoiding following the same path.  
4.2. Article 140 
Article 140367 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for the implementation of Article 58 
of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)368 by the 31st December 2007.	  369  
Article 58 calls for the normalisation of the disputed territories of Iraq,370 
followed by a census and then a referendum on the future constitutional 
status (in Kirkuk’s case whether it would join the KRG or not). There are two 
views on Article 140 from the academics that have analysed the Kirkuk case, 
those who see it as redundant (such as: Liam Anderson, Gareth Stansfield 
and Stefan Wolff) and those who see it as imperative due to the fact that it is 
in the Iraqi constitution (such as: David Romano and O’Leary). Anderson and 
Stansfield are the only academics that have examined the Kirkuk conflict in 
detail; they have written an entire book, Crisis in Kirkuk, which focuses on the 
emergence of the conflict in Kirkuk, but not the future of the province. 
However, there are two chapters addressing the future of Kirkuk, these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 For the full text of Article 140 see Appendix III. 
368 For the full text of Article 58 see Appendix IV. 
369 The TAL was an Interim constitution for Iraq, which was put in place before the creation of 
a permanent constitution in 2005. 
370 The disputed territories of Iraq are those areas that had their borders changed by the 
previous regime and now involve disputes over the borders. They involve Kirkuk, Diyala, 
Ninawa, Salahaddin and the KRG. For a detailed analysis of the border changes in Kirkuk 
see Chapter 1.2. 
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discuss what a possible resolution to the conflict should include and what 
realistic compromises are available, rather than giving a preferred option. 
Consequently this makes these two chapters useful to analyse what an 
agreement should entail. Anderson and Stansfield see Article 140 as 
somewhat defeated, as it would be very hard to implement it at this stage, 
due to the fact that it has expired. They do however reiterate that this doesn’t 
remove the issue of the disputed territories, in and around Kirkuk, that Article 
140 was meant to deal with and therefore deem that it is in need of 
replacement. Nevertheless, the political situation in Kirkuk and Iraq has 
moved on since the creation of Article 140 and it would be very difficult to 
replace it with something similar and would instead have to involve 
compromises on both sides.371  
 In the academic article The Future of Kirkuk, David Romano sees 
Article 140 as imperative to Kirkuk’s future, although Romano’s article was 
published before the deadline for the implementation of Article 140 was 
reached – and indeed missed. Romano divides the conflict in Kirkuk between 
two issues: control of resources and the symbolic value that Kirkuk represents 
to the various segments. For Romano the resources are an easy issue to deal 
with as they can be divided, as per Article 112, which distributes the revenues 
of all oil and gas fields that had been discovered prior to the creation of the 
constitution (this includes those in Kirkuk) in proportion to the population of 
Iraq. This analysis ignores the fear of those who see the KRG as wanting 
Kirkuk’s resources for their own secessionist agenda, as misplaced as this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 185-203. 
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fear may be – it still exists.372 Despite this, it is still the easier issue to solve as 
it can be overcome with assurances and guarantees to win over the 
population. Whereas the symbol that Kirkuk has become to Kurds, Turkmen 
and even Arabs, which leads to their desire for ownership of the province (or 
at least preventing others’ ownership) is a harder task to negotiate over. This 
is due to the importance of the symbolism of Kirkuk, paired with the very 
different desires for Kirkuk that all of the segments involved have. Thus 
making it very hard to reach a solution without large compromises being 
made on all sides. Romano sees the failure to reach an agreement as a great 
threat to stability in Iraq, as the competition between these groups could lead 
to large-scale violence. Due to these facts, he derives that none of the options 
available for Kirkuk can perfectly satisfy all the parties. However, he sees it as 
an important factor for the future of Kirkuk that a settlement allows non-
Kurdish majority areas the freedom not to join the KRG and that the 
referendum proposed in Article 140 should go beyond a mere majority in 
order to stabilise any transition. In Romano’s opinion there are four available 
options for Kirkuk: 
• The first option is to follow Article 140, although as already stated 
some complications have met this option since Romano’s analysis – in 
that the deadline for the implementation of this article has passed and 
thus its legality can be questioned. However, even ignoring this, 
Romano sees some obstacles to this option. [1] The borders of the 
province would have to be agreed upon (i.e. maintain the current 
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if they separated from Iraq due to animosity all of its neighbours hold towards the KRG 
annexing Kirkuk as well as seceding from Iraq.  
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borders or revert to the old borders)373 and if Kirkuk’s borders are to be 
redrawn there would be pressure to redraw all borders, including those 
between the KRG and the Nineva and Diyala provinces.374 [2] Another 
obstacle is the likelihood of any census being boycotted and the 
possibility of people being ‘bussed in’ from other provinces to vote in 
the referendum, if indeed this is not boycotted too. [3] With no 
agreement on the referendum, whatever the results, violence is a likely 
outcome from the losing parties.  
• The second option also involves following Article 140, however it 
differs in that Kirkuk city would be given a special status as a free 
standing municipality, and districts that vote against joining the KRG 
would not have to join it. The details for this option are seriously 
lacking: what would happen to those districts who don’t join the KRG, 
what governance system would operate in Kirkuk city, what links would 
Kirkuk city have with the KRG and Baghdad, etc.? 
• Romano’s third option is to leave Kirkuk as it is, that is under 
Baghdad’s control, which as an option consists of doing nothing and it 
can be argued that this would allow for the conflict to spiral out of 
control. Romano rightly points out that this would lead to a Kurdish 
uprising that would destabilise an already fragile Iraq, therefore 
discounting it as a desirable option. 
• The final option put forward by Romano is the recommendation of the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) in their policy paper on Kirkuk, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 The current borders of Kirkuk are a result of the Arabisation process for a detailed 
analysis of the previous borders see Chapter 1.2. 
374 This would result in the KRG having to relinquish territory that was previously part of these 
provinces. 
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comprises of giving Kirkuk province a special status for ten years 
before allowing for a referendum to take place. In ICG’s opinion, this 
time period would allow for normalisation to take place and Kirkuk 
would be more stable with better community relations by the time of 
the referendum. Romano rightly points out that this would just be a 
method of postponing violence – that is if the Kurds would be even 
willing to wait ten years before they could settle the issue of Kirkuk.375  
In Romano’s analysis of the options available to Kirkuk, he has left out some 
highly feasible options, which are discussed elsewhere in this section, and 
has included options that are entirely unfeasible, such as leaving the status 
quo. He admits that none of the options are entirely satisfactory, however he 
favours the second option, with a few additions. These are: consociational 
power sharing (in both the KRG and Kirkuk city), resource sharing, and a 
detailed referendum with various options (including the option for districts 
voting against the referendum to break away). Although this answers some of 
the questions raised above about this option, it is still significantly short on the 
details needed to give an analysis of its chances for success. For example 
consociational theory is very broad and numerous options are available within 
it, without giving specific details it could cover a great many varied 
possibilities.376 This option therefore needs further development, as it does 
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  International Crisis Group. ‘Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears.’ Middle 
East Report No. 103 – 28 March 2011. 
376 Consociation is a form of power sharing that guarantees segments representation – if they 
so wish – and places different parties together in a coalition government. It uses the very 
divides present within the society in the management of the conflict through elite cooperation 
at the centre. The four principles of consociation are: executive power sharing, mutual veto, 
proportionality and segmental autonomy and they can be implemented to varying levels. For 
a detailed analysis of consociational theory see Chapter 3.2. 
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what many analyses on the future of Kirkuk do – it raises more questions than 
answers.377 
4.3. Special Status 
Anderson and Stansfield state that any compromise deal that replaces Article 
140 would have to address whether Kirkuk joins the KRG, whether Kirkuk is 
awarded a special status (if this applies to the city or the province), and finally 
what form of power sharing arrangement – if any – Kirkuk should be governed 
by. As this deal by definition would have to involve a compromise by both 
sides they automatically eliminate the options of Kirkuk joining the KRG or 
remaining under central control. This leaves the options of Kirkuk joining the 
KRG under a special status, or remaining outside the KRG with a special 
status. Therefore according to Anderson and Stansfield the resolution to the 
current conflict requires for Kirkuk to be awarded a special status. For many 
reasons, which are highlighted throughout this thesis, this should be the way 
forward for Kirkuk. Moreover, through Anderson and Stansfield’s elimination 
process it becomes clear that this is the only feasible option.378 As already 
mentioned Romano also favours awarding Kirkuk a special status, but for the 
city alone in order to allow the surrounding districts a choice in their provincial 
classification.379 
 In his article Governing (in) Kirkuk, Stefan Wolff states that based on 
the current constitution there are three options available for the status of 
Kirkuk within Iraq. (1) Join the KRG through Article 140; (2) become an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Romano, David 'The Future of Kirkuk', Ethnopolitics Volume 6, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 265 – 
283. 
378 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 185-203. 
379 Romano, David 'The Future of Kirkuk', Ethnopolitics Volume 6, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 265 – 
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autonomous region (like the KRG), on its own or with other governorates; or 
(3) remain a governorate under central control. Each of these options would 
give different levels of power to Kirkuk, with the option of becoming an 
autonomous region allowing for it to have the most power. Wolff also 
examines the four options given in the UNAMI report (see Chapter 4.5.) and 
has a preference for the fourth option of a special status for Kirkuk. He sees 
Article 140 as redundant, at least in its current form, and therefore proposes a 
special status for Kirkuk as an interim settlement. This interim status which 
would be granted for a certain period of time (ten years is recommended by 
the ICG), would include power sharing along the lines of the Berlin 
Accords;380it would place Kirkuk outside the KRG with a future referendum on 
whether it should join the KRG and would give Kirkuk powers greater than 
that of a governorate. It would also allow the option for the various segments 
of the society to form links with their ethnic group in the rest of Iraq (Kurds 
with the KRG and Arabs with Baghdad). Furthermore, Wolff suggests that the 
Turkmen of Kirkuk should be allowed to create formal links with Ankara. This 
could be a dangerous precedent to set, as not only could it endanger the 
territorial integrity of Kirkuk, but also that of Iraq. Although highlighting the fact 
that the UNAMI report gives very little details on a special status for Kirkuk, 
Wolff gives very few details himself. He instead states that it should be for the 
people of Kirkuk to decide the type of power sharing, the areas to fall under 
self-governance, how to form the referendum, etc. Wolff is absolutely right in 
saying that this decision should be made by Kirkukis. However, the more 
options that are analysed the better chance they have of making an informed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 This would give Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen a 32% share of the power each and allow a 
4% share for the Assyrians. There are numerous problems with this, which are discussed 
under the Berlin Accords. 
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decision and academics should argue their recommendations in order to 
advance the discussion on the future of Kirkuk. Governing (in) Kirkuk does 
not give any geographical specifications, although from the language used it 
seems to refer to Kirkuk province. Should this be the case, it leaves the 
question of why the districts of Kirkuk province, other than the city itself, 
would be included in a special status, as due to the relative homogeneity of 
the sub-districts, and the history of the creation of al-Ta’mim,381 there could be 
the possibility of them joining other governorates and Kirkuk city receiving a 
special status.382 This would release some of the ethnic tensions by allowing 
homogenous areas to join governorates along the same lines, it would also 
lead to greater numeric equality of the ethnic groups, which would be 
beneficial to power sharing in Kirkuk, as ethnic dominance would be removed. 
Wolff’s article does explore an interim status for Kirkuk and contextualises 
Kirkuk within the self-determination dispute/territorial self-governance arena. 
However, a far more detailed and specific argument is needed to display the 
merits of an interim status, particularly if it were to be for the entire Kirkuk 
province.383  
4.4. Governance 
When it comes to governing Kirkuk, Anderson and Stansfield also see 
compromises as necessary, thus eliminating the least favoured outcome of 
each faction and resulting in only two remaining options; power sharing within 
the KRG or Kurdish majority rule outside of the KRG’s borders. Due to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 The name given to the province of Kirkuk as part of the Arabisation process. It is still the 
legal name for Kirkuk province to this day. For details on the history of the creation of al-
Ta’mim see Chapter 1.2.. 
382 The division of the governorate of Kirkuk and the creation of a special status for Kirkuk city 
is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
383 Wolff, Stefan. ‘Governing (in) Kirkuk: resolving the status of a disputed territory in post-
American Iraq.’ International Affairs 86, no. 6, November 2010, pp. 1361-1379. 
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fact that the number of returnee Kurds is contested they see power sharing 
only being accepted by Arabs and Turkmen based on a 32,32,32,4 
scenario.384 Therefore, in their opinion Kurds either have to accept majority 
control outside of the KRG or equal power within the KRG and likewise 
Turkmen and Arabs either have to accept equal control in the KRG or being 
politically dominated outside the KRG. This leaves both factions with the 
choice over symbolic or actual power, and would involve a negotiation over 
which each would prefer. Although this analysis put forward by Anderson and 
Stansfield is valid, it involves a resolution where Kirkuk province remains 
intact and does not involve additions such as cross-border institutions. In a 
more intricate resolution involving these important details, both the 
demographics and dynamics of the scenario would change, which would 
increase the number of options available. For example: if the majority-Kurdish 
subdistricts were allowed to join the KRG; the other subdistricts had a choice 
of joining existing provinces or forming their own; and Kirkuk city was given a 
special status with links to the KRG and Baghdad, the dynamics and 
demographics of the resolution would change. This would largely eliminate 
the problem of the Kurdish influx, allow the districts outside the city to decide 
their future and lead to more equally balanced demographics by confining the 
conflict to the city. This would allow for a proportionate power sharing 
arrangement with a future referendum being held on whether Kirkuk city 
(under this special status) should be part of the KRG or not. Therefore 
although Anderson and Stansfield’s analysis is correct, by adding to and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 This consists of giving 32% of the seats each to the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen and 4% to 
the Christians.  
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expanding the scope of the agreement, other previously discounted 
possibilities might become feasible.385 
In Governing (in) Kirkuk, Wolff gives a brief background to the conflict 
in Kirkuk and the position of the relevant actors.386  Based on a combination of 
this background and an examination of other self-determination disputes – 
which are used to contextualise Kirkuk within this arena – Wolff sees Kirkuk 
as having an internal territorial dispute that is not secessionist in nature, yet 
with external properties, in that its future has implications beyond Iraq. He 
therefore gives the dispute three levels: the dispute between the ethnic 
groups in Kirkuk, the dispute between the KRG and Baghdad and the dispute 
involving other regional powers (mainly Turkey, but also Syria and Iran, due 
to the impact Kirkuk joining the KRG would have on the Kurdish question in 
the Middle East). Based on these three levels of dispute, there are two 
components that need resolution: Kirkuk’s territorial status within Iraq, and the 
internal governance of Kirkuk.  The literature on self-determination disputes 
discussed in Wolff’s article would suggest that a resolution in Kirkuk would 
need to involve territorial self-governance. Wolff argues that this must go 
beyond a mere territorial dimension and must include political, economic and 
military elements as well, thus forming a complex power sharing 
arrangement.387 Thus, he derives that an agreement on the resolution of 
Kirkuk must include: (1) a form of self-governance for Kirkuk; (2) distribution 
of power between Kirkuk and the centre; (3) the creation of a power sharing 
arrangement, both in Kirkuk and with the next level of governance (KRG or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Anderson, Liam & Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 204-233. 
386 This is not covered in this chapter, as a more in depth analysis of Kirkuk’s background 
was given in Chapter 1. 
387 For more details on Complex Power Sharing see Chapter 3.4..  
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Baghdad); (4) the creation of institutional arrangements that address policy 
coordination and the resolution of future disputes. Wolff’s article appears to 
be in favour of the governance agreements made in the Dead Sea 
Declaration of 2008 and the Berlin Accords of 2009, which can be considered 
as highly problematic (see next paragraph). 
 The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) has hosted a 
number of conferences on developing a government arrangement for Kirkuk, 
which have created some of the few actual agreements on Kirkuk by actors 
from the conflict. It began with a workshop held in Amman, Jordan in May 
2008, which included twenty-three politicians and civil society officials from 
Kirkuk. The aim of this conference was to create an understanding of the 
conflict and to initiate dialogue between the various factions of Kirkuk away 
from the realities of the situation.388 The second conference hosted by FNF 
was held at the Dead Sea, Jordan in December 2008. The aim of this 
conference was to build on the relationships created in the earlier workshop 
and to develop possible future outcomes for Kirkuk, along the same lines as 
Article 23 of the Provincial Elections Law.389 The result of this conference was 
the drafting and signing of the Dead Sea Declaration, where the participants 
agreed to work together towards finding solutions for the key issues in 
Kirkuk. 390  The third FNF conference was hosted in Berlin in April 2009. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Foundation Facilitates a Multi-Party Dialogue on the Conflict Over Kirkuk/Iraq. Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation for Liberty [Online] Available from http://fnst-
amman.org/en/index.php/iraq/33.html [Accessed 19/11/2010] 
389 The purpose of this article was to allow for a temporary power sharing arrangement in 
Kirkuk until local elections could be held under a newly formed election law, created 
specifically for Kirkuk. As part of this article the Article 23 Committee was formed to examine 
power sharing for Kirkuk, the distribution of power, and the demographic issues that exist in 
Kirkuk. 
390 Governing Arrangements for Kirkuk: Dead Sea Workshop Continues Dialogue, Adopts 
Joint Declaration. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty [Online] Available from 
http://fnst-amman.org/en/index.php/iraq/34.html [Accessed 19/11/2010] 
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Twenty-five politicians and civil society officials from Kirkuk attended the 
conference. As a result of this conference an agreement for power sharing in 
Kirkuk, the Berlin Accord, was drafted and signed.391 The signatories of the 
Berlin Accord agreed on the following points: 
• To analyse the positions in government and the civil service in Kirkuk 
and rank them according to their importance. 
• To implement power sharing under the ratio of 32,32,32,4 across the 
board in the government and all other civil employment, whilst taking 
into consideration the importance of each position and making it 
proportionate to the demographic situation of the region. 
• To distribute the top positions of: Governor, Deputy Governor and 
Chairman of the Provincial Council, as per Article 23. 
There are some key issues with this agreement, which explain why it was 
never implemented. Firstly, it took just three short conferences to reach, 
which explains why it is lacking in detail. Moreover, it would be impossible to 
implement this agreement without also reaching an agreement on the status 
of Kirkuk. Without a clarification on the constitutional status, it is not actually 
possible to know what powers the government of Kirkuk would have, which is 
a necessary requirement when laying out the governance structure. Although 
the Berlin Accord concentrates on the power sharing arrangement, it needs to 
go beyond a mere designation of the percentage of seats that each segment 
gets within the council; it needs to develop an understanding of the structure 
of the power sharing arrangement. Secondly, this is an agreement reached by 
a group of people from Kirkuk that does not include many of the leading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Berlin Conference 2009. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty [Online] Available from 
http://fnst-amman.org/en/index.php/iraq/35.html [Accessed 22/11/2010] 
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politicians; for an agreement to stand a chance of actually being implemented 
it needs to have been agreed on by all the parties of Kirkuk and then signed 
by their representatives, not individuals. Furthermore, the reality is that any 
agreement on Kirkuk will have to include Baghdad and the KRG in the 
negotiations. Both these entities are hugely involved in the future of Kirkuk 
and no viable agreement can be made without their agreement. Finally, a 
power sharing arrangement of 32,32,32,4 is completely disproportionate. It 
would be impossible for the KRG or the Kurds of Kirkuk to agree to 
surrendering such a large percentage of the proportion they are warranted in 
the council without the other segments making serious concessions 
elsewhere.392 It would also be unbalanced to give the other segments more 
representation than their numbers warrant. By having a prescriptive division 
of the power, this agreement would follow corporate rather than liberal 
consociation – in that the segments would be pre-determined, rather than 
self-determined.393 This would discriminate against those not represented in 
this formula, in this case mainly parties that represent all segments. This 
could also lead to the destruction of the settlement as the demographics of 
the society change,394 as happened in Lebanon.395 Therefore, although these 
meetings have allowed some of the protagonists from Kirkuk to meet on 
neutral territory, the agreements that have been made have no chance of 
being implemented.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Berlin Accord. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty [Online] Available from 
http://fnst-amman.org/en/images/stories/en-Berlin_Accord.pdf [Accessed 22/11/2010] 
393 For a detailed explanation on corporate and liberal consociation see Chapter 3.2..  
394 For example, if the Turkmen population diminished to 7% conflict would likely emerge 
based on the fact that they would still have a 32% representation across society. 
395 Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff. ‘Power Sharing’ in Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff (eds.) 
Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 300-310. 
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 Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) 
wrote a policy paper on a possible settlement for Kirkuk, Kirkuk: Reaching a 
Comprehensive Settlement for a Disputed Province. According to this paper 
there are several issues that need to be addressed, such as birthright, 
constitutional powers, provincial governance and power sharing, 
decentralisation of power, provincial elections, referendum and sequencing. 
SIPA’s paper lays out proposals to address these issues. 
• Birthright: To deal with this issue SIPA borrows from the Northern 
Ireland (NI) situation, where as part of the deal for the Republic of 
Ireland (ROI) to abandon its constitutional claim to NI, Irish citizenship 
law was modified so that it was no longer defined by its territory, but 
rather by its people. This allowed people in NI to continue to be part of 
the Irish Nation through citizenship on a non-territorial basis, i.e. 
without NI being annexed by the ROI. SIPA’s paper envisions a similar 
deal in Kirkuk and states it as follows:  
The birthright of all citizens of Kirkuk to identify themselves and be 
accepted as Kurdish and Iraqi, as they may so choose, and accordingly 
confirm that their right to hold both Kurdish and Iraqi heritage would be 
accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future 
change in the status of Kirkuk or the Kurdish Regional Government.396 
 
This thus allows Kurds from Kirkuk to be employed in the KRG civil 
service, receive an education in the KRG, buy a house in the KRG, etc.. 
Although this paper recommends ‘birthright’ it does not indicate whom 
this should apply to, but rather that the KRG should decide whom to 
award it to. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 SIPA. Kirkuk: Reaching a Comprehensive Settlement for a Disputed Province. New York: 
Columbia University, 2011, p.4.  
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• Constitutional Powers: Again along the lines of NI, this paper 
recommends joint administration, which is similar to – although 
potentially more powerful than – the cross-border institutions of NI. 
Under this ‘dual nexus’ SIPA sees the Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPG) 
taking control of local affairs (as per the Provincial Powers Act of 2008), 
this includes taking control of a ‘mixed and balanced police force’ once 
this is created. As for the Government of Iraq (GOI), they would control 
all national/sovereign powers, e.g.: trade, national security, etc.. The 
GOI would also have majority control over oil and gas management in 
Kirkuk; as part of this arrangement the KPG would control the 
distribution of all funds in a deal created for revenue-sharing. The 
proposal put forward in this paper severely limits the ‘dual nexus’ 
powers that the KRG would have. The only lone power proposed for 
the KRG would be in the determination of which of Kirkuk’s residents 
qualify for KRG birthright. The KRG is given joint powers with the GOI, 
in that they would jointly administer the security forces until such a time 
as the new multiethnic force is successfully implemented. The GOI and 
the KRG would also jointly govern Kirkuk’s main sources of energy and 
its distribution, development and general planning policies, domestic 
water policy, and public education. Under this plan Kirkuk would also 
elect representatives within the KRG legislature. 
• Provincial Governance and Power Sharing: Like many of the analyses 
that precede this, this paper also proposes power sharing within the 
KPC along the 32/32/32/4 percentage representation. The proposal is 
to implement this level of power sharing until a referendum is held, at 
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which point it could be changed or eliminated. The faults of 32/4 have 
already been discussed, but what is interesting is the methods that 
SIPA’s paper proposes in order to implement it. One option it gives is 
‘Geographical Representation’, which is just gerrymandering with a 
less politically charged name. This would involve redrawing the 
borders of the districts in order to ensure that a particular ethnic group 
would win each district adding up to a 32/32/32/4 end result. In light of 
Kirkuk’s recent history, involving Arabisation and gerrymandering, this 
could be considered a cavalier suggestion. It would also cause 
unequal representation, large districts having less per capita 
representation, instability as demographics change, and would involve 
extreme complications. This would result in corporate rather than 
liberal consociation and would therefore be less stable (see Chapter 
3.2. for further details). Although the authors do acknowledge some of 
these disadvantages, they still propose it as a method of installing a 
type of power sharing that has already been viewed as unfair i.e. 32/4. 
The other option proposed in this paper is to have an open list with the 
32/4 quota a prerequisite for each list. This would ultimately see the 
introduction of centripetalism397 in Kirkuk, which is argued against in 
the next chapter. One of the main reasons that it is argued against is 
that due to the dynamics of the conflict it is unlikely that the leading 
parties would be willing to work together, therefore leading to smaller 
parties with little support taking control of Kirkuk. Alternatively, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Centripetalism is a form of power sharing that creates institutional designs that promote 
and encourage interaction between the cleavages of the society. The aim is to moderate 
politics through creating multiethnic parties, thus leading to accommodation between the 
segments of the society. For a detailed analysis see Chapter 3.3.  
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Kurds could form a list consisting of all pro Kurdish parties, which 
would result in the Arabs and Turkmen not being properly represented. 
For the KPG Executive this paper proposes a Kurdish Governor with 
an Arab and Turkmen Deputy. Again this is corporate rather than 
liberal consociation and would prevent the Executive from evolving 
with the demographics of the society and from having members from 
multiethnic parties elected (ways around this are discussed in the next 
chapter). SIPA also proposes that each of the three executives should 
have veto rights. The problem with this solution is that not all the 
members of each ethnicity are aligned or have the same views for the 
future of Kirkuk, therefore, depending on which political parties get a 
member into the Executive, there will be other parties who will have no 
minority veto. Whereas in a weighted majority system each political 
party would have a chance to influence the decision making process. 
• Decentralisation of Power: SIPA’s paper recommends a 
decentralisation of power including giving budgeting powers at a 
subdistrict level. It also proposes the demilitarisation of Kirkuk city, 
which would be controlled by shared security forces. Decentralisation 
is a common method used to minimise conflict at a central level and to 
give minorities greater autonomy. However, the fact that SIPA 
separates the city from the province by saying it should be 
demilitarised begs the question as to why the authors don’t think the 
city should be given a special status – as suggested by other analysts 
– as this clearly demonstrates that they think greater action should be 
taken within the city. 
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• Provincial Elections: SIPA believes that it is highly important that 
provincial elections are held in Kirkuk, preferably before the US’ 
withdrawal.398 The reason for this is to rectify the disparities resulting 
from the Sunni boycott of the last provincial elections and to allow for 
the implementation of the Provincial Powers Act, which would give the 
provincial council more power. They also believe that electing a 
provincial council that is legitimate would therefore make it more 
capable to begin a dialogue on Kirkuk’s future. The difficulty with this 
proposal is that many facets relating directly to the election are issues 
of contention in Kirkuk, therefore it would be hard to hold elections 
without having some form of agreement on these other issues as well. 
SIPA’s paper does acknowledge that the power to call a referendum – 
which would be granted under the Provincial Power Act – should be 
receded, as this would ultimately allow for a referendum on Kirkuk’s 
future status. Furthermore, SIPA also proposes a policy similar to the 
2010 national elections, in that an electoral list for the provincial 
elections should not be made available for any referendum. It would be 
hard to deny a referendum without giving the Kurds some other gain in 
return, thus returning to negotiations over Kirkuk’s future, which 
demonstrates the difficulties in having provincial elections before 
negotiations.   
• Referendum and Sequencing: The other agreements SIPA proposes 
before elections are an agreement on dual nexus and on power 
sharing. As already stated, these agreements spawn other issues that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Ultimately the US withdrew before provincial elections were held. 
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need to be resolved therefore leading to negotiations, again making 
provincial elections problematic before negotiations have started in 
earnest. A dual nexus solution does not answer the question of a 
future status, as it could function with different constitutional statuses 
for Kirkuk. Whereas SIPA seems to think that by implementing a dual 
nexus there will no longer be the need for Kirkuk’s status to be 
questioned – when considering the minimal powers they propose for 
the KRG, this is highly unlikely.399  
4.5. Sitting on the Fence 
Perhaps it is unfair to claim that UNAMI are sitting on the fence with regards 
to the resolution of Kirkuk’s conflict. However, they do have the most 
influence on Kirkuk’s future out of all the analysts mentioned, therefore a 
clearer direction from them could help with the conflicts resolution. In their 
policy/diplomatic discussion paper, Possible Options for the Future 
Administrative Status of Kirkuk Within the Iraqi Federation, UNAMI explores 
the options that they see available for Kirkuk’s future. The report is on the 
basis that Kirkuk province should remain intact, however it is not stated 
whether the old boundaries should be restored or the new ones upheld. 
UNAMI sets out some common elements that they believe should be present 
in any agreement for Kirkuk:  
• An unbiased local security force that corresponds to the population of 
the area being policed, along the lines of the police service in Northern 
Ireland. This would include a clear statement of the role of each 
security force and introduce mechanisms to monitor these roles. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 SIPA. Kirkuk: Reaching a Comprehensive Settlement for a Disputed Province. New York: 
Columbia University, 2011, pp. ii-15. 
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• A power sharing arrangement, UNAMI stipulates that this would be 
along the lines of the report of the Article 23 Committee. Ultimately the 
Article 23 Committee didn’t reach an agreement and was seen as a 
failure. However, it can be said that UNAMI favours a 32/32/32/4 
power sharing arrangement.400 
• Local autonomy and a form of self-governance for each of the 
segments of the society. 
• Kirkuk to be involved in the management of it natural recourses 
alongside the federal government and to receive a higher distribution 
of the oil revenue. 
• The creation and expansion of economic ties with the rest of Iraq. 
• UNAMI sees it as imperative that there is a transitional period before 
this option is implemented. This would allow for transparency, 
organisation and mechanisms of accountability to be addressed before 
an option could be put into place. 
UNAMI discusses four specific options for Kirkuk, which should include the 
elements above: 
1. Restructuring Article 140: This would involve clarifying all aspects of 
Article 140 (particularly the normalisation process and the details of 
any referendum), a longer time period allowed for the normalisation 
process and that the referendum will only take place once a political 
agreement has been reached. This option would favour the Kurds, 
providing the details were not drastically changed, as they would have 
Article 140 legitimised once more and this would allow for Kirkuk to join 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 This poses problems, which are discussed under the Berlin Accords. 
	  	   187	  
the KRG, albeit that it would take a much longer time period than they 
would wish for. However, a large proportion of the population would not 
favour this option and it would need to include other elements and a 
significant change to Article 140 to be accepted by Iraq as a whole. 
2. Fixed Governorate status for Kirkuk: This would see Kirkuk being 
fixed as a governorate, which would mean that they could not become 
a region or join an existing region. Under this option Kirkuk would 
receive a higher level of autonomy than other governorates. However, 
even with higher autonomy, this option is highly unlikely, as it would 
entail majority Kurds giving up their aim of joining the KRG and the 
KRG giving up on annexing Kirkuk – both which are highly unlikely 
events. 
3. Dual Nexus: Under this option, Kirkuk could remain a governorate or 
become a region, but the significant point is that Kirkuk would have 
strong links to both the KRG and Baghdad. UNAMI proposes a similar 
agreement to that of Northern Ireland, where cross-border institutions 
exist linking Northern Ireland to the UK and Ireland.401 UNAMI sees this 
as either involving joint institutions between Kirkuk, Baghdad and the 
KRG or the division of departments between the three. This dual nexus 
would either be implemented permanently or as an interim solution.402 
UNAMI’s recommendation does not allow for a future referendum (if 
the dual nexus was implemented on a permanent basis), nor does it 
specifically mention removing Article 140, which would allow for the 
KRG to have a claim to Kirkuk. For a dual nexus agreement on Kirkuk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 More details are given on the cross-border institutions in Chapter 5. 
402 UNAMI. ‘Possible Options for the Future Administrative Status of Kirkuk Within the Iraqi 
Federation’ in UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries, Volume Two, 2009 [Not published] 
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to be acceptable to all the segments of the society these factors would 
have to be included in the settlement, which would raise further issues 
that would need to be addressed; for example, how Kirkuk would be 
governed if it joined the KRG, if Kirkuk joined the KRG would it still 
have links to Baghdad, the structuring of a new referendum, etc.. 
4. Special Status: UNAMI recommends awarding Kirkuk a special status 
as a distinct administrative territory with a power sharing arrangement. 
Kirkuk could be a governorate or a region and the special status could 
be an interim or permanent option. Under a special status Kirkuk would 
be given a high level of self-governance. UNAMI sees this special 
status as including legislation that prevents Kirkuk from joining another 
governorate or region; therefore, if Kirkuk were given a permanent 
special status it would be unable to join the KRG. Additionally, under 
this option, should Kirkuk ever join the KRG it would have to be without 
a special status and thus the rights of non-Kurds would be jeopardised 
as they would become marginalised in an overwhelmingly Kurdish 
political context. Although UNAMI does not address the option of the 
possibility of a special status for Kirkuk within the KRG, it offers many 
solutions to some of the key issues in the conflict. 
UNAMI admits that options one and two are the least feasible and it would be 
difficult to gain the consensus of all the segments of Kirkuk to implement them. 
They also see a combination of any of the four options as being another 
alternative, with a mixture of options three and four being the most plausible. 
An amalgamation of options three and four does indeed seem the most likely 
to succeed for reasons discussed above. This leaves the question why 
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UNAMI didn’t make this a separate option and give their recommendation as 
to how these two options could be joined to offer the best chance of it being 
successful in Kirkuk. However, even if UNAMI did create a separate option for 
such an amalgamation, like all the options given, it would need to be further 
developed and include more details than they currently give in order to judge 
its feasibility, and indeed to make it possible to achieve.403 
 
4.6. Changing Internal Borders 
In the academic book How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity, O’Leary examines 
the US’ withdrawal from Iraq, and comes to the conclusion that Iraq must 
maintain its territorial integrity. Firstly, he argues that this was promised to 
Iraq and the rest of the world before the 2003 Iraq War and secondly, 
because a federal Iraq was established in the Iraqi constitution, which was 
voted on by the people of Iraq. However, this does not mean that the internal 
boundaries cannot be changed, as changing them may help to ease Iraq’s 
conflict without having to partition Iraq into homogenous states. In keeping 
with this, O’Leary sees two possibilities to resolve the status of Kirkuk fairly. 
One would be to Follow Article 140 and hold a referendum within the 
historical boundaries of Kirkuk and the second would be to allocate the 
districts and subdistricts to the KRG, or not, based on their population 
groupings.  Both these options involve changing territorial borders, however 
these are internal borders and can be changed without violating the 
constitution. In O’Leary’s writings he seems to favour following Article 140, as 
he believes that as this was agreed upon it would be unfair to the Kurds not to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 UNAMI. ‘Possible Options for the Future Administrative Status of Kirkuk Within the Iraqi 
Federation’ in UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries, Volume Two, 2009 [Not published] 
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honour it. In this he is right, however, as an advisor to the Kurds on the 
formation of the draft constitution he doesn’t take into consideration the 
favourable position the Kurds were in; whilst the rest of the segments were in 
chaos the Kurds were organised and able to hire numerous outside advisors 
which enabled them to negotiate Article 140 into the constitution.404 As it 
would be unfair to the Kurds if Article 140 was reneged on, it would also be 
unfair to the other segments in Kirkuk to install something that they did not 
vote on directly (as it was part of the entire constitution and voted on by the 
whole of Iraq). This therefore makes the second option more favourable, even 
though it has been dismissed by many405, as it holds a reasonable chance of 
ending violence due to the fact that it allows for the majorities of both sections 
to achieve their aims. Despite O’Leary expressing this as a fair and feasible 
option, he has not provided a possible framework for its implementation. He 
states that the districts and subdistricts would be allocated based on their 
election results, but does not offer an opinion on what should happen to them 
– will they form a new governorate, join existing ones, have the choice of 
joining the KRG or not, have any links with Kirkuk on matters of governance, 
resources, etc.? These questions need to be addressed when considering the 
break up of the current Kirkuk province. O’Leary does however give more 
details for Kirkuk city, if it were to join the KRG, stating that it should have a 
special status, with its own consociational power sharing arrangement and 
maintain links to Baghdad. Even though this analysis contains more details, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Article 140 was added as part of a bargain where the Kurds accepted Article 119 and as 
most of the Arab and Turkmen parties in Kirkuk were part of broader Iraqi political party they 
were forced to back the constitution despite the fact that they were against Article 140. 
405 Mainly UNAMI, see UNAMI. ‘Possible Options for the Future Administrative Status of 
Kirkuk Within the Iraqi Federation’ in UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries, Volume Two, 
2009 [Not published] 
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still raises questions as to what this special status would entail – how 
independent Kirkuk would be from the KRG, what governance responsibilities 
it would have, what links it would have with Baghdad, etc.? The ideas put 
forward by O’Leary do come across as some of the more plausible options for 
Kirkuk, which can be attributed not only to his standing as an academic, but 
also to his experience with Northern Ireland (due to its many similarities with 
Kirkuk). However, as already stated, these ideas need to be developed 
further in order to successfully analyse their chances for success and to give 
the relevant actors of Kirkuk something more than just an idea to work with.406 
Romano also favours a form of border change, in that he believes that non-
Kurdish majority areas should have the choice not to join the KRG, therefore 
dividing the province if the Kurdish areas decided to join the KRG. However, 
as already highlighted, he too does not discuss what would happen to these 
districts if they chose not to join the KRG.407 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
Although the various options that have been put forward for Kirkuk are lacking 
in detail, there are many aspects that could be included in a settlement that 
would be accepted by its population. These include: [1] Giving a special 
status to Kirkuk city; [2] allowing non-Kurdish majority areas the option not to 
join the KRG; [3] creating cross-border institutions/links between Kirkuk, the 
KRG and Baghdad; [4] and introducing liberal consociational power sharing. 
Although these options are feasible for a settlement in Kirkuk, as already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 O’Leary, Brendan. How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 141-160. 
407 Romano, David 'The Future of Kirkuk', Ethnopolitics Volume 6, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 265 – 
283. 
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stated, there needs to be far more particulars as to what each aspect will 
involve and should include the geographic specifics, as these were somewhat 
thin in many of the analyses. If the resolution for Kirkuk is going to involve 
splitting up the province, it is imperative that clear details are given for the 
future of each section and how they link to the resolution. If the options 
mentioned are to be included in an agreement it is important that they are 
analysed further and a detailed description of how they can be implemented 
successfully is developed. The further analysis should take into consideration 
the geographic ramifications of each option and the affect that they could 
have on the dynamics and demographics of the conflict. Thus, allowing for the 
development of an agreement that takes into consideration the realities of 
each option available. It is an objective for this thesis to take the advances 
highlighted above and develop them towards a detailed framework for a 
possible agreement for Kirkuk. The next chapter analyses the relevant 
theories of power sharing, and when this is paired with the available 
resolutions highlighted in this chapter, an understanding of the direction a 
possible agreement for Kirkuk should take is formulated. Thus creating an 
outline that can be developed into a potential agreement for the future of 
Kirkuk in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   193	  
Chapter 5: Recommended Settlement 	  
5.1. Introduction 	  
Up to this point this thesis has laid the groundwork to develop an informed 
framework for Kirkuk; power sharing theories have been analysed, previous 
frameworks for Kirkuk have been discussed, a background to the situation 
has been given, and the issues of conflict have been highlighted. In the next 
two chapters this information will be used in order to develop a settlement for 
the conflict of Kirkuk. According to the Rand Corporation: 
…durable settlements to ethno-territorial conflicts must address both strategic 
national concerns and hands-on governance issues. Rather than posit a choice 
between approaches that are driven from the bottom or from the top, therefore, it 
appears that both tracks must be pursued.408 
 
The next two chapters will demonstrate that this thesis does just that – use a 
top-down as well as a bottom-up approach – in that power sharing, the 
political status and ethnic ties will be addressed alongside local issues such 
as policing, employment, education, etc.. This chapter will address the issue 
of the political status as well as addressing the local issues discussed in 
Chapter 2; thus creating a consociational settlement that goes beyond mere 
institution creating, but actually addresses all vital aspects of conflict. Thus, 
allowing the proposed settlement to ‘tackle the many causes which lie at the 
heart of the conflict’, which Gerry Adams highlights as one of the most 
important aspects in reaching a successful settlement .409 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Hanauer, Larry & Laural E. Miller. Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons Learned from Settlements of 
Earlier Ethno-Territorial Conflicts. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2012, p. 55. 
409 Interview, conducted by the author, Gerry Adams, 15/07/2010. 
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5.2. Special Status 
As the chapters preceding this one have highlighted, a special status for 
Kirkuk would ease some of the tensions created by the existence of rival 
ethnonationalisms by diminishing the battle for the ownership of Kirkuk. 
Article 140 has created conflict and by attempting to install this article, not 
only will the future of Kirkuk remain in limbo – as the various ethnicities fight 
over the installation of this disputable legislation – but there will also be all-out 
ethnic conflict in Kirkuk if it is ever implemented to the letter. Awarding Kirkuk 
a special status is one of the first steps necessary towards creating a 
settlement that can replace Article 140 as it creates a system where Kirkuk is 
predominantly owned/managed by Kirkuk and not by the KRG or Baghdad. 
Furthermore, by preventing Kirkuk from being directly under either Baghdad’s 
or KRG’s control there is no longer the need for the unconstructive discourse 
used by the leading protagonists in their attempt to prevent Kirkuk from being 
controlled by rival ethnonationalisms, which ultimately leads to the erosion of 
community relations. This eliminates one of the leading issues of conflict, 
which has created detrimental relations between the various ethnicities within 
Kirkuk. Furthermore, by disabling the fight for ownership, the negative 
discourse is also reduced, which thus allows for cross-community 
reconciliation to become a more feasible prospect. The RAND Corporation’s 
report on Kirkuk states that ‘minimising the symbolic importance of territorial 
control and sovereignty can help the parties focus on their pragmatic interests 
rather than on intractable nationalistic imperatives’, which is what creating a 
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special status does.410 Nevertheless, the fact that the Kurds managed to 
achieve the creation of Article 140 means that they are highly unlikely to just 
relinquish it – despite the fact that it is technically void. Thus, there are four 
steps that need to be introduced alongside a special status in order to 
counteract this issue; these are: (1.) the normalisation of Kirkuk (2.) allowing 
majority-Kurdish areas (or any area that wants to) to join the KRG (3.) 
creating cross-border institutions (4.) allowing for a future referendum on the 
positioning of the special status within Iraq’s internal borders. In an interview 
the KRG Foreign Relations Minister showed a willingness to allow for the 
decision to join the KRG to be made on a district level:  
You know we have rule of law in Kurdistan, we have stability and security, we 
want the people to make up their own minds, we want them to decide. If the 
people of these areas [non-Kurdish majority districts of Kirkuk] want to join 
Kurdistan they are welcome, if not, we don’t want them. For us it is important to 
have people who are faithful, loyal to the process and not troublemakers… if 
there was a district where the majority of the people have decided not to join – 
it’s their choice.411  
The Iraqi Turkmen Front have also showed their willingness to allow other 
districts to decide where they wish to be placed as demonstrated in the 
following statement by Sundus Saqi when asked if her party backed Hawija 
joining another province: ‘This is up to Hawija’s people to decide.’412 However, 
establishing a special status for the city would be harder for the Kurds to 
accept, as already stated, they firmly believe in the validity and applicability of 
Article 140. Therefore, this would have to involve wider negotiations on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Hanauer, Larry & Laural E. Miller. Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons Learned from Settlements of 
Earlier Ethno-Territorial Conflicts. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2012, p. XII. 
411 Interview conducted by the author with Falah Mustafa, KRG Foreign Relations Minister, in 
Erbil, Iraq - 01/06/2013 
412 Interview, conducted by the author, with Sundus Saqi, Iraqi Turkmen Front 
Representative London - 09/06/2013. 
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national level, which would include hydrocarbon laws, budget, as well as the 
already mentioned cross border institutions and future referendum. In the 
negotiations discussed above Erbil and Baghdad can take a lead and play a 
major role in helping to reach an agreement in Kirkuk. Although the KDP and 
PUK would be against a special status for the city, in an interview with the 
Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk, they voiced a willingness to follow the 
ICG’s recommendations, which called for a special status for Kirkuk for ten 
years.413 Furthermore, Gorran seem more willing than other Kurdish parties to 
relinquish Article 140 as evident from the following statement by Khadir 
Gihan:  
From the beginning we believe that Article 140 made the problem bigger and 
harder to solve. They could solve the problem without going to the constitution 
and using Article 58 of the TAL or Article 140 of the constitution, which has right 
now created a big problem and a big deal. We believe that in any region of the 
world when there is a problem it must be solved by the people from the city. 
Right now the future of Kirkuk’s people is in the hand of the political parties and 
we believe that this is wrong and that it must be in the hand of the people of 
Kirkuk to solve their own problems.414 
With Gorran’s popularity growing and the PUK’s diminishing, they may have a 
larger say following the next national election, which could open up the path 
for negotiations.415 The Turkmen population of Kirkuk also favours a special 
status, but for them Tuz Khurmatu is extremely important. However, through 
the normalisation process Tuz Khurmatu would rejoin Kirkuk and then would 
be able to decide its own future and as Tuz Khurmatu is also important to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Interview, conducted by the author, with the Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 
06/06/2013 
414 Interview, conducted by the author, with the Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 
06/06/2013 
415 In the KRG provincial elections in September 2013 Gorran received the second highest 
number of votes after the KDP, overtaking the PUK as the second most popular party in the 
KRG. See: ‘Results’ Rudaw [Online] Available from 
http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/elections/results [Accessed 22/09/2015]  
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Kurds they could persuade the Turkmen to join the KRG through a side deal 
on its governance.416 
As there are majority-Kurdish areas, in Kirkuk province that border the 
KRG, it is highly feasible for these to join the KRG (if they desire) and 
therefore no longer fall within the boundaries of Kirkuk province. This allows 
for a large population of the Kurds within Kirkuk to achieve their desire of 
joining the KRG. However, this would not be possible if it resulted in the 
Kurds being a minority within Kirkuk; therefore, as part of this deal Kirkuk city 
would be given a special status and other majority districts/subdistricts would 
either join other provinces or form a new one. This again is a feasible 
proposition due to the history of gerrymandering that existed within Kirkuk 
(with districts being added to the province). By giving the city a special status 
and by allowing districts with a majority to join other provinces (or indeed 
create their own province), the conflict therefore becomes reduced to the city. 
With Kirkuk city having a far more equal spread of ethnic diversity, this 
therefore makes power sharing an easier and more attainable prospect. Such 
a solution is similar to the recommendations put forward for Jerusalem to 
enlarge its borders in order to create parity between the ethnic groups, as 
decreasing the conflict to the city would have the same effect in Kirkuk. It 
would be highly likely that the Kurdish-majority districts would join the KRG, 
rather than join the other districts/subdistricts in forming a new province. It 
would then be left for the remaining districts/subdistricts to decide whether 
they would like to join existing provinces (decided by joint referenda) or form 
their own province. With a special status being created for the city, this would 	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member of Turkmeneli Party Leadership Council – Erbil,  13/02/2013 
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be the only option for the remaining districts, thus easing any worries that the 
Kurds may have of being marginalised through this process. Furthermore, if 
the districts decided to form a province they would need a capital city. This is 
where the example of Chandigarh in India is useful; Chandigarh is a Union 
Territory on its own, but is also capital to both the Haryana and Punjab states. 
If the remaining districts chose to form their own province Kirkuk city could 
become their capital whilst remaining under a special status (this would also 
fit in well with the cross-border institutions). However, this does not mean that 
Kirkuk city cannot be independent, yet also be the administrative capital of 
the new province. The KRG could also choose to have Kirkuk as its capital – 
although this is highly unlikely due to the fact that the KDP would not 
relinquish the power stronghold that they currently have in Erbil.417 However, 
the KRG could follow the example of many other entities that have multi 
capitals – South Africa has three; Pretoria is the administrative capital, 
Bloemfontein is the judiciary capital, and Cape Town is the legislative capital 
– making Kirkuk a second capital. This would be more symbolic and would be 
used to ensure that Kirkuk city does not hold more prominence to the new 
province, but nonetheless would be extremely useful in the administration of 
the cross-border institutions.418 Making Kirkuk the capital to more than one 
entity would reduce the exclusive ownership claims by formally increasing the 
ownership. 
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In the event that the remaining districts decided to form their own 
province with Kirkuk city as the capital, a system would have to be formed to 
manage the governance of all the relative entities. In Chandigarh the Capitol 
Complex houses the seat of government of Haryana, Punjab and Chandigarh 
itself.419 Ideally in Kirkuk these seats of government would also be housed in 
the same building to allow for maximum interaction in the cross-border 
institutions. This would entail having separate, but linked, areas for the seats 
of government for Kirkuk city and the new province. The KRG would also 
have the option of moving some form of governance to Kirkuk, which they 
would be likely to take up (although it is highly unlikely that they would move 
their seat of government to Kirkuk, but rather some aspect of this) and this 
would also be housed alongside the others. Furthermore, it would be 
important to house the cross-border institutions in this same space, as these 
would involve members of all the governments and by housing them together 
interaction would be encouraged, if not inevitable. In this way Kirkuk could be 
the capital city (in some form) for more than one entity, whilst its governance 
would remain separate, yet at the same time being linked through location 
and through the cross-border institutions. The housing of these institutions 
could initially be held in the Provincial Council’s building – there would no 
longer be the need for such a large space once Kirkuk is no longer a province 
– although, it is recommended that a new space be created specifically for 
this purpose. 
However, by giving Kirkuk city a special status the self-determination 
desires of the Kurds within the city are not addressed. This is where cross-	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border institutions come into play. By forming links between Kirkuk city and 
the KRG with joint governance on certain issues, particularly those which are 
of great interest to the Kurds, strong links between the Kurds within Kirkuk 
city and the KRG are created. This allows for the creation of official offices 
that involve both KRG and Kirkuki officials, thus leading to Kurds having an 
active role with their counterparts in both regions. It is also important for those 
districts that were part of Kirkuk province to maintain links to the city once a 
special status is created. By allowing their representatives to take up 
positions within these cross-border institutions on issues that affect them such 
as water, agriculture, etc. these districts could maintain links whilst benefiting 
from the products of these institutions. Thus, giving theses districts links to 
Kirkuk, whilst at the same time ensuring their input on issues that directly 
affect them. There would also need to be cross-border institutions between 
Kirkuk City and Baghdad in order to address any potential changes to the 
territorial position that Kirkuk city (under special status) falls within. In order to 
decide what cross-border institutions are created there would have to be 
negotiations between the KRG, Kirkuk province (as it currently stands) and 
Baghdad. However, recommendations for potential institutions are given in 
Chapter 5.9.. 
Ultimately – this is still not enough – with the Kurds holding on to 
Article 140, where they had a deal for the whole of Kirkuk to join the KRG, 
mere links to the city fall short. This is why there also has to be the possibility 
for a future referendum allowing for Kirkuk city (under special status) to join 
the KRG. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to use plebiscitary-majoritarian 
mechanisms to decide such a sensitive issue; as this could lead to just under 
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half of the population being forced against their will to join the KRG. Therefore, 
the Kurds would have to compromise and allow for this to be decided by 
majority consent (most likely 2/3 of the population) in order to prevent conflict 
from arising.  The creation of cross-border institutions between Baghdad and 
Kirkuk city would also ensure that the communities within Kirkuk would 
always maintain strong links with Baghdad. The KRG could view the cross 
border institutions as a chance to prove to the people of Kirkuk, through the 
provision of services, that their future would be better within the KRG. In 
interviews conducted with the Turkmen parties and Gorran they have all 
pointed to the fact that the KRG and the PUK/KDP have done little to prove to 
the people of Kirkuk that they should join the KRG. Therefore, the KRG can 
view the cross border institutions as an opportunity to lead to a smooth 
transition to Kirkuk joining the KRG. However, due to the powers that Kirkuk 
city (under special status) would have, paired with the cross-border 
institutions and Kirkuk’s continued links to Baghdad through its sovereign 
commitments, the increase in power that the KRG would have over Kirkuk’s 
affairs would be minimal and indeed largely symbolic. 
Although all the geographic changes to the provinces/regions/districts 
would be voted on by those that it affects, the most likely/desirable outcome 
can be highlighted. Therefore, it is recommended that majority-Kurdish 
districts/subdistricts that border the KRG join the KRG. Thus allowing for the 
remaining districts (apart from Kirkuk city, which is given a special status) to 
form a new province with Kirkuk city becoming its capital (following the 
Chandigarh model). It is then recommended that the KRG move some form of 
governance to Kirkuk, thus making Kirkuk the KRG’s joint capital with Erbil. 
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5.3. New Police Force 
Dealing with the security situation in Kirkuk is one of the most important 
aspects of any settlement. The people of Kirkuk need to feel safe, as 
highlighted by Khadir Gihan of Gorran:  
The first thing that every person is looking for is security and in my opinion since 
the creation of human they try to secure themselves and if you don’t, you don’t 
feel human. One of the reasons they [PUK &KDP] couldn’t secure Kirkuk and 
give the people safety and security is because there is militia for every person 
with responsibility and this makes people go mad. Militia in this community is 
seen as a civil phenomenon, for example there is no house without weapon, 
there is no young man without weapon and this is a disaster.  No day passes 
without death…420 
Kirkuk has witnessed a lot of violence, particularly since the creation of the 
Dijla Operation, therefore it is imperative that the issue of security is 
addressed in order to give the people the safety necessary to address the 
other issues in their society. By granting Kirkuk city a special status the 
opportunity arises to create a new multiethnic, multi-lingual and fully 
functional police force. The restructuring of the security services is backed by 
Arabs, Turkmen and Gorran, as previously mentioned, and was put forward 
(in negotiations over the Dijla Operations) by Baghdad and the KRG.421 This 
process would involve those areas that have chosen to join the KRG 
becoming part of the KRG security services and those that have joined 
another province becoming part of that system – or if a new province is 
created forming a new system under the current Iraqi model. Thus, opening 
up the possibility of making Kirkuk city a demilitarised zone, which would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Interview, conducted by the author, with the Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 
06/06/2013 
421 In interviews with the author, politicians that did not belong to the KDP or PUK 
continuously voiced their complaints of these parties control of the security in Kirkuk. 
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remove the tensions of the peshmerga and Iraqi Army’s presence within 
Kirkuk. Due to the current problems with a multi-level security service within 
Kirkuk that creates ethnic tensions, it is imperative that one single 
organisation is created, which follows the ethnic demographics of the city and 
has departments rather than divisions to deal with the various security duties. 
As part of the creation of a new police force in Kirkuk city a new cross-border 
institution focusing on policing terrorism and the borders of Kirkuk city would 
also have to be created. The cross border institution would create a joint task 
force involved in information sharing and possibly joint action at the borders. It 
would thus pave the way for the demilitarisation of Kirkuk, as apart from there 
being no trust between the peshmerga and the army there is also a belief that 
the current system could not deal with terrorism in Kirkuk without their help. 
This is illustrated by Lieutenant Colonel Azad of the Asayesh:  
We also think that the peshmerga and the Iraqi army should be at the borders 
and not in the city, but we think that it is impossible, you can’t do it. First of all 
the peshmerga and the army are not trusting each other, for example if the 
peshmerga left they don’t believe that the army would leave the city too and 
secondly the Iraqi police are not capable of facing terrorist activities in the city.422 
Thus, not only would the creation of a new multiethnic force with cross-border 
institutions linking it to the peshmerga and the Iraqi army allow for trust to 
develop, it would also create a force capable of dealing with the terrorist 
issues in Kirkuk. It is important to put a system in place that allows for the 
demilitarisation of Kirkuk, this is supported even by the Kurds, as illustrated 
by Fatih Muhammed Ameen:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 Interview, conducted by the author, Lieutenant Colonel Azad, Spokesperson KDP 
Asayesh Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 06/06/13      
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I believe that the military forces are not for internal use or for inside the city, it is 
for the borders. The creation of the Dijla forces is for political rather than security 
reasons. It is the police force’s job to take care of the internal security and the 
city, not the military.423 
The creation of a new police force should involve a pathway being developed 
by an independent panel and possibly being implemented by an independent 
administrator. Laying out the dynamics of the new police force is a PhD thesis 
in itself (as seen by the lengthy Patten Report), however it is important to give 
a basic outline.424  
 Firstly, Kirkuk city should be demilitarised to ease any tensions with 
regards to a perceived military take over of the city. Any police force created 
in Kirkuk city should aim to mirror the ethnic demographics of the city – this 
should also be represented within the hierarchy of the command of the new 
force. Secondly, there should be language training in order to create a 
multilingual police force. Thirdly, a cross-border task force should be created 
to fight terrorism and manage the borders – this should involve the KRG 
security services, Kirkuk police, border region police and the Iraqi Army. 
Fourthly, there should be a strong community policing system where local 
police work within, and interact with, their community. Finally, the police 
should be monitored by an independent commission to ensure that the police 
system does not revert to the grossly fractured and ethnically divided system 
that is currently in place. The level of monitoring should be extended to the 
role that the peshmerga and army have in Kirkuk in order to ensure that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Interview, conducted by the author, Fatih Muhammed Ameen, Member of KDP's Kirkuk-
Garmiyan leadership Council and former member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kirkuk, 06/06/13 424	  The Patten Report gave recommendations for changes to policing in Northern Ireland. 
See:	  Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. ‘A New Beginning: Policing in 
Northern Ireland.’ CAIN [Online] Available from 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf [Accessed 10/11/2010] 
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once again don’t encroach on the borders, thus preventing the fears of the 
various ethnic groups and the lack of trust between them. 
5.4. Managing Resources 
Article 112, section one, of the Iraqi Constitution states: 
The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from 
present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in 
proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an 
allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly 
deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged 
afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the 
country, and this shall be regulated by a law.425 
As oil was found in Kirkuk during the first explorations for oil in Iraq, it 
definitely falls under the ‘present fields’ label.  Therefore, under the Iraqi 
constitution, oil in Kirkuk must be managed by Baghdad regardless of Kirkuk’s 
status. This statute should be strengthened rather than weakened and it 
should be further highlighted that Kirkuk’s oil will always be controlled by 
Baghdad regardless of Kirkuk’s status. It is necessary, in order to ease the 
tension of some Turkmen and Arabs who think that the Kurds want Kirkuk’s 
oil for secessionist reasons. Also, the Kurds seem content with Baghdad 
controlling the oil industry in Kirkuk; they follow the reading of the constitution 
where old oil fields are managed by Baghdad. Nonetheless, the Kurds do 
have a problem with the reading of the constitution relating to new oil fields 
and although this is limited to the KRG, it is likely that any deal on 
hydrocarbon laws will involve deals on Kirkuk. Furthermore, the Kurds take 
issue with the employment in the Kirkuki oil industry, as they feel it is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 ‘Iraqi Constitution’ UNIraq [Online] Available from 
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf [Accessed 08/12/2011] 
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representative of the population (this is addressed in Chapter 5.5.). Although 
the oil in Kirkuk should be managed by Baghdad, the people of Kirkuk should 
see some of the benefits of living on one of the largest oil deposits in Iraq. 
Currently, they experience a lot of the negative aspects of oil production with 
very few of the positives, as opined by Khadir Gihan of the Kirkuk Gorran 
Leadership Council:  
we have a lot of oil but we have a shortage of the useful products that come 
from oil that we need. There is the worst kind gasoline in Kirkuk. The people of 
Kirkuk are getting the smoke, toxins and other bad materials that come from the 
oil industry, but the positive products that come from this industry are going to 
those in charge and for power.426 
As already stated, although $1 for every barrel of oil produced in Kirkuk goes 
to Kirkuk, this is not enough for an area that has seen so much destruction 
over the years and needs major reconstruction. The people of Kirkuk deserve 
to see positive redevelopments as a result of the oil, which has been the bane 
of their existence for so many years. Furthermore, despite the fact Kirkuk 
produces so much oil there is no refinery, which would bring jobs and oil 
products to the residents of Kirkuk. As with most industry in Kirkuk, this is 
down to the political situation and lack of governance and this can and should 
be rectified through the successful resolution of the current conflict. Once the 
political sensitivity no longer surrounds Kirkuk and everything to do with it, the 
governance can change to benefiting the people, rather than political one-
upmanship. As already stated, and further highlighted in Chapter 5.9., this 
should include a cross-border institution to manage the financial benefits of 
the oil industry. The finances available from the oil industry should be used to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Interview, conducted by the author, with the Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 
06/06/2013 
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undo the damages from the past. These damages are particularly evident in 
the rural areas and have had a negative effect on the agricultural industry. 
Therefore, the extra finances should be used to modernise the agricultural 
sector through: developing the rural areas, training the rural communities in 
modern agricultural techniques, creating cooperatives to help farmers deal 
with their produce and any shortages thereof, and offering grants in order to 
make this feasible. However, first and foremost, this should address the issue 
of encouraging people to return to the rural areas as: 
Nowadays we see negative migration where the farmer people have become 
urban people and this is not good and is unbalanced. The reason for that the 
farmers did not return to villages to produce agricultural products is the PUK, 
KDP and the central government have not supported them in doing this.427 
Therefore, the finances need to be in place in order to support and encourage 
people to return to the rural areas. The majority of the other issues created by 
the remaining resources in Kirkuk would be dealt with through cross border 
institutions, which will be further examined in Chapter 5.9.. This would include 
a cross border institution devoted to the management of the water resources, 
particularly those entering Kirkuk from the KRG and this cross border 
institution should extend to a cooperation body in agriculture, as they are 
closely linked. Finally there should be a cross border institution for managing 
electricity in order to link the production and consumption thereof between the 
three entities of Baghdad, Kirkuk and the KRG. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Interview, conducted by the author, with the Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Kirkuk, 
06/06/2013 
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5.5. Civil Employment 
The Berlin Accord recommended that a committee representing all lists be 
formed in order to collect data concerning the organisational structure of all 
departments and to rank the positions according to their importance.428 It is 
recommended that this process be followed, although contrasting to the Berlin 
Accord this should not lead to the implementation of these positions on the 
32/32/32/4 scale. As already discussed in this thesis, this would lead to 
corporate consociation and thus instability as it would not represent, or follow 
changes in, the demographics. Therefore, the positions within the civil service 
should be distributed according to the demographics and involve the correct 
share of each ranking position. However, this should not be an immediate 
process, but should rather be applied over a longer period of time. Also, it 
should involve the creation of jobs and adjusting the statistics through 
retirements/hiring and should not involve the loss of jobs, as this would create 
discontent. There are jobs available, particularly in the oil industry, as well as 
the employment that would be created through the new institutions, but there 
is a lack of skilled people. Therefore, as part of the initiative of fairly 
distributing civil service employment, training should also be provided in the 
areas where jobs are created and this should follow the demographics 
needed to ensure that the ethnic groups are correctly represented. Although 
the committee for employment should include representatives of each list in 
Kirkuk, it should be led by an international supervisor. This would ensure 
progression and allow for external pressure to be used in order to avoid 
delays. It would also ensure fairness in the creation of, and training for, new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Berlin Accord. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty [Online] Available from 
http://fnst-amman.org/en/images/stories/en-Berlin_Accord.pdf [Accessed 01/12/2011] 
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jobs. Although the Turkmen call for an implementation of 32/32/32/4 
employment in the civil service, Salar Erbil from the Turkmenli Party has 
shown that they are willing to be flexible on this matter as long as they feel 
that they are being treated as equals:  
Each one should feel that he is equal with the others, there is no difference 
between the Muslim and the Christian or between the Turkmen and the Kurdish. 
If you succeed in this, even if it is 40%, 30% [share of the positions] it doesn’t 
matter, it’s not very important, the importance is in the equality between them.429 
 As there is currently no legislation calling for this form of employment 
distribution in Iraq, the factors mentioned here would have to be included 
within the Special Status Law. 
5.6. Returnees 
By giving Kirkuk city a special status the sensitivity around returnees to the 
surrounding districts is counterbalanced. Therefore simplifying the release of 
the allocated funds and allowing for the rebuilding of villages destroyed by the 
Anfal campaign. Furthermore, it also makes it no longer necessary to remove 
Arabs who were brought to the province through Arabisation; although those 
who want to leave should be helped in their relocation and this too should be 
an easier process due to the depoliticisation of the issue. Creating a special 
status for the city also defuses the element of ownership of the city – as it will 
always be under a special status and predominantly run by itself regardless of 
its location within the internal borders of Iraq – thus making it easier to accept 
the new demographics. By creating a discourse of Kirkuk being a new city 
under special status and the population as the people of this new city, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Interview, conducted by the author, Salar Erbil, member of Turkmeneli Party Leadership 
Council – Erbil, 13/02/2013 
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issue over who rightfully belongs can be reduced. Thus, allowing Kirkuk to 
finally address the housing, administration, resources and services issues 
that have presented themselves through the presence of returnees. The 
creation of a special status should remove the ethnic competition for 
ownership of Kirkuk. The process would be strengthened by the creation of 
cross-border institutions, as this would ensure that links were maintained to 
Kirkuk. Furthermore, by demilitarising Kirkuk the concerns over a possible 
future military takeover are counteracted. This would allow for the acceptance 
of returnees and would also stop the process of trying to evict those people 
who do not desire to leave. This would lead to the creation of houses and the 
provision of services for both those who have been displaced by returnees 
and for the returnees themselves. Thus leading to a higher standard of living 
and consequently easing conflict. This thesis argues that this is the route that 
Kirkuk has to follow in order to effectively and successfully deal with the issue 
of returnees. The finances are available – with there continually being a 
massive budget surplus for the central government at the end of each year – 
to address these issues. 430 Furthermore, once they are addressed many of 
the issues involving who is rightfully a Kirkuki will dissipate once the standard 
of living is increased.  
 The current panel dealing with returnees in Kirkuk represents the 
ethnic makeup of Iraq and consists of people who are against the very 
process. 431  Although ethnic competition should become lesser with the 
implementation of the elements previously discussed, this process is likely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Wing, Joel. ‘Iraq Ends Up With Another Budget Surplus In 2010.’ Musings on Iraq [Online] 
Available from http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/11/iraq-ends-up-with-another-
budget.html [Accessed 23/11/2011] 
431 Mahmoud, Nawzad. ‘Analysis: No Progress on Article 140.’ Rudaw [Online] Available from 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4134.html [Accessed 25/11/2011] 
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be sped up by installing an independent international supervisor (undertaken 
with advice from the ethnic groups). Furthermore, the current panel is related 
to Article 140 and it can therefore be argued that it is no longer valid and 
needs replacing. Therefore, it is recommended that an international observer 
be placed in charge of managing the returnee issue and that a new 
independent committee is established. 
 
5.7. Education 
In order for Kirkuk to transcend beyond a society where rival ethnonationalism 
is at the fore, ethnic competition in its current form needs to be eliminated and 
this should begin with the youth. Therefore, the education system needs to be 
redesigned, as this is a sphere where the next generation’s attitudes towards 
other ethnic groups can be positively influenced. For this to have the desired 
outcome it is important that Kirkuk changes from a monoethnic education 
system to a multiethnic one. This process is not possible without creating a 
new curriculum that is respectful to all the ethnicities’ heritage and entrenches 
a notion of common history. Once again, due to the lack of trust and of 
productive dialogue between the various ethnicities in Kirkuk, this too would 
best be done under an international committee with advisors from each ethnic 
group. The international committee would supervise the implementation and 
initial running of the new system until such a time as it was deemed suitable 
to handover to the Kirkuk government. It is recommended that apart from 
being multiethnic the education system in Kirkuk should also follow the Brčko 
	  	   212	  
system;432 in that it should be a multilingual system, where the children are not 
forced to speak or do their homework in another language, but the teacher 
teaches in all the languages. As the special status is recommended for the 
city alone in this thesis, it makes this a more feasible prospect, as here the 
ethnic groups are living in close proximity to each other and there is more 
interaction between them. It also makes this process more necessary as it is 
important that all the ethnic groups can communicate and interact properly in 
order to reduce conflict. 
 A reformed education system should also include a cross-border 
institution for education that links Kirkuk, the KRG and Baghdad. This would 
allow the three different education systems to be connected, thus enabling 
the sharing of information and research, progression towards a common goal 
and for students to be able to pursue tertiary education throughout Iraq. It is 
imperative that a new education system is formed so that divisions within Iraq 
are not entrenched, thus beginning the process of building a multiethnic, 
inclusive society, starting with the next generation.  
 It could be argued that the educational system recommended above is 
centripetal in nature, as it does not use the divides in the society, but rather 
brings all the ethnic groups together at the centre. This is not an issue to 
having a liberal consociational settlement, as through complex power sharing 
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  Following the Bosnian War students in Brčko attended mono-ethnic schools that followed 
an ethically tailored curriculum. One of the new laws established by the Brčko Law Revision 
Commission was the Law on Education, which introduced integrated multiethnic schools. 
This process included the creation of an integrated multiethnic curriculum, which was led by 
the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and carried out by 
international and local experts. This saw the banning of religious and nationalist symbols in 
schools and the introduction of teaching in all three languages (Croatian, Bosnian and 
Serbian) whilst still allowing the students to speak and do their homework in the language of 
their choice. See: Karnavas, Michael. ‘Creating the Legal Framework of the Brčko District of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Model for the Region and Other Postconflict Countries.’ The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003, pp. 111-131.	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other forms of power sharing can be added to the base in order to deal with 
the issues of conflict.433 
 
5.8. International Committee 
A number of the recommendations put forward in this chapter involve an 
international presence in the management of the Kirkuk conflict resolution 
process. As these recommendations differ greatly in the expertise needed to 
help successfully implement them, it is suggested that an international 
committee be created with members who have expertise in the specific areas 
that require intervention and reform. The committee would include experts on 
policing, employment, returnees, etc., and would be led by an expert on 
power sharing and constitutional law. Currently UNAMI and the US have the 
strongest presence in Kirkuk, however there are controversies surrounding 
both of them. The early US withdrawal diminishes their presence in Iraq and 
there would be opposition to their involvement by certain groups, therefore it 
would not be suitable for them to be in charge of such a committee. 
Furthermore, many actors reject the role that UNAMI has played in Iraq, 
particularly in Kirkuk and their report on Kirkuk (See Chapter 4.5.) alienated 
all the ethnic groups. This is illustrated by Falah Mustafa when questioned on 
the role of UNAMI in Kirkuk: 
They have distorted historical facts, they did not say anything, they went into 
details that were not allowed and in fact they brought young university graduates 
and sent them into the field without knowing what kind of method they are using 
and what are they looking for… Being neutral, doesn’t mean pleasing everybody, 
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  Cordell, Karl & Stefan Wolff. ‘Power Sharing’ in Karl Cordell & Stefan Wolff (eds.) 
Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.	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it means to be scientific in your approach, to be objective and to have facts in 
your hand.434 
Therefore, their role as leaders of the committee would also have to be 
discounted. Nevertheless, as these two groups have had the largest 
international presence in Kirkuk they would undeniably have to have some 
sort of an involvement. As both the UN and US have experience in 
international committees and in finding experienced international advisors, it 
would be feasible for them to use this experience to select an independent 
committee not directly connected to them. Obviously this international 
committee would have to be approved by the Iraqi parliament and in the 
event that this is not approved a committee could be chosen consisting of 
Iraqi citizens. This would ideally be the preferred original option, but since it 
involves larger issues linked to the KRG’s and Baghdad’s aspirations for 
Kirkuk, it could lead to unfairness, friction within the committee, delays, and 
an inability to exert pressure. Therefore, the selection of the committee should 
be managed by both the US and UNAMI and it should be left to these entities 
to find and hire international members with the relevant expertise. The 
committee members would then have three stages of work; research and 
write a proposal, oversee the implementation, and finally monitor its workings. 
The committee should be given a specific time frame for each stage of the 
process and a deadline to hand over the management to the relevant local 
entities.  
 Although it is likely that some factions of Iraqi society would have a 
problem with an international presence resolving Iraqi issues, they only have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Interview conducted by the author with Falah Mustafa, KRG Foreign Relations Minister, in 
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to look at the past failures of the local committees relating to Kirkuk to see the 
need for external involvement in this matter. Even members of the 
international community my take issue with what they see as international 
interference, but without this no progress may be made; as seen in the 
dynamics of Kirkuk since 2003. Furthermore, there is a long history of 
international supervision, dating back to the League of Nations’ involvement 
in the Free City of Danzig (1920-1939).  The UN itself also has a history of 
being involved in international administration, beginning with the Congo 
(1969-1974). In all the cases that the UN has played a role, they have 
become involved in administration of the territory due to a sovereignty issue 
or the lack of good governance in the territory – both which exist in Kirkuk. 
The UN also has a history of international territory administration involving 
disputed internal territory (cities, provinces), of which Kirkuk is, this is 
demonstrated by their administration of Eastern Slavonia, Mostar and Brčko. 
Moreover, by having an international committee the transition towards a 
special status and liberal consociational power sharing can be managed fairly 
and the processes needed can be implemented. As Kirkuk has an active 
political community it would not be the place of the international 
administration to take over this role, but rather to ‘promote a multiethnic social 
and political culture’ through the creation of new institutions.435 Therefore, it 
would not be up to the international committee to govern these institutions, 
but rather to implement their creation and to ensure that they are fair to all the 
communities within Kirkuk. Exogenous pressure is, as highlighted by McGarry 
and O’Leary, an extremely important part of creating a successful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Wilde, Ralph. ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International 
Territorial Administration’ The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 3, 2001, pp. 
583-606.  
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consociational settlement.436 This was evident in the NI Peace Process where 
the UK, US and ROI all played a major role in reaching an agreement.437 
Furthermore, the UK acted as a form of international supervisor and thus 
ensured that the process moved forward. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the US 
acted as an international supervisor and this case is a prime example of the 
fact that through international supervision a society can transcend from an 
extremely damaging ethnic conflict to having the institutions to 
manage/govern the conflict, thus leading to relative peace.438  Exogenous 
pressure is an important aspect in reaching an agreement in ethnic conflicts 
that involve self-determination disputes and for this reason it is imperative that 
an international committee is put into place in Kirkuk. Without this aspect it is 
unlikely that the political process will move forward enough to transfer Kirkuk 
out of its current state of limbo. 
5.9. Cross Border Institutions 
The role that cross border institutions play has already been discussed in 
Chapter 5.2. Therefore, this section will consist of recommendations for 
possible cross border institutions. Some of the areas where implementation 
bodies linking the KRG, Kirkuk city and Baghdad could be created are:  
• Education: The reforming of the education system has already 
been discussed in Chapter 5.7., however issues still remain that 
require cross border institutions to deal with them. Currently those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 See Chapter 3.2..  
437 See:	  O’Kane, Eamonn. Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland Since 1980; The Totality of 
Relationships. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. Clancy, Mary Alice C. ‘The United States and 
Post-Agreement Northern Ireland, 2001-6’ Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 18, 
(2007), pp. 155-173. 
438 Bieber, Florian. ‘Local institutional engineering: A tale of two cities, Mostar and Brčko.’ 
International Peacekeeping 12, no. 3, 2005, pp. 420-433. 
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Kurdish students studying in Kirkuk are disadvantaged because 
they are stuck between two education systems where the two-
examination system from the KRG is condensed into the one final 
examination system that exists in the rest of Iraq. They are also not 
given places in Kurdish universities and do not have the Arabic 
skills necessary for Arabic universities. Creating a body for 
education would allow students in Kirkuk to follow one educational 
system and would also allow them to go to university in the KRG 
and the rest of Iraq.439 Furthermore, by joining Baghdad to this body 
students maintain a link to the central system, which would be 
particularly important if the special status was ever to be placed 
within the KRG. 
• Anti-terrorism: Turkmen and Arabs have complained about the 
domination of the Asayesh forces in Kirkuk, and the Kurds have 
insisted they are needed to combat terrorism. If the security forces 
in Kirkuk are to be restructured and Kirkuk is to be demilitarised, 
there needs to be links with the security services in the KRG, 
Baghdad and the border regions in order to ensure the safety of the 
people. By establishing an anti-terrorism body to ensure 
cooperation and the operation of joint task forces between these 
entities, the security in both the KRG and Kirkuk would be protected. 
This would thus allow for the restructuring of the security services in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Usman, Rebwar. ‘Kirkuk Students Face Curriculum Problems.’ Kurdish Globe [Online] 
Available from http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-
article.html?id=AC0FB01C878ACD2B8F783403CA373AFE [Accessed 08/03/2011] 
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Kirkuk.440 
Some of the areas where implementation bodies linking the KRG, Kirkuk city 
and those areas formerly part of Kirkuk province are:  
• Electricity: there is a long running dispute with the central 
government and Kirkuk over electricity. An imbalance exists where 
electricity produced in Kirkuk province is being transferred to 
Baghdad, leaving those in Kirkuk with no electricity. If Kirkuk city 
was to be given a special status, an electricity body could be 
formed with the KRG for the production and sharing of electricity, 
as the KRG has the highest levels of electricity in the country.441 
• Water: the water shortage in Iraq has raised tensions in Kirkuk with 
Arab farmers accusing the KRG of closing the valves to the Dukam 
dam in the winter. The KRG claim that the dam gates must be 
closed in the winter to ensure that there is sufficient water for crops 
in the spring and summer. They state that they are not trying to 
harm those in Kirkuk, but rather that there is a shortage of water. 
Through creating a joint water management body these decisions 
could be negotiated and made together so those in Kirkuk can not 
only understand but also trust the reasons behind these 
decisions.442 
• Redevelopment Body: The most successful cross border 
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institution in Northern Ireland, with regards to positive interaction 
between the various ethnic communities, was the cross-border 
institution focusing on EU projects. This was due to the funds 
available for development projects. It is therefore recommended 
that a similar cross border institution is established linking Kirkuk 
city to the areas previously part of Kirkuk province. The focus of this 
institution would be the redevelopment of the area as well as on 
projects that bring the communities together. The funds for this 
institution would be made available from the production of oil in 
Kirkuk (see Chapter 5.4.). 
There are also many areas where it would be beneficial to both Kirkuk city 
and the KRG if bodies for cooperation were formed. Some of the areas where 
cooperation could be created between Kirkuk and the KRG are: agriculture, 
healthcare, transport and the environmental concerns.  
If Kirkuk were to be granted a special status, Baghdad would lose 
some if its control over, and links with, Kirkuk. As there are many in Kirkuk 
who oppose such a solution, it is essential that formalised cross-border 
institutions between Kirkuk and Baghdad are created. Many of these would 
not entail any drastic changes from the current system, however their creation 
should be aimed at protecting the rights of non-Kurds in areas that are 
important to them if Kirkuk were ever to join the KRG. Baghdad would already 
be part of the Education and Anti-terrorism institutions, however they should 
also form cross border institutions with Kirkuk on: 
• Oil, even though the oil operations in Kirkuk, and the profits there from, 
are controlled by Baghdad it is important that a Kirkuk/Baghdad oil 
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body is formed if Kirkuk is given a special status. This will guarantee to 
non-Kurds that the KRG will not take control of Kirkuk’s oil if they are 
successful in a referendum on Kirkuk.443 
• Electricity, as already highlighted, Kirkuk supplies Baghdad with much 
needed electricity. Therefore, in order to allow for Kirkuk to be given a 
special status, Baghdad still needs access to electricity from Kirkuk 
and in order to make this possible a cross border institution should be 
created between the two for electricity. In the future this could also link 
to the cross border institution for electricity between Kirkuk and the 
KRG, but to begin with, due to the animosity between Baghdad and the 
KRG, these two institutions should remain separate. 
It is important to ensure that high levels of collaboration exist between Kirkuk 
and Baghdad if Kirkuk were to ever join the KRG. For this reason it is 
important that areas of cooperation in common policies are set up. Again, 
although these would exist at a national level, it is important to have 
committees focusing directly on Kirkuk as its autonomy increases. These 
could include: transport, healthcare, and the environment.  
Additionally, Stefan Wolff has suggested that it is important for the 
Turkmen in Kirkuk to have links to Ankara through cross-border institutions.444 
As discussed in Chapter 4.6., this could have undesirable consequences, as, 
depending on the type of institutions, it could even lead to a threat to the 
territorial integrity of Iraq. Wolff’s analysis could also be said to overplay the 	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importance that Turkey has to the Turkmen in Kirkuk and ignores the fact that 
many Turkmen in Kirkuk desire to create a separate Turkmen region, not to 
join Turkey. However, it is important that the Turkmen in Iraq maintain strong 
links with each other in order to ensure the preservation of the Turkmen 
culture and language. The creation of a national Turkmen institution with 
funding from Baghdad would support this and would also help Turkmen feel 
more protected within Iraq. As well as concentrating on language and culture, 
this institution could also be involved with developing Turkmen education 
throughout Iraq. For the same reasons behind the need to create a national 
Turkmen institution, and following the same guise, it would also be important 
to create a national Assyrian institution, or alternately a national Christian 
institution. The creation of these institutions would give these minorities a 
level of autonomy over their own affairs and would prevent them from being 
neglected within Iraq. 
5.10. Conclusion 
As highlighted in this chapter the structure of the framework for a deal on 
Kirkuk depends highly on a special status for the city, as this allows all the 
other facets to fall into place. Giving Kirkuk city a special status changes the 
whole dynamics of the conflict and opens up possibilities for resolution. As 
underlined throughout this thesis, successful resolution must involve equal 
gains and compromises for each group, i.e. every compromise must be 
counteracted with an equitable gain. In relinquishing Article 140 the Kurds 
make the biggest compromise of all, but one that is essential as Article 140 
cannot ease the conflict and can only intensify it. The only possible equitable 
gain that can be given to the Kurds within Kirkuk is for them to be given 
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majoritarian control of the governance.  However, as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, this is not a feasible option as majority rule in a 
deeply divided society generally creates minorities who are excluded from the 
political process and have no hope of changing this. Thus, resulting in conflict 
either through the minority groups seeking power, or the majority suppressing 
them. As this is not an option, it leaves a deal for the special status of Kirkuk 
between Baghdad and the KRG involving facets outside of the realm of Kirkuk. 
This could involve a deal on the budget and a new hydrocarbon law, which 
would ensure that the KRG gets their 17% of the budget, that Baghdad pays 
the oil companies in the KRG for their export costs, etc., and finally that the 
KRG can manage their own oil fields. Thus, effectively, a deal for Kirkuk relies 
highly on cooperation between Baghdad and the KRG. However, this involves 
issues that need to be resolved regardless of Kirkuk, as they are creating 
conflict between these two entities. Furthermore, other options for Kirkuk 
have failed and ten years after the US forces arrived there is still no end to 
the Kirkuk conflict in sight. The framework put forward in this thesis offers 
feasible alternatives to minimise conflict and move away from the status quo 
of trying to dominate other ethnic groups into submission. A lot of the 
analyses on the future of Kirkuk try too hard to please and are not audacious 
enough to give their opinion on what can regulate conflict in Kirkuk. This 
thesis aims to be different in that, despite the fact that it will not make 
everybody happy, it highlights that the only viable option for Kirkuk is 
awarding a special status for the city. As it has been illustrated, this enables 
the local issues such as policing, employment, education, etc., to be 
addressed and resolved. In order to strengthen the special status and other 
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proposals put forward, the next chapter will focus on the power sharing and 
legalities of the framework. 
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Chapter 6: Power Sharing 
 
6.1. Introduction 	  
The previous chapter discussed the most important part of the agreement 
(special status) and then went on to address the local issues that exist within 
the conflict in Kirkuk. The aim of this chapter is to strengthen the framework 
put forward by examining the legal details necessary to make it work, as the 
structure for the special status goes beyond the current dynamics of Iraq. 
Although it is possible for Kirkuk to have a special status within the laws of the 
current constitution, it is important that a new law is formed in order to make it 
more binding and to address all the issues that are specific to Kirkuk. This will 
allow for the various additional factors, like cross border institutions, to be 
implemented. As highlighted in Chapter 4, many of the analyses on Kirkuk 
call for power sharing without actually giving the details of how such an 
arrangement would operate in Kirkuk. Therefore, this chapter will examine the 
finer details of the actual governance of Kirkuk, by forming a method for 
power sharing in Kirkuk and developing a legal structure in order to facilitate 
this. It will cover the issues of electing the government, the ratio of 
representation, decision-making and developing an ulterior option in case the 
power sharing breaks down. 
6.2. Special Status Law 
If Arabs want to remain under the control of Baghdad, Turkmen want Kirkuk 
to be a strong region, and Kurds want Kirkuk to join the KRG; the creation of 
a special status with cross-border institutions gives each group an element of 
their desired option and involves them all making compromises (the Turkmen 
compromise involves relinquishing their desire for 32,32,32,4 form of 
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governance), thus including the necessary components for a successful 
settlement. In order for Kirkuk city to be given a special status with power 
sharing a new law would need to be created. This new law would cement the 
necessary components needed in order for the special status to be successful. 
A special status for Kirkuk could be created within the current constitution, but 
by creating a law that specifically deals with this issue, problems and 
disagreements can be prevented from arising through addressing them in the 
legislation.  
 The first matter that this law needs to address is what governmental 
status Kirkuk city is given, as this denotes what power is available to share. It 
is the recommendation here that Kirkuk city, under a special status, form a 
governorate, as per Law 21/2008. This would allow for further powers to be 
shared through the Cross Border institutions (more details on this are given in 
Chapter 5.9.). Under Law 21/2008 the governorate council comprises of 25 
seats with the addition of one seat for every 200,000 inhabitants over and 
above 500,000 people. Therefore Kirkuk city would have a council of 26 seats, 
due to its estimated population of 700,000.445 Ultimately, a decision on such a 
fundamental issue cannot be done through an estimation of the population, 
so as part of this law a census will have to be held in Kirkuk city. Including a 
census as part of the Special Status Law would take away from the fears of 
this leading to Article 140 being fulfilled, as this article would be completely 
void and would be replaced by the Special Status Law. Law 21/2008 gives a 
term of four years for the governorate council. Although it is suggested that 
Kirkuk city follows Law 21/2008, there would have to be a few alterations 	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present in the Special Status Law. Law 21/2008 calls for the council head and 
his deputy, as well as the governor and his/her two deputies to be elected by 
an absolute majority, whereas it is proposed here that it is not necessary to 
have a council head and deputy as well as a governor and deputies. 
Therefore, the governor and two deputies would take responsibility for the 
council and would be elected through Sequential Proportionality Rules (SPR). 
Although in Chapter 2.2. it is recommended that the national cabinet be 
elected through the SPR system of d’Hondt, due to the dynamics of the 
situation, in Kirkuk Sainte-Laguë is more suitable as it is beneficial to have the 
smaller ethnic groups involved. Law 21 also calls for the governor to propose 
at least five candidates for senior positions in the governorate of which the 
council must approve three by an absolute majority, under the Special Status 
Law this too should be chosen through Sainte-Laguë. Sainte-Laguë should 
also replace the method of absolute majority for electing positions within the 
Qada’a (district) Councils and Nahiya (sub-district) Councils. Under Law 21 
the governors deputies are named first and second deputies, it is proposed 
here that under the Special Status Law they both simply be named Deputy 
Governor, thus not giving one importance over the other. Under Law 21, and 
thus the Special Status Law, the Governorate Council would have the 
following powers: remove the governor and his deputies if they are not 
fulfilling their duties; to issue local laws, instructions, bylaws and regulations; 
to develop policies in coordination with the ministries; to prepare the council 
budget and to approve the general budget; to monitor the local executive 
authority (excluding those that fall under federal control); to approve local 
security plans; to approve administrative changes made to the districts/sub-
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districts/villages; outline the governorates strategic plans; select the 
governorates logo; collect any fees due to the governorate, including taxes 
and duties. Whilst the governor’s powers include: drafting the general budget; 
executing the decisions of the governorate council; executing federal policy; 
overseeing and inspecting public facilities (excluding those that fall under 
federal control); establishing universities, colleges and institutes in 
coordination with the relevant ministry and with the approval of an absolute 
majority of the council; appointing civil servants; directing the local security 
services and responsibility for all matters with regards to their size; and 
directing the work of up to five assistants and seven advisors.446  
 As Cross Border Institutions do not exist in Iraq, for them to operate 
within Kirkuk they would have to be introduced within the Special Status Law. 
This would address their creation, what areas they cover and also the amount 
of power they would have. As the creation of the cross border institutions is 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is only left to distinguish how much 
power they would have. If Kirkuk is a governorate it allows for the extra 
powers that would be available to it if it were a region to be wielded within the 
Cross Border Institutions. Thus making Kirkuk more powerful than a 
governorate, satisfying the Turkmen desire for it to be more autonomous, 
satisfying the Kurds’ desire for it to have links to the KRG and also satisfying 
the Arab desire for it to be tied to Baghdad. Therefore, the powers now 
available within the Cross Border Institutions would include: all those 
executive, legislative and judicial powers that the federal government doesn’t 
have exclusive authority over (foreign policy; national security; fiscal and 	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customs policy; regulating standards, weights and measures; citizenship; 
broadcast frequencies and mail; general and investment budget; external 
water policies; population statistics and census); it would have joint powers 
over numerous areas (customs; regulate electric energy sources and 
distribution; environmental policies; developmental and general planning 
policies; public health; education; internal water policies) although the 
regional law would take precedence over these. This would thus allow for the 
creation of Cross border institutions relating to education, security, water, 
environment, health, etc..447 As part of the law on Cross Border Institutions 
there should be an increase in the amount of oil revenue that Kirkuk receives 
from the central government. This extra funding would go directly to the cross 
border institution for redevelopment and would be used to develop all the 
areas that have suffered in the former Kirkuk province, not just in Kirkuk city. 
This would allow some of the vast oil wealth that Kirkuk has to be spent on 
readdressing some of the destruction from the past.  
 As Article 140 included a referendum for Kirkuk to join the KRG it 
would be unfair for any legislation that replaces it not to also include this 
referendum. Although, as it has already been deemed unfair, there would 
have to be a few adjustments to the details of the legislation. Firstly, if Kirkuk 
were to join the KRG it would have to be the will of the vast majority of the 
people, otherwise it would only lead to all-out ethnic conflict. Therefore, 
instead of a majority deciding in a referendum, it would have to be a super 
majority. It is recommended here that this be decided by a 2/3 majority. 
Secondly, as there is a huge fear amongst the non-Kurdish population of 	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Kirkuk that they would be marginalised if they were to join the KRG, the 
special status in Kirkuk would have to remain even if Kirkuk were to join the 
KRG. This would ensure that power sharing would continue in Kirkuk, thus 
protecting the minorities.  
 In order for the security recommendations, as per Chapter 5.3., to be 
installed, it would have to be included within the legislation that Kirkuk is a 
demilitarised zone. By installing the fact that Kirkuk is a demilitarised zone in 
the legislation, not only does it prevent the peshmerga and Iraqi army from 
entering Kirkuk, it also allows for the ethnicities to feel more at ease by 
limiting the potential of a military takeover by a rival ethnic group. Furthermore, 
this opens up the way for the creation of a new security service in Kirkuk and 
allows for the formation of the Cross Border Institution on security. 
 In order for Kirkuk to become a multi-entity capital city (as discussed in 
Chapter 5.2.), this prospect needs to be installed in the legislation. It would 
allow the KRG to establish Kirkuk as a second capital, if they so desired. This 
legislation would also allow Kirkuk to become the capital city of the new 
governorate created by the break away districts. Therefore, Kirkuk would 
become the capital of three entities and for this to be possible it would have to 
be introduced in the Special Status Law. 
 
6.3. Electing Power Sharing Government 
In order to elect members to the council it is recommended here that PR-STV 
is used. In this system voters, from each electoral district, rank candidates in 
order of their preference. In order to get elected, candidates must reach the 
desired quota, [votes / (seats +1)] +1, those who reach this quota with their 
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first preference votes are automatically elected and their remaining votes 
(those over and above the quota) are redistributed according to the voters’ 
second preference. This continues until all the seats have been allocated. If 
there are no votes above the quota to allocate, the lowest party is eliminated 
and their votes are redistributed according to the next available preference.448 
This is not to say that there are no issues with this system; it can lead to rival 
candidates in the same party battling each other rather fiercely, a sort of tribal 
voting where voters vote for candidates they know or for candidates who are 
from their area, if parties run too many candidates they can end up losing out 
on a seat, and finally a very popular candidate can influence his supporters 
second preference vote.449 However, despite the pitfalls of this system, it is 
still superior to the other recommended option of PR Party List; where seats 
in each electoral district are given in proportion to the votes won, but voters 
vote for a party list, rather than individuals within the party. 450 In this system 
candidates from smaller parties or those representing smaller ethnic groups 
are less likely to get elected, as voters only vote for one single party. 
Therefore, voters would also be less likely to vote outside their ethnic group 
for a particularly worthy candidate or for a multiethnic party. Furthermore, as 
McGarry and O’Leary point out, PR Party List is likely to lead to the creation 
of extremist parties as hardliners are aware that the creation of a new party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Guide to Ireland’s PR-STV Electoral System. Irish Department of Environment, Heritage 
and Local Government [Online] Available from 
http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/LocalGovernment/Voting/FileDownLoad,1895,en.pdf 
[Accessed 24/02/2012] 
449 White, Michael. ‘If you Believe PR is the Answer Don’t go to Ireland’. Guardian [Online] 
Available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2011/feb/28/if-you-believe-pr-answer-
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[Accessed 24/02/2012] 
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will take votes away from the moderate parties without detracting votes from 
their ethnic group.451 Thus, PR STV is more suitable for power sharing in a 
multiethnic society and is therefore recommended here for the election of the 
Governorate Council in Kirkuk. 
 It is recommended that the top positions within the council be elected 
through Sainte-Laguë, this includes the governor and his deputies, as such 
important positions should not go to candidates that were not voted for by the 
people. Since the Governor and his two deputies are the top positions, they 
should be chosen first and with the proviso that each faction can only win one 
of these positions. This prevents ethnic groups from dominating the key 
positions. It also allows for non-ethnic parties to be awarded these positions 
as they would be included as a faction thus allowing for their advance as the 
ethnic divides weaken. Following the SPR system, if a member of Kirkuk’s 
government were to resign their position, it would be given to the next 
available candidate through Sainte-Laguë, provided that a member from their 
faction doesn’t already hold one of these positions. This will prevent the 
current issue in Kirkuk of resigning one’s position in order to prevent the 
political process.452  
 
6.4. Decisions/Veto 
As discussed in Chapter 3.2., having some form of a minority veto is 
imperative for consociational power sharing in ethnically diverse society. This 
prevents the minorities from being politically marginalised and turning to non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. The Northern Ireland Conflict - Consociational 
Engagements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 13-16. 
452 McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. The Northern Ireland Conflict - Consociational 
Engagements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 48-54. 
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political means to voice their opinion. The issue with having a veto is that it 
should not be too strong or ‘hard’, as it is referred to, otherwise it will disrupt 
the political process. Yet, at the same time you don’t want it to be too ‘soft’ so 
that it does not adequately protect the minorities. Furthermore, the use of the 
veto should not be corporate in nature, as this would entrench the ethnic 
divide and prevent other groups, specifically non-ethnic parties, from 
emerging.453 Therefore creating a veto that protects the minorities, yet doesn’t 
entrench them, and prevents them from disrupting the political process is a 
fine balancing act.  
In order to prevent ethnic groups from halting the political process it is 
not recommended that they be given a veto as such, but rather that decisions 
within the council are passed by a weighted majority (60%) with at least 40% 
of two of the three (Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds) ethnic groups voting in favour. 
This would prevent the situation that exists in Northern Ireland where parties 
do not work together on legislature due to a weighted majority not being 
prescribed. Lord Alderdice highlights this fault: 
The type of power-sharing formula which was adopted in the GFA - the 'parallel 
consensus' model - was not the right approach because by institutionalizing 
cooperation between the most powerful party in EACH community, it deepened 
the split and hindered cross-community politics.  We had proposed that the 
power-sharing government should require a 67% support from the elected 
Assembly AS A WHOLE, and this weighted majority approach would have 
facilitated and indeed required the building of cross-community alliances.454    
However, due to the dynamics in Kirkuk – where there are three, rather than 
two main ethnic groups – this has to still include a form of cross community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Kelleher, Shane. ‘Minority Veto Rights in Power Sharing Systems: Lessons from 
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454 Interview, conducted by the author, Lord Alderdice, former leader of the Alliance Party, 
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support, otherwise it would be possible to pass legislature that is not widely 
supported by all communities.455 In order for this to not to cement the ethnic 
divide and prevent new groups from emerging (thus being corporate in 
nature) it is recommended that this be reviewed regularly and changed to 
include the Assyrians, multi-ethnic blocs, or any other group that emerges, 
once they pass 15% of the council members. It is important that aspects such 
as this are written into the Special Status Law so that the legislation can 
evolve with the community otherwise it can be very difficult to change these 
afterwards, as highlighted by Lord Alderdice: 
In the long-term, if it is possible to sustain the Good Friday institutions it may be 
possible to evolve into something better, but changing written constitutions is 
notoriously difficult if they do not have 'sunset' clauses written into some 
provisions from the start, and this we failed to do.456 
Decisions by the governor or the removal thereof can also be put to this same 
vote if 1/3 of the council contests his order (this already exists within Law 
21/2008). Although this system does not give the minorities a traditional veto, 
it does prevent decisions from being made by a simple majority. It ensures 
that decisions are made by strong support from the majority of the 
communities, thus leading to sharing power, rather than a majoritarian form of 
power sharing, as with the central government. By stipulating that there must 
be a weighted majority as well as support from 40% of at least two of the 
ethnic groups, parties are forced to work together and versions of laws that 
are more likely to be accepted are put forward. This helps with the political 
process, lessens the divides and takes away extreme politics, as there is no 	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chance of it being successful. The reason that only two ethnic groups need to 
exceed the 40% mark is in order not to halt the political process, as if 40% 
from all ethnic groups was needed it would be almost impossible to reach 
agreement and negotiations would be made more difficult.457 This system is a 
variation of the system used in Northern Ireland, but it additionally addresses 
some of the concerns of the non-ethnic based parties who feel that they do 
not have a veto. The NI system has been far more successful in not halting 
the process and allowing for power sharing to work than the one used in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which gives minorities the right to veto decisions 
and has continuously delayed the political process. It is for this reason that 
the traditional veto is not recommended for Kirkuk and rather a system of 
weighted majority and ethnic consent is put forward.458 It is further suggested 
that this process be reviewed after six months to ensure that this veto is not 
slowing down minor issues, as if it is its usage can be reserved for serious 
issues, such as budget, security, etc.. 
 
6.5. Birthright 
As already highlighted by SIPA the issue of birthright is very important in 
minimising self-determination disputes. If Kirkuk is given a special status and 
Article 140 is removed, it is necessary to implement counteracting policies to 
minimise the loss to the Kurds of Article 140. One such measure is to ensure 
that Kurds in Kirkuk have birthright to the KRG, thus allowing them to be 
employed in the KRG civil service, receive an education in the KRG, buy a 	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house in the KRG, etc.. Although SIPA recommends birthright to the KRG for 
Kirkukis, it does not go as far as to specify whether this should only be for 
Kurds or whether this should be for the whole population, but instead leaves 
this for the KRG to decide. It is recommended here that under the Special 
Status Law birthright to the KRG be given to all those in Kirkuk who wish to 
claim it. This fits with the Foreign Minister of the KRG’s statement that ‘it is 
important to have people who are faithful, loyal to the process and not 
troublemakers.’459 As it would be their choice to claim birthright to the KRG, 
which implies that they share the ideologies of the KRG. The reason behind 
offering birthright to all Kirkukis is to create a stronger unity amongst all the 
ethnicities in Kirkuk by not differentiating amongst them. This also helps the 
KRG in laying their claim for Kirkuk as a special status to be situated within 
the KRG. 
6.6. Contingency Plan 
Through SPR there is a mechanism in place if officials resign from their 
position – electing the next highest candidate through Sainte-Laguë. However, 
a contingency plan is needed for if the situation becomes untenable. To let 
the governance revert back to Baghdad in the event that this happened would 
undermine the special status, as those against it and for central control would 
be rewarded for disrupting the governance. To let the KRG govern Kirkuk 
would have a similar affect, with Kurds being rewarded for sabotaging the 
political process in Kirkuk. Through the cross border institutions there will 
already be a strong link between the KRG, Baghdad and Kirkuk. Therefore, in 
order not to favour any one ethnicity, it is recommended that if the 	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governance of Kirkuk becomes untenable Kirkuk is governed jointly by the 
KRG and Baghdad with the input of Kirkuki officials. It is preferred that this is 
done by officials from the cross border institutions, as they will already be in a 
cooperation partnership with each other and will have a greater 
understanding of the dynamics of Kirkuk. This is obviously a worst-case 
scenario, and it is preferable that it doesn’t come to this and that Kirkuk is 
governed by Kirkukis. Nevertheless, a system has to be in place in the event 
of a breakdown. This scenario would not be activated whilst the international 
supervisor was present, in which case s/he would manage the power sharing, 
but would rather be reserved as an emergency plan for if the government 
became untenable after his/her withdrawal. However, as animosity is likely to 
exist between Baghdad and Erbil, it is recommended that a member of the 
international committee return in order to act as a whip for the process. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the final aspects necessary in order to 
implement a working deal in Kirkuk. It has concentrated on the top down 
features in order to complement the bottom up aspects of the previous 
chapter. Thus, this chapter has focused on the legal facets necessary in order 
to make the deal work. The main characteristic of this is to create a specific 
Special Status Law in order to address the issues that are particular to Kirkuk. 
As part of this Kirkuk city would be given the powers of a governorate, thus 
allowing for the additional powers available to a region to be wielded through 
the cross border institutions. However, unlike a governorate, Kirkuk city would 
use Sequential Proportionality Rules (SPR) in order to elect the government 
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with Sainte-Laguë being the chosen system in order for the smaller parties to 
be represented. This will be paired with PR-STV for the election of seats, 
which will prevent the system that currently exists in Kirkuk where people vote 
for parties and people with connections are put into power.460 Furthermore, 
this will give smaller parties and multiethnic parties a chance and will also 
lead to the election of more eligible candidates. As the Special Status Law 
would be a replacement for Article 140, the option for Kirkuk to join the KRG 
in the future has to be included, although it is recommended that Kirkuk city 
remains under a special status and that this decision is decided by a super 
majority in order to reduce conflict. The whole idea behind a special status for 
Kirkuk is to neutralise the issue of ownership, making Kirkuk city a multi 
capital city further enhances this through giving every ethnicity a link to it. 
Minority vetoes are an important aspect of consociation, although they can be 
used to slow down the political process, therefore, it is recommended that 
decisions be made by a weighted majority of 60% and that at least 40% of 
two of the three main ethic groups vote in favour. This should be regularly 
reviewed in order to take into account any changes in population. It has also 
been recommended that birthright to the KRG be offered to all people from 
Kirkuk, thus offering Kurds their desired link and creating a stronger link 
between the ethnicities. This thesis has been all about offering a framework 
for Kirkuk’s future, however it would be arrogant and dangerous not to 
prepare for the event of the prescribed solution’s failing. It is therefore 
recommended that in the event of the power sharing arrangement collapsing 
that Kirkuk be governed by both Baghdad and the KRG through the officials 	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of the cross border institutions. The reason that this must involve both entities 
is in order to ensure that ethnic groups don’t benefit through forcing the 
arrangement’s failure. This chapter has highlighted the top down aspects of 
the agreement that are imperative in order to allow the bottom up aspects of 
the previous chapter to work. Together they compliment each other and allow 
for a conclusive agreement that has the best possible chance of success. 
Most importantly they give the citizens their rights and implement projects to 
further the society, thus taking away from the ethnic ownership of Kirkuk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   239	  
Conclusion 
 
Since the start of the Dijla Operations there has been a drastic increase in 
violence in Kirkuk and in Iraq as a whole, and by April 2013 Iraq had reached 
its deadliest period since June 2008. There is an ongoing battle between 
Baghdad and the KRG over many issues, of which Kirkuk plays a 
considerable part, and there is also a wider conflict in Iraq between the Sunni 
and the Shiites (see Chapter 1.9.). Many analysts believe Iraq has already 
entered a civil war – due to the issues between the Sunni and Shiites – and 
fear that the situation may get worse if the tensions between the KRG and 
Baghdad continue to increase. There is currently no agreement between the 
main factions (Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds) in Iraq and they are all working for 
their own groups rather than for Iraq as a whole, as highlighted by the KRG 
Foreign Relations Minister: 
Sunnis will not accept Shiites to rule over them and Shiites do not accept Sunnis 
and we do not accept either. So therefore when you can preserve your own 
identity, especially for us our national identity is far more important to us that our 
other identity – I am a Kurd, and then we are part of this country we are Iraqis. 
For the Sunnis, the Sunni identity comes first and for the Shiites the Shiite 
identity.461 
Iraq is currently without a president; it has a vice president in exile who has 
been sentenced to death; a host of al-Iraqiya ministers have resigned, despite 
their bloc having won the most seats in the election; there are boycotts of 
parliament meetings by both Kurds and Sunnis, whilst Maliki’s party is also 
battling fellow Shiites the Sadrists; Maliki is trying to take control of more 
power and is currently Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of 
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Interior; the peshmerga and the Iraqi army are facing off in Kirkuk; the Kurds 
are making oil deals that Baghdad doesn’t approve of, whilst Baghdad is 
making oil deals that the Kurds don’t approve of; and finally ethnic and 
sectarian violence is happening across the country at the highest level since 
2008. This does not paint a good picture of the state of Iraqi politics and it is 
not clear how long Iraq can continue with this daily extreme sectarian and 
ethnic violence before the system collapses entirely. Many of the key issues 
could be solved through finding a solution for Kirkuk, as this would likely 
involve aspects that would end the tensions between the KRG and Baghdad 
and would also contain facets that could ease some of the Sunni’s discontent. 
This would involve creating a region for the Sunnis; however, it would not 
ease the major concern of Maliki’s grab for power and the lack of proper 
power sharing. Therefore, the constitution needs to be changed in order to 
institutionalise power sharing and prevent a return to majoritarian politics, 
which can easily be done (as highlighted in Chapter 2.2.) through installing 
d’Hondt as a method for choosing the cabinet. D’ Hondt is an important part 
of ensuring good governance and a way to implement it must be found. As 
demonstrated, ethnic tensions are getting worse which makes it all the more 
important that power sharing between all the communities is institutionalised 
in central governance through d’Hondt. As, firstly, if the cabinet was chosen 
through d’Hondt Maliki would not be in power in the first place, as his coalition 
did not win the most seats. Secondly, it would not be possible for someone to 
hold more than one cabinet position, as they would be allocated to specific 
people within the parties in rounds of allocation. Thirdly, it would not be 
possible to have empty or absent positions, as if the party did not replace 
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these positions they would be replaced by the next in line. Finally, it would not 
be possible to try and freeze out parties and begin new coalitions as through 
d’Hondt anyone who has enough votes and who wants to be part of the 
government, can. It therefore makes it imperative that a sequential 
proportionality system like d’Hondt is installed in Iraq. It was extremely 
irresponsible of the US to withdraw before its implementation, as if Maliki truly 
does have an eye on creating a majoritarian regime he would not back the 
legislation necessary to implement this. Kirkuk is also a major factor in the 
current situation in Iraq and a deal for it is likely to involve solutions for many 
other issues that exist. Therefore, a solution for Kirkuk can help to stabilise 
Iraq and prevent an escalation of civil war.  
The Conflict: 
Although the resolution of the conflict in Kirkuk could help to stabilise Iraq, the 
conflict involves many issues, which also consist of sub-issues and it is 
imperative that these are all solved together. Thus, through the use of 
process tracing the emergence of conflict was analysed in this thesis in order 
to create a greater understanding of the issues of conflict and the possible 
resolutions thereof. Firstly, it has been argued that Article 140 needs to be 
replaced, as the 2010 national elections demonstrated that a minimum of 
38% of the population of Kirkuk’s active electorate are against Article 140 and 
the therein embedded prospect of joining the KRG. As a consequence of this, 
Article 140 cannot be used to decide the future of Kirkuk and is 
correspondingly one of the main issues that needs to be dealt with in Kirkuk. 
The inclusion of it in the constitution was made without the Sunnis and was 
decided at a national level, rather than by the people of Kirkuk whose lives it 
	  	   242	  
will actually affect. If Article 140 is implemented the conflict will intensify; 
therefore it cannot be seen as a solution, as it doesn’t solve anything. 
Furthermore, it has passed its constitutional deadline, thus putting a question 
mark over its legitimacy. Therefore, Article 140 must be replaced by a more 
acceptable solution that involves all the groups making compromises, whilst 
still feeling as if they are making gains and are being treated as equals. As 
Article 140 deals with the normalisation of Kirkuk, replacing it creates the sub-
issues of defining the borders of Kirkuk and dealing with returnees, which also 
must be tackled. Furthermore, as Article 140 involves a referendum on the 
future of Kirkuk, by eliminating it the sub-issue of dealing with the future 
constitutional status of Kirkuk is created and thus needs to be resolved. 
Secondly, the rival ethnonationalisms in Kirkuk are preventing the 
political process. Rather than trying to advance the situation and find a 
solution together, they are focusing on impeding their rivals and thus 
negotiations are impossible. Unfortunately, this does not seem likely to 
change anytime in the near future. For this reason, as has happened in the 
other conflicts examined, exogenous pressure has got to play a role in the 
resolution of the conflict in Kirkuk. This exogenous pressure can take the role 
of the US and UN putting pressure on Kirkuk, the KRG and Baghdad, thus 
leading to a deal being made between Baghdad and the KRG on other 
internal issues. This would allow for a deal to be made on Kirkuk on the parts 
that they disagree on, but must still involve the people of Kirkuk having a say 
in their own future.  
Thirdly, Kirkuk has a history of bad/non governance, which stems from 
the issues between the rival ethnonationalisms. There are countless boycotts 
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and threats of boycotts in Kirkuk, which have done little to help with the 
governance of the city. By many accounts, there seems to be a governor in 
place now who is honest and hardworking, however, despite this, there is still 
no transparency or proper power sharing, thus preventing the ethnic groups 
from working together. The lack of governance creates many sub-issues, as 
although the people of Kirkuk live in one of the wealthiest cities, with regards 
to natural resources, in the world there is an extreme lack of services, a high 
unemployment rate and a major security/safety issue. The entire system of 
governance in Kirkuk needs to be replaced, as it is not fair and has no chance 
of working. From the division of power to the election of positions, the current 
system is a failure. It needs to be replaced by a fair arrangement based on 
the dynamics of Kirkuk, one where boycotts are not rewarded and side deals 
are not possible. Most importantly, it must receive the backing of all the ethnic 
groups in order to prevent future complaints and disruptions. It is not just the 
division of power in the government that is affected by the bad/non 
governance, as a further sub-issue created by this is the unfair/unequal 
division of power across the civil service, which also needs to be addressed. 
Fourthly, the oil in Kirkuk causes conflict, as although the constitution 
is clear on the fact that the oilfields in Kirkuk will always be managed by 
Baghdad, it needs to be strengthened in a new agreement for Kirkuk, as non 
Kurds still fear that the KRG is trying to annexe Kirkuk in order to secede from 
Iraq. This is paired with the fact that Baghdad’s own reading of the 
hydrocarbon laws with regards to the KRG is not exactly correct. Thus, the 
hydrocarbon laws are brought into play in the negotiation over Kirkuk, as 
Baghdad could potentially support the KRG’s reading of the hydrocarbon law 
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(along with other concessions) in exchange for the KRG relinquishing Article 
140. Furthermore, this would involve a clearer understanding that Kirkuk’s oil 
will always be managed by Baghdad, thus giving the non-Kurds of Kirkuk the 
protection they feel they need. By ensuring that Kirkuk’s oil is always 
controlled by Baghdad the wider sub-issue of Iraq’s hydrocarbon laws needs 
to be dealt with, as one cannot be done without the other. This is not 
necessarily a problem, as it opens the way for deals to be made on Kirkuk. 
Nevertheless, a further sub-issue is managing all the resources in Kirkuk fairly, 
as from water to electricity conflict has emerged through the way these 
resources have been managed and therefore this must be successfully 
resolved to prevent disagreements from happening in the future. 
Finally, the security situation in Kirkuk needs to be improved. It has 
been highlighted throughout this thesis that the security issues in conflicts are 
the most important and often the hardest issues to solve. In Kirkuk this 
situation is particularly inauspicious due to the proliferation of different 
security agencies operating within its borders. This is heightened by the lack 
of cooperation between them, their control by single ethnic groups and the 
fear from the different ethnic groups that they will be used in order to take 
control of Kirkuk by force. The proliferation of forces in Kirkuk has not led to 
an increase in security and safety, but has rather had the opposite effect, as 
the lack of cooperation between the forces has allowed terrorism to flourish. 
Therefore, as with other conflicts, it is imperative that the security situation in 
Kirkuk is resolved. There are many concerns within the security issue in 
Kirkuk, for example: the Iraqi army’s presence, the peshmerga’s presence, 
militias, ethnic dominance, etc.. This only reiterates the fact that solving the 
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security issue in Kirkuk is one of the most important and most difficult aspects 
of the conflict to resolve.  
The Lessons: 
Through identifying the issues of conflict it then makes it possible to propose 
a resolution for Kirkuk. This thesis has used an examination of the solutions 
put forward by other analysts working on Kirkuk in order to analyse the 
elements necessary for a successful resolution. The overriding feature of 
these analyses is their considerable lack of depth. This is due to the fact that 
the majority of these are articles, which makes it somewhat impossible to give 
a complete analysis to the resolution of a conflict as complex as that of Kirkuk. 
There are however methods put forward in these analyses that deserve 
further attention; these include: giving a special status to Kirkuk city, allowing 
non-Kurdish majority areas the option not to join the KRG, creating cross-
border institutions/links between Kirkuk, the KRG and Baghdad, and 
introducing liberal consociational power sharing. Although these options are 
feasible for a settlement in Kirkuk, as already stated, they need to be far more 
detailed on what they will involve. In this thesis these options have been 
examined further in order to assess their probability of success. Consequently, 
it is important for this thesis to take the advances made by other scholars and 
highlighted here, and develop them towards a detailed framework for a 
possible agreement for Kirkuk.  
Although an analysis of the issues of conflict and an example of 
resolutions used in other conflicts gives a good foundation to develop a 
framework for Kirkuk the various theories of power sharing also play an 
important role. This was examined in Chapter 3 and through this analysis it 
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became evident that centripetalism is not feasible for Kirkuk. This is due to 
the fact that in a deeply divided society, which Kirkuk is, it is highly unlikely 
that the ethnic groups will form a coalition across the divide, or that voters will 
vote for someone outside of their ethnic group. If centripetalism were to be 
implemented in Kirkuk there would be unrepresented minorities, as this model 
creates a form of majoritarian government by excluding those who are not in 
the coalition. It is therefore likely to radicalise the factions excluded from such 
an arrangement, as if they are not being heard through the political sphere, 
they are forced to voice their opinion in another way, which is often violence. 
However, the analysis of consociation proved more favourable for Kirkuk, as 
this model uses the very divides present in deeply divided societies as part of 
the governing process. It has been demonstrated in this thesis that due to the 
structure of the cleavages in Kirkuk consociation would have more chance of 
success in the city, as through Lijphart’s analysis of the favourable conditions 
it becomes evident that the more even split of the ethnic groups in the city 
makes it less likely that the political process will be blocked. Moreover, liberal 
consociation is even more feasible for Kirkuk, as it does not entrench the 
divides and rather allows them to evolve with the society. The advances in 
consociational theory made by McGarry and O’Leary address the issues 
involved in ethnic conflicts with self-determination disputes, of which the 
situation in Kirkuk is an example. One of the key factors of their 
advancements to consociational theory is the necessity of exogenous 
pressure in order to reach a successful settlement. It is therefore imperative 
that any settlement for Kirkuk has some form of exogenous pressure if it is to 
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successfully resolve the conflict. Furthermore, Adrian Guelke highlights the 
suitability of consociation to these external factors: 
 the consociational model is particularly attractive to external parties seeking to 
influence political developments, since its institutionalization of differences 
facilitates the management of these sorts of conflicts by external parties.462  
Moreover, McGarry and O’Leary assert that contemporary ethnic 
conflicts often have some form of trans-state/region self-determination dispute 
and therefore new issues, that were not addressed in original consociational 
theory, arise. Therefore, new methods, such as cross border institutions, 
need to be added to the original theory, as it was done in practice in NI and 
as it has been recommended for Kirkuk in this thesis. Perhaps the most 
important addition that McGarry and O’Leary made to consociational theory, 
particularly with regards to this thesis, is that it needs to go beyond the design 
of political institutions in order to address all the issues of conflict. As if the 
other issues of conflict are not addressed within the settlement, it makes it 
impossible for the political institutions to function. This hypothesis is 
strengthened through the analysis of complex power sharing in Chapter 3.4.. 
Complex power sharing has self-rule at the centre and is then surrounded by 
other aspects to deal with all the issues of conflict. When paired with liberal 
consociation one arrives at, what is seen in this thesis as, the best method to 
deal with the conflict of Kirkuk, as it adds the positive factor of not being 
confined to any one theory.   
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The Settlement: 
The first step in replacing Article 140 would be to give a special status to 
Kirkuk. As already discussed, when examining the favourable conditions for 
consociation, it would have more chance of success if this included the city 
only. Furthermore, such a solution would allow for the addressing of the self 
determination desires of many members of Kirkuk’s population, as part of this 
process would involve the remaining districts/subdistricts deciding if they want 
to join the KRG, an existing neighbouring province, or form a new province of 
their own. This process would take away from the competition over the 
ownership of Kirkuk and would go a long way to easing the tensions created 
by the rival ethnonationalisms, thus allowing the protagonists to focus their 
attention on the actual governance of Kirkuk. Giving Kirkuk city a special 
status is one of the most important aspects of this framework, as it opens up 
the prospect of the other methods proposed to deal with the issues of conflict. 
Another aspect of the special status that helps to deal with the self-
determination desires is the maintaining of strong links between 
districts/subdistricts that are excluded from the special status with Kirkuk city. 
This is ensured through making Kirkuk a multi-capital city similar to 
Chandigarh in India; Kirkuk would be made the centre of governance for the 
special status, it would be the capital city of the new province if it were to be 
created, and it would be some form of additional capital to the KRG, for 
example the judiciary capital. The special status for Kirkuk city is the first 
stage in replacing Article 140 and thus a Special Status Law is needed to 
make it part of the constitution. Through the Special Status Law, Kirkuk would 
be given the powers of a governorate, as per Law 21/2008, thus allowing the 
additional powers that would be available to a region to be shared through the 
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cross border institutions. The Special Status Law would also include a census 
for Kirkuk city and this would be made possible, as it would not hold the same 
threat as it did through Article 140. The Special Status Law would also include 
all the succeeding aspects mentioned in this framework, thus allowing a 
different system to operate in Kirkuk. 
Nonetheless, a special status does not address all the self-
determination desires of those within the city, therefore the addition of cross 
border institutions is a essential. Cross border institutions linking the special 
status of Kirkuk city to the KRG, Baghdad and a new province (if created), 
give those within the special status a link to their desired entity. Furthermore, 
introducing cross border institutions helps with the governance of contentious 
issues. Additionally, in order to satisfy the Kurd’s self-determination desires, 
the inclusion of a future referendum for Kirkuk, under a special status, to join 
the KRG would have to be included. However, a mere majority decision would 
not be good enough, as this would lead to conflict, therefore it would have to 
be decided by a weighted majority of 2/3 of the voters. A Further aspect of 
answering the self-determination desires of those remaining within the special 
status – alongside cross border institutions and a future referendum – is 
granting members of the special status birthright to the KRG. This would give 
citizens of the special status the same rights as those within the KRG. 
As discussed throughout this thesis, security is a major concern in 
Kirkuk and nothing can be achieved without improvements in this area. 
Therefore, under the special status Kirkuk city would become a demilitarised 
zone, thus eliminating the threat that the peshmerga and Iraqi army portray to 
their rival ethnonationalisms. This also opens up the opportunity to create a 
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new police force to replace the current one and take up the duties left vacant 
by the Iraqi army, peshmerga and Asayesh. Thus, allowing for the security in 
Kirkuk to come together under one umbrella in a new multiethnic, multi-lingual 
(implemented through a language training programme) force, where all 
departments are linked together through one central command. At the same 
time, with the demilitarisation of Kirkuk it becomes necessary to create a 
cross border institution focusing on terrorism and border control and thus 
maintaining links to the Asayesh, peshmerga and Iraqi Army. Consequently, a 
joint task force would be created, which would include information sharing 
and joint action on the borders. In order to implement the replacement of the 
entire security services in Kirkuk and to ensure that the old political links don’t 
resurface in the new ones, it is important that an independent commission 
monitors the new force. This would be made up of international specialists on 
policing who would put forward recommendations for the new force and make 
sure these were implemented properly.  
In an oil-rich country management of natural resources is bound to be 
highly politicised, and Iraq is no different in this matter. A functional settlement 
for Kirkuk needs to therefore address this issue effectively. Management of 
Kirkuk’s oil fields by the federal government needs to be strengthened in the 
legislation. This can be done through the Special Status Law by ensuring that 
no matter what constitutional status Kirkuk falls under the oil fields will be 
managed by the federal government. Furthermore, Baghdad’s ownership can 
be strengthened through the new hydrocarbon law, although this would have 
to happen alongside an acceptance that the KRG can manage their own oil 
fields. This is however a necessary step as part of the negotiations for the 
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Kurds to relinquish Article 140, as this must include compromises and gains 
for both parties. The remaining issues involving the resources – including 
water, agriculture, and electricity – of Kirkuk can be managed through the 
various cross border institutions.  
Another matter that was given consideration in this thesis is civil 
employment in Kirkuk. The civil employment should be distributed amongst 
the ethnic groups based on their demographics; to do this the positions within 
the civil service would have to be ranked in order to ensure fairness in their 
distribution. The process of changing the employment in the civil service to a 
demographic based model should not involve the firing or redundancy of any 
existing employees, but should rather be done over time through the creation 
of jobs and training in order to correctly fill positions. This process would be 
advanced through the positions created by the formation of the cross border 
institutions and the new police force. This would all be implemented through 
the Special Status Law, which already calls for a census, by including the 
additional aspects within the legislation. Part of this would also include an 
international committee in order to manage the entire process, ensure 
fairness and to prevent disagreements between the ethnic groups from 
surfacing.  
Giving Kirkuk city a special status, finally allows for the addressing of 
the housing, administration, resource and service issues that have arisen due 
to the issue of returnees. A further step in speeding up the process of dealing 
with the returnees is the installation of an independent international 
committee to deal with this issue. This takes away from the ethnic competition 
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and installs someone who will deal with both returnees and those displaced 
equally and fairly, therefore allowing for the whole process to move forward.   
This thesis also addresses the issue of education in Kirkuk. The Kirkuki 
educational system needs to be changed from a mono-ethnic to a multiethnic 
one. The first step in this process would be the creation of a new curriculum 
that is respectful to all the ethnicities’ heritage and entrenches a notion of 
common history. As the process of creating such a curriculum is bound to 
cause disagreement and raise tensions, it is best that this is done under the 
auspices of an independent international committee specialising in education 
with advisors from each ethnic group. This would allow for the international 
committee to supervise the implementation of the new education system and 
take it to a stage where it would be suitable to hand it over to the council. 
Furthermore, schools should be changed so that they offer a multi-language 
education system, where the children are not forced to speak or do their 
homework in another language, but the teacher does however alternate 
between the languages. There also needs to be a cross border institution 
linking the education systems of Erbil, Baghdad and Kirkuk. The cross border 
institution would ensure that they are all moving towards a common goal and 
would allow students to pursue tertiary education in any of the three systems.  
Several aspects of this framework for Kirkuk – policing, returnees, 
education and civil employment – call for some form of international 
committee to ensure the successful implementation of the process. It 
therefore makes it imperative to create a wider independent international 
committee for the entire framework with experts who specialise in each area. 
As power sharing is at the centre of this agreement the committee would be 
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led by an expert in power sharing and constitutional law. The committee 
members would have to research and write a proposal, oversee the 
implementation and the monitor the functioning of the programme.  
Power sharing is at the centre of this framework for Kirkuk and 
therefore it is important that it is entrenched through the Special Status Law. 
The first part of this would be the election of the power sharing government 
and it is recommended that this be done through PR-STV. In this system 
candidates from smaller parties or those representing smaller ethnic groups 
are more likely to get elected, as voters vote for individuals, thus making it 
more likely that a particularly charismatic or talented candidate would receive 
votes. Therefore, voters would be more likely to vote outside their ethnic 
group for a particularly worthy candidate or for a multiethnic party. Once seats 
within the council are given it is then left for the top positions to be decided 
and this would be done through Sainte-Laguë. The governor and his two 
deputies are the highest offices and therefore would have to be chosen first, 
but this would be under the proviso that each faction can only win one of 
these positions. This prevents ethnic domination of the council, but doesn’t 
prevent the growth of non-ethnic parties as they would be included as a 
faction. This process institutionalises power sharing, but rather than setting 
any fixed quota the ethnic groups representation within the council is based 
on the votes received. Using Sainte-Laguë allows for a wider cross-section of 
the political community to be part of the power sharing government by giving 
smaller blocs a higher chance of being elected. Once power sharing is 
installed a system for the decision making process is needed. Decisions by 
the council should be made by a weighted majority (60%) with at least 40% of 
	  	   254	  
two of the three factions (Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds) voting in favour. If 
decisions by the governor are contested by more than 1/3 of the council they 
would also be put to the weighted majority vote – likewise with the removal of 
the governor. This prevents decisions being made by a simple majority and 
ensures that they are made with strong support from the majority of the 
communities. Furthermore, it forces parties to work together in order to put 
forward versions of laws that are more likely to receive cross community 
support. By making decisions through this method minorities are given a form 
of veto as they have the ability to influence the formation of laws/bills. As 
already highlighted this leads to more consultation on ideas put forward and 
makes it more likely that a version that is agreeable to all would be proposed, 
thus taking away the need for a ‘hard’ veto.  
Even the best-laid plans need to include preparation for the event of 
failure, as this always remains a possibility. Therefore, if the government in 
Kirkuk becomes untenable it would have to be governed by both Baghdad 
and the KRG through the officials from the cross border institutions. This 
system would not come into place until after the international supervisor has 
withdrawn, as whilst s/he is present it would be his/her duty to prevent the 
situation of the governance collapsing.  
Substantiation: 
Currently, in Kirkuk, all sides seem to be willing to wait whilst they try to 
manoeuvre themselves into a better position, rather than negotiate and 
compromise towards a solution. With the greater political game of Iraq 
happening in Kirkuk it is the people of Kirkuk who suffer whilst the politicians 
refuse to negotiate; it is the people who are denied the basic services and 
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who have to deal with the lack of security. The politics in Kirkuk cannot 
continue in this vain and neither can the politics in Iraq. There have been 
many proposals put forward for the future of Kirkuk, but (as analysed in 
Chapter 4) they lack the details necessary to make them a viable possibility. 
Furthermore, many of them have tried too much not to offend and have failed 
to replace the disputed Article 140. That is where this thesis is different, as it 
is detailed, has not tried just to please and has put forward a viable 
replacement for Article 140. In this thesis conflicts are viewed as not existing 
within a static status quo, but rather as being ever-changing. In 
acknowledging the ever-changing nature of conflicts, the thesis makes 
forecasts of socioeconomic changes, as these too impact upon the dynamics 
and what is effectively possible in any resolution. Furthermore, the notion of 
an ever-changing context impacts on the development of a resolution, in that 
each side has aims and once an aim is achieved or a compromise is reached 
the dynamics of the remaining issues at stake change. Therefore, when 
working towards a resolution all the strategies are linked together, as the 
previous steps taken open up new possibilities, whilst halting others. 
Furthermore, by linking all the aspects together more actions become 
possible. In addition to replacing Article 140, this thesis has also put forward a 
proposal to replace the 32/4 ratio of power sharing, both which have been 
analysed in this thesis as being unsuitable for ending conflict in Kirkuk. The 
framework delivered in this thesis follows the four principles of consociation: 
• Executive power sharing is ensured by electing the government 
through PR-STV and Sainte-Laguë, thus giving all those with sufficient 
votes the choice to join the power sharing government. 
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• Mutual veto, giving minorities political protection from decisions that 
affect their vital interests, is present through making decisions in the 
council by a weighted majority (60%) with at least 40% of two of the 
three factions (Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds) voting in favour. 
• Proportionality in political representation is guaranteed through using 
PR-STV for the election of seats and Sainte-Laguë for the election of 
positions within the council. Proportionality in public sector employment 
is guaranteed by distributing the positions based on the demographics 
of Kirkuk city. In order to do this the positions within the civil service 
would have to be ranked in order to ensure fairness in the distribution 
of the positions. 
• Segmental autonomy in the internal affairs of each group is 
implemented by using Sainte-Laguë at district and sub-district level, 
thus allowing for the governance of their own community. Furthermore 
it is implemented through the cross border institution in education and 
the creation of Turkmen and Christian cultural/language organisations.  
This thesis also follows the principle of liberal consociation, as it is advised 
that any political identity that wins enough votes in the election may choose to 
join the power sharing coalition and all groups are eligible for the top positions 
within the council. Although the weighted majority voting procedure does call 
for 40% of two of the three main ethnic groups, this is in order not to stop the 
political process by letting a group that only constitutes say 1% of the vote 
preventing a decision from being made. Furthermore, any group that reaches 
more than 15% of the council is eligible to join this aspect of the decision 
making process.  This thesis also follows the principles of complex power 
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sharing, as well as McGarry and O’Leary’s developments to consociational 
theory, as it goes beyond the mere creation of political institutions and 
addresses all the issues of conflict. Therefore, this framework follows the 
analysis, laid out in Chapter 3, of using liberal consociation as a base, whilst 
addressing all the issues of conflict.  
This thesis’ analysis of power sharing theories, issues of conflict and 
the previous proposals put forward for Kirkuk, give it a solid foundation to 
propose a settlement for Kirkuk. Through an unbiased, neutral and flexible 
approach, as adopted in this thesis, it is possible to examine the ‘problems as 
problems of disturbed historic relationships between groups rather than a 
'zero sum' struggle over territory and resources’, which Lord Alderdice sees 
as the first step in reaching an agreement.463 This allows for all the issues to 
be addressed in the best possible way, rather than being caught up in the 
ethnic divisions. This thesis has developed a framework that addresses all the 
issues of conflict in Kirkuk, whilst at the same time not favouring any ethnicity. 
It follows the principle that every ethnicity should make necessary 
compromises, yet still make gains, which is an essential component in conflict 
resolution. Through a detailed analysis of all the issues of conflict and the 
best option to resolve them, a complete framework that differs from those that 
precede it has been put forward. The reason for this is that through exploring 
options in further detail more possibilities become available, as through being 
linked to each other they become feasible. Thus, new proposals for Kirkuk 
have been put forward in this thesis, such as: an international committee, the 
various cross border institutions available, a multi-capital city, the creation of 	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a new province, and making decisions in the council based on a weighted 
majority of 60% with 40% of two of the main three ethnic groups being in 
favour. Furthermore, this thesis also addresses many issues that exist within 
Iraq that affect Kirkuk and have resulted in the country being in the turbulent 
state it currently finds itself in.  
Through creating a liberal consociational settlement for Kirkuk, this 
thesis has developed liberal consociational theory with regards to trans-
regional self-determination disputes. Therefore, the concepts of cross border 
institutions, demilitarisation, multi-capital city, special status, international 
committee and regional power sharing are analysed within this context, thus 
furthering consociational theory. 
As already highlighted, O’Leary, McGarry and Guelke have all pointed 
out that solving the security issues are both the hardest and the most 
important in resolving an ethnic conflict. Furthermore, the Rand Corporation 
stipulates solving the issues of ethnic identity, security, sovereignty and 
control over land as the most important regarding the governance of divided 
societies. 464 This thesis has given options for the resolution of the above-
mentioned issues, thus potentially making it a comprehensive settlement that 
could help move Kirkuk beyond its current stalemate.  
Firstly, ethnic identity is addressed by giving Kirkuk a special status, as 
this allows many of the Kurds to join the KRG, thus joining their ethnic kin in a 
Kurdish region. Likewise, this also allows the Sunnis to create their own 
province, join an existing province and to even join a Sunni region if one were 
to be created.  Ethnic Identity is also addressed through the cross border 	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institutions and making Kirkuk a multi-entity capital, as this allows ethnic 
groups to maintain links to their ethnic kin. The inclusion of birthright to the 
KRG also addresses the Kurds’ ethnic identity, as this gives them the same 
rights as Kurds within the KRG, whilst the creation of Turkmen and Christian 
bodies secures their ethnic identity. Furthermore, ensuring that civil 
employment is distributed based on the demographics guarantees that ethnic 
identity does not count against the population in employment. Ethnic identity 
is also addressed through power sharing, as this allows the ethnic groups 
representation with the government (with Sainte-Laguë giving the smaller 
ethnic groups a greater chance of being represented) and gives the ethnic 
groups access to a form of veto. 
Secondly, the security in Kirkuk is addressed through making Kirkuk a 
demilitarised zone and by creating a new police force. This would address the 
main issue, with regards to security, of ethnic dominance of the security 
services. Having one single force with an overall command also addresses 
the problem of a lack of communication between the security services, which 
causes confusion and a lack of unity and consistency in the policing of Kirkuk. 
The creation of the new service would allow trust and transparency, which is 
essential for the transition of the society.  
Thirdly, the sovereignty of Kirkuk is decided through the awarding of a 
special status, as following this certain districts would join the KRG, thus 
deciding their sovereignty. The other districts, outside the city, would also 
decide their own sovereignty and this would be either under a new province 
or an existing one. The sovereignty given to Kirkuk city would be a more 
complicated matter, as it would be given a special status with the powers of a 
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province whilst the powers of a region would be governed through the cross 
border institutions and would be shared between Kirkuk, Baghdad and the 
KRG. 
Finally, control over land is dealt with very clearly under this framework, 
as the districts/sub-districts would decide under which boundary they fall and 
thus who controls the land. The likely scenario would be for the Kurdish 
districts/sub-districts on the border with the KRG to join the KRG and for the 
creation of a new province, thus controlling their own land under the wider 
control of the central government. The city would be given a special status 
and would thus control its own land, but through it being a multi-capital and 
having cross border institutions the other entities would have claims to certain 
offices – similar to that of an embassy. The inclusion of a future referendum 
could put Kirkuk under the umbrella of the KRG, but it would still remain under 
a special status. Thus, Kirkuk would have its own police force, be a 
demilitarised zone, etc., so for all intents and purpose it would still control its 
own land.  
As shown above, the framework proposed in this thesis includes all the 
elements that the Rand Corporation deem necessary for success. Thus, 
implementing this framework could minimise conflict in Kirkuk and move Iraq 
forward to a better political position. The aim of this thesis is to provide a 
greater understanding of the issues of conflict in Kirkuk and the possible 
resolutions thereof. Through this it is then possible to increase the debate in 
Kirkuk and help those on the ground to resolve the conflict. As other conflicts 
have taught us, this is not a quick process, but the more literature that is 
available and the greater understanding that is created, the greater chance 
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that a resolution is found. Highlighting the possibilities available to the 
protagonists could enable them to see more options when they eventually 
develop their own framework. It is not likely that any ethnic group would put 
forward a framework like the one proposed here, as it does not favour any 
one ethnicity, but through negotiations they might nevertheless arrive at a 
similar solution. So although when the various factions in Kirkuk examine this 
framework they may disagree with the ideas put forward, this is not 
necessarily negative, nor is it a sign of failure. On the contrary, it is actually a 
sign of success, as if one ethnic group did approve entirely that would mean 
that the framework favoured them, which is not the aim. The aim of this thesis 
is to put forward a framework that could be accomplished through 
negotiations, in other words the product after compromises and gains have 
been made, it has thus made predictions based on actions and has viewed 
the conflict as ever-changing. Baghdad and Erbil have to reach an agreement 
on Kirkuk’s future. However, a deal on Kirkuk is likely to be decided through 
trade-offs between the KRG and Baghdad on many issues, not just on Kirkuk. 
This is not an issue as these trade-offs have been included within the 
framework put forward in this thesis. The problem arises when these 
compromises – between Baghdad and Erbil – are made without addressing 
all the issues in Kirkuk. Here the exogenous pressure of UNAMI and the US 
come into play, as they cannot allow for this to happen and need to ensure 
that negotiations include all the issues.  
In the words of Salar Erbil, ‘after each night a sun is born again, now 
we are living the night of Kirkuk, but there must be a day where the sun will 
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rise again.’465 The only hope is that Kirkuk reaches serious negotiations soon 
so that the sun can be born again in Kirkuk. If Kirkuk is considered a 
tinderbox that could explode at any minute, the aim of this thesis is to throw 
water over the tinderbox in order to prevent it from being set alight. In this 
analogy the alternative path available through the framework developed in 
this thesis is the water to be thrown over the tinderbox known as Kirkuk.  
Further Research: 
To develop this research further the procedure of forming negotiations in 
order to create a similar framework needs to be analysed. Examining all the 
issues of conflict to develop a framework that not only addresses these, but 
also does this without favouring any ethnic group is only the first step. 
Developing a method to start formal negotiations on all the issues by all the 
parties in a way that resolutions such as these could be accepted is a more 
complicated issue. As already highlighted this is likely to start with the 
negotiation of other issues that would have a domino effect moving from one 
issue to the next. The challenge is to develop a method that ensures 
resolutions are made for all the issues, thus allowing a framework such as the 
one put forward in this thesis to be proposed. Additionally, once data 
becomes available regarding the demographics of Kirkuk – through either a 
census or local elections being held in Kirkuk – it needs to be analysed in 
order to understand the ethnic make up of Kirkuk. This understanding allows 
for an educated analysis of the likely power sharing arrangement in the city as 
well as the constitutional desire of the subdistricts. Furthermore, in the future, 
the lack of access to people on the ground (due to the security situation) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Interview, conducted by the author, Salar Erbil, member of Turkmeneli Party Leadership 
Council – Erbil,  13/02/2013 
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needs to be rectified and the surveys put forward in Appendixes I and II need 
to be conducted, thus cementing the research already carried out.  
As part of this thesis I also began a comparative analysis between the 
conflict in Kirkuk and the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Brcko and Chandigarh, 
which I decided to omit as it needed to be far broader than would be possible 
within the current thesis. I would like to continue with this research, as it is 
important in creating a further understanding of the conflict in Kirkuk. Finally, it 
would be desirable to conduct fieldwork in Chandigarh in order to learn from 
their experiences of having multi-capital city and what is essentially a special 
status. As there is very little written on the case study of Chandigarh, a further 
analysis could help to develop the framework for Kirkuk. 
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Appendix I 	  
The survey created for this fieldwork borrowed from the work of Colin Irwin 
and involved four questions, which each entails several possibilities that need 
to be ranked. The first question is ‘What do you see as the cause of conflict in 
Kirkuk?’ This question entails a list of options – from ‘Arabic terrorist groups’ 
actions’ to ‘the actions of the Kurdish security services’ – to be ranked with 
‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance, 
and finally ‘Of No Significance’. This allows one to see what issues need to be 
dealt with in order to satisfy each ethnic group and also where they possibly 
have similar ideas. If, for example, security places high on all the ethnic 
groups’ list, then it becomes clear that a complete overhaul of the various 
security systems operating in Kirkuk is necessary, and so on. The second 
question asks ‘What actions are necessary to secure peace in Kirkuk?’ Like 
the previous question this will give a list of options – from ‘Restructuring the 
security services’ to  ‘Supplying houses to the returnees’ – to be ranked with 
‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and finally ‘Unacceptable’. 
Again, this allows one to see what actions are important to each ethnic group 
and where they possibly converge. This also demonstrates possible 
compromises through examining those actions that are not ranked as 
essential. The third question asks ‘What are the possible consequences of 
failure to ensure peace?’ This question entails a list of possibilities – from ‘All-
out ethnic conflict’ to ‘Mass emigration” – to be ranked with ‘Very Probable’, 
‘Probable’, ‘Not Sure’, ‘Improbable’, Very Improbable’.  This question allows 
one to gauge what each ethnic group thinks will happen and what their likely 
actions are in the event of failure. Furthermore, it also gives the participants a 
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chance to think of the consequences of failure to reach an agreement. Seeing 
as there has not been a local election in Kirkuk, the final question asks ‘What 
is necessary for free and fair elections?’ This question will involve a list of 
options – from ‘Acceptance of returnees’ to ‘International monitors’ – to be 
ranked with ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and finally 
‘Unacceptable’. This question will allow one to gauge what steps each ethnic 
group sees as necessary for free and fair elections and this can then be 
included in a settlement.466 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Irwin, Colin. ‘Peace, Stability and Elections: An Opinion Poll and Its Implications.’ The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics Vol. 2 no. 1, 2002, pp. 62-74. 
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Appendix II 	  
Following the research of John Fraser the first question of the survey would 
ask the respondent: ‘What steps towards establishing Kirkuk’s future do you 
think your political representatives ought to make?’ The second question 
would ask: ‘how well they think their representatives are acting towards 
establishing Kirkuk’s future?’ This is then followed by questions that are 
answered on a scale of 1-10 (1 = very poor, 5 = average and 10 = excellent) 
in order to measure the responses. This allows for the survey to determine 
their perceptions in relation to their support. The remaining questions would 
relate to political trust, political efficacy, political cynicism, political ethics and 
political violence. Through examining the level of support the participants 
have in relation to these questions it is then possible to measure the level of 
support they have for their representatives.467 The survey would be reinforced 
through interviews, in order to push the limitations in what is acceptable to the 
ethnic groups rather than the individual. The intention was to conduct these 
interviews in groups in order to create a more relaxed environment that 
encourages debate, thus allowing for the boundaries to be pushed on what 
the group would be willing to accept. Although this could lead to certain 
individuals not portraying their true opinion, it does give a more realistic 
portrayal of what the group is willing to accept and how certain weaker 
opinions may be manipulated. The language problem of needing a translator 
could pose an issue, however with a trusty and confident translator it can be 
used as an advantage by only allowing one person to speak at a time and in 
order, thus preventing stronger personalities from dominating the debate. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Fraser, John. ‘Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy.’ American Journal of 
Political Science Vol. 18, No. 1, 1974, pp. 117-134. 
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Appendix III 
 
Article (140) of the constitution of the Republic of Iraq.468 
 
• First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to 
complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of 
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.  
 
• Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional 
Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority 
elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes 
completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by 
a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 Iraqi Constitution. ‘Article 140’. Fourth Annual Report of the Article 140 Committee [Online] 
Available from http://www.com140.com/pdf/enghlish%20copy.pdf [Accessed 20/09/2013] 
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Appendix IV 
Article 58.469 
 (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims 
Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to 
remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices in altering the 
demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and 
expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of 
the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, 
and correcting nationality.  To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional 
Government shall take the following steps: 
(1)      With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who 
emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property 
Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a 
reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and 
property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation. 
(2)        With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and 
territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property 
Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be 
resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new 
land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which 
they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such 
areas. 
(3)        With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of 
support in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it 
shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and 
territories. 
(4)        With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees 
and shall permit affected persons the right to determine their own 
national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.  
(B)       The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative 
boundaries for political ends.  The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying 
these unjust changes in the permanent constitution.  In the event the Presidency 
Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall 
unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make 
recommendations.  In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an 
arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a 
distinguished international person to be the arbitrator. 
(C)       The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be 
deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has 
been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified   This resolution 
shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the 
people of those territories. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 The Coalition Provisional Authority. ‘Article 58’ Transitional Administrative Law [Online] Available 
from http://web.archive.org/web/20090423064920/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html 
[Accessed 02/09/2013] 
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Appendix V 
 
Table 2 demonstrates how the positions would be allocated following the 
d’Hondt rule (the figures are for illustrative purposes). 	  
Table	  2	  
 
As the KA has the highest number of seats, 39, they win the first position. 
Their total number of seats is then divided by the first divisor, two, giving them 
a total of 19.5. 
 The highest total in the next round is the 20 seats that the INDF hold, 
therefore they win the next position and their total is divided by the first divisor, 
leaving them with 10. 
 In the third round the KA has the highest total again, 19.5, therefore 
gaining them another position. Now their original total is divided by the 
second divisor (as this is their second seat) of 3, leaving them with 13 for the 
next round. 
 
This process continues until all the positions are allocated. 
 
 
Position KA INDF ITF INL IAF GORRAN 
[1] 39 20 17 15 10 11 
[2] 13 20 17 15 10 11 
[3] 13 6.7 17 15 10 11 
[4] 13 6.7 5.7 15 10 11 
[5] 13 6.7 5.7 5 10 11 
[6] 4.3 6.7 5.7 5 10 11 
[7] 4.3 6.7 5.7 5 10 3.7 
Total won: 2 1 1 1 1 1 Table	  3	  
 
Table 3 demonstrates how the positions would be allocated following the 
Sainte-Laguë method.  
 By changing the divisors to 3,5,7,etc. the smallest party, IAF, wins a 
position that it was unable to win following the d’Hondt method. This 
demonstrates how the Sainte-Laguë method allows small minority parties a 
greater chance of winning a position in the cabinet. 
Position KA INDF ITF INL IAF GORRAN 
[1] 39 20 17 15 10 11 
[2] 19.5 20 17 15 10 11 
[3] 19.5 10 17 15 10 11 
[4] 13 10 17 15 10 11 
[5] 13 10 8.5 15 10 11 
[6] 13 10 8.5 7.5 10 11 
[7] 9.75 10 8.5 7.5 10 11 
Total won: 3 1 1 1 0 1 
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• Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Féin, conducted via emails, 15/07/2010. 
• Gorran Leadership Council for Kirkuk – Gorran Kirkuk Office, 06/06/2013. 
• Lieutenant Colonel Azad, Spokesperson for the KDP Asayesh, KDP Asayesh 
headquarters, Kirkuk - 06/06/2013. 
• Lord Alderdice, former leader of the Alliance Party, conducted via emails, 25/08/2010. 
• Martin McGuinness, deputy First Minister of NI, conducted via emails, 08/07/2010. 
• Mona Sameer, Assyrian from Kirkuk living in Erbil, countless conversations with her 
and her family in Ainkawa Erbil 2012-1013. 
• Mukrian Aziz, Lawyer for KDP Kirkuk, numerous meetings and conversations in 
Kirkuk in 2013. 
• Salah Dalo, Head of KDP Kirkuk and Garmiyan Leadership Council, Kirkuk KDP 
Head Office, 17/04/2013. 
• Salar Erbil, Turkmenli Party Leadership Council, Turkmenli Party Erbil Office, 
13/02/2013. 
• Sundus Saqi, Iraqi Turkmen Front Representative London - 09/06/2013. 
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• William Hay, DUP member and Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
conducted via emails, 02/07/2010. 
